本文選題：關(guān)鍵字　切入點(diǎn)：物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：服務(wù)質(zhì)量承諾是顯示服務(wù)企業(yè)質(zhì)量水平的一個(gè)重要信號(hào)，它能降低消費(fèi)者的感知風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，保證服務(wù)順利地交付。因此，服務(wù)質(zhì)量承諾被產(chǎn)業(yè)界和理論界認(rèn)為是最有效的吸引客戶的策略之一。當(dāng)前大多數(shù)與服務(wù)承諾相關(guān)的研究只關(guān)注單個(gè)成員的決策，而在一定程度上忽略了多個(gè)成員之間的交互作用，特別的，服務(wù)質(zhì)量承諾的相關(guān)成果主要基于實(shí)證調(diào)研，定量分析的研究相對(duì)較少。因此，本文以物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈為研究背景，深入研究了與服務(wù)質(zhì)量承諾行為有關(guān)的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題。希望能為物流服務(wù)集成商與功能型物流服務(wù)提供商在解決與服務(wù)質(zhì)量承諾的相關(guān)問(wèn)題提供一個(gè)理論上的指導(dǎo)。 本文首先從實(shí)踐和理論層面分析了選題的依據(jù)和意義，指出在物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈環(huán)境下服務(wù)質(zhì)量承諾研究的重要性和相關(guān)理論成果的缺乏。然后，本文梳理了質(zhì)量博弈關(guān)系、供應(yīng)商的數(shù)量選擇、需求更新下的采購(gòu)問(wèn)題以及收益共享契約等方面的理論成果，并指出基于服務(wù)質(zhì)量承諾行為對(duì)上述問(wèn)題進(jìn)行再研究的創(chuàng)新性和合理性，為全文的研究工作奠定了基礎(chǔ)。之后，本文從質(zhì)量協(xié)調(diào)、數(shù)量決策、服務(wù)能力采購(gòu)以及利潤(rùn)分配等四個(gè)方面分別討論物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題，具體包括：（1）論文研究了在三種合作模式下（Nash博弈、Stackelberg博弈和集中決策）集成商和提供商的質(zhì)量策略，并分析了最優(yōu)決策水平與客戶對(duì)集成商的懲罰值和質(zhì)量承諾彈性系數(shù)的關(guān)系；（2）論文提出了一種存在集成商公平性偏好約束下的提供商最優(yōu)數(shù)量的確定方法，并利用數(shù)值模擬探討了相關(guān)參數(shù)對(duì)提供商數(shù)量的影響機(jī)制；（3）論文討論在需求隨機(jī)的服務(wù)市場(chǎng)，需求更新前后物流服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈的質(zhì)量承諾水平與服務(wù)能力采購(gòu)策略，并通過(guò)比較四種情形對(duì)決策水平的影響，為系統(tǒng)成員有效地選擇最優(yōu)策略提供理論參考；（4）論文論證了傳統(tǒng)的收入共享契約在協(xié)調(diào)存在需求更新的供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)時(shí)存在局限性，并進(jìn)一步提出了一種改進(jìn)的收入共享合約來(lái)優(yōu)化供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效。最后，，給出了本文主要的研究結(jié)論和未來(lái)展望。
[Abstract]:Quality of service commitment is an important signal to show the quality level of service enterprises. It can reduce the perceived risk of consumers and ensure the smooth delivery of services. Service quality commitment (QoS) is considered by industry and theorists to be one of the most effective strategies to attract customers. In particular, the results of QoS commitment are mainly based on empirical research, and the quantitative analysis is relatively few. Therefore, this paper takes logistics service supply chain as the research background. In this paper, the supply chain coordination problem related to QoS commitment behavior is studied in depth. It is hoped that it can provide a theoretical guide for logistics service integrators and functional logistics service providers to solve the problems related to QoS commitment. This paper first analyzes the basis and significance of the topic from the practical and theoretical aspects, points out the importance of service quality commitment research and the lack of relevant theoretical results in the logistics service supply chain environment. Then, this paper combs the quality game relationship. It also points out the innovation and rationality of re-research on the above issues based on QoS commitment behavior, such as quantity selection of suppliers, purchasing problem under demand updating and revenue sharing contract, and so on. After that, this paper discusses the coordination of logistics service supply chain from four aspects: quality coordination, quantity decision, service capability purchase and profit distribution. This paper studies the quality strategies of integrators and providers in three cooperative modes: the Nash game Stackelberg game and the centralized decision making. The relationship between the optimal decision level and the penalty value of customer to the integrator and the elasticity coefficient of quality commitment is analyzed. In this paper, a method of determining the optimal number of providers under the constraint of fairness and preference of integrator is proposed. The paper also discusses the quality commitment level and purchasing strategy of logistics service supply chain before and after demand updating in the stochastic service market. By comparing the influence of four kinds of cases on the decision level and providing a theoretical reference for the system members to choose the optimal strategy effectively, the paper demonstrates the limitations of the traditional revenue-sharing contract in coordinating the supply chain profits with demand renewal. Furthermore, an improved revenue-sharing contract is proposed to optimize the performance of supply chain. Finally, the main research conclusions and future prospects are given.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F259.2;F274

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