本文選題：旅游服務供應鏈　切入點：服務質(zhì)量　出處：《湖南工業(yè)大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著旅游業(yè)的飛速發(fā)展，人民生活水平的不斷提高，游客越來越注重旅游的真實體驗和旅游過程中的切實感受，對旅游服務質(zhì)量的要求也越來越高。中國首部《旅游法》的實施，開啟了中國旅游業(yè)走出 零負團費和強迫購物的畸形發(fā)展之路，新《旅游法》在一定程度上也引領了游客更加重視旅游服務質(zhì)量，旅行社迎來了轉型定位和規(guī)范服務的新挑戰(zhàn)，旅行社必須以優(yōu)質(zhì)的服務來贏得挑戰(zhàn)。而導游作為連接游客與旅行社之間的橋梁和旅游服務的直接提供者，是整個旅游活動的軸心，其服務質(zhì)量直接影響游客感知的旅游服務質(zhì)量。設計激勵機制充分激勵導游發(fā)揮工作積極性、提高服務質(zhì)量是旅行社面臨的現(xiàn)實問題。本文從旅游服務質(zhì)量的角度對導游激勵機制進行研究，綜合運用管理學、委托代理理論、聲譽理論和激勵機制理論等多學科理論方法，分別從導游的顯性激勵和隱性激勵兩個方面對導游激勵機制進行了系統(tǒng)研究。 首先闡述了論文的研究背景，指出了設計能有效激勵導游努力提高服務質(zhì)量的激勵機制的重要性和必要性，對相關研究現(xiàn)狀進行了回顧和述評。 相關理論部分主要是對論文研究所涉及到的理論進行說明介紹，理清了旅游服務供應鏈中旅行社的核心地位、委托代理理論中代理人橫向和縱向多任務的概念、激勵機制理論中顯性激勵機制和隱性激勵機制理論的特點等。 接下來針對導游工作的特性，探討基于服務質(zhì)量的導游顯性激勵機制的設計問題，建立了一個顯性激勵機制——二階段動態(tài)激勵契約，與沒有考慮服務質(zhì)量投入的單周期靜態(tài)契約進行比較分析。 進一步在第三章顯性激勵機制的基礎上，為緩解導游提供低服務質(zhì)量的道德風險，繼續(xù)研究旅游服務供應鏈中旅行社和導游的多期合作背景下，導游服務質(zhì)量的決策問題，通過建立一個隱性激勵機制——導游多周期動態(tài)聲譽模型，來彌補顯性激勵機制的不足，對聲譽模型的隱性激勵作用進行分析，找出臨界條件，，揭示導游聲譽模型演化機理。 最后對全文進行總結和指出下一步的研究展望。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of tourism and the continuous improvement of people's living standards, tourists pay more and more attention to the real experience of tourism and the real feelings in the process of tourism. The implementation of China's first "Tourism Law" has opened the door for China's tourism industry to go out of the way. The deformed development road of zero negative tour fee and forced shopping, the new "Tourism Law" has also led tourists to pay more attention to the quality of tourism service to a certain extent, and the travel agency has ushered in a new challenge of transforming its orientation and standardizing its service. Travel agencies must win the challenge with good service, and tour guides, as a bridge between tourists and travel agencies and direct providers of tourism services, are the axis of the entire tourism activity. The service quality directly affects the tourism service quality perceived by tourists, and the incentive mechanism is designed to encourage tour guides to give full play to their work enthusiasm. Improving the service quality is the realistic problem that the travel agency faces. This paper studies the tour guide incentive mechanism from the tourism service quality angle, synthetically uses the management science, the principal-agent theory, the reputation theory and the incentive mechanism theory and so on multi-disciplinary theory method. The incentive mechanism of tour guide is studied systematically from two aspects: explicit incentive and implicit incentive. Firstly, this paper expounds the research background, points out the importance and necessity of the incentive mechanism which can effectively motivate tour guides to improve service quality, and reviews the current research situation. The related theory part mainly introduces the theories involved in the paper, clarifies the core position of the travel agency in the tourism service supply chain, and the concept of horizontal and vertical multi-task agent in the principal-agent theory. The characteristics of explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism theory in incentive mechanism theory. Then, according to the characteristics of tour guide work, this paper discusses the design of dominant incentive mechanism based on service quality, and establishes a dominant incentive mechanism, which is a two-stage dynamic incentive contract. It is compared with single cycle static contract without quality of service input. On the basis of the dominant incentive mechanism in Chapter 3, in order to alleviate the moral hazard of low service quality, we continue to study the decision-making of tour guide service quality in the context of multi-stage cooperation between travel agency and tour guide in the tourism service supply chain. In order to make up for the deficiency of dominant incentive mechanism, a recessive incentive mechanism, a dynamic reputation model for tour guides, is established. The recessive incentive effect of reputation model is analyzed, the critical conditions are found out, and the evolution mechanism of tour guide reputation model is revealed. Finally, the paper summarizes the full text and points out the future research prospects.
【學位授予單位】：湖南工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F592.6

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