本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)　切入點(diǎn)：計(jì)算實(shí)驗(yàn)方法　出處：《寧波大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化進(jìn)程的不斷加快，企業(yè)與企業(yè)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楣⿷?yīng)鏈與供應(yīng)鏈之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，環(huán)境的復(fù)雜性以及競(jìng)爭(zhēng)方式的轉(zhuǎn)變改變了供應(yīng)鏈管理的運(yùn)作模式，同時(shí)更加為供應(yīng)鏈管理帶來(lái)了挑戰(zhàn)。 本文基于計(jì)算實(shí)驗(yàn)的方法，從企業(yè)間既競(jìng)爭(zhēng)又合作的特殊關(guān)系出發(fā)，在對(duì)影響供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)間競(jìng)合關(guān)系的重要因素的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)間競(jìng)合關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。本文的主要內(nèi)容如下所述： 1、在構(gòu)建制造商和銷(xiāo)售商博弈模型的基礎(chǔ)上，將計(jì)算實(shí)驗(yàn)方法引入到供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的研究中去，通過(guò)自下而上的研究方法，利用多主體建模技術(shù)來(lái)建立供應(yīng)鏈模型，設(shè)計(jì)了關(guān)于供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)競(jìng)合關(guān)系的計(jì)算實(shí)驗(yàn)，以實(shí)驗(yàn)的方法嘗試進(jìn)行供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)間競(jìng)合關(guān)系的研究。并且實(shí)驗(yàn)發(fā)現(xiàn)的規(guī)律與演化博弈方法所得出的結(jié)論基本一致，，證明了實(shí)驗(yàn)的可行性。通過(guò)實(shí)驗(yàn)我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)合作的支付矩陣以及初始合作比例對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)間的競(jìng)合關(guān)系有著重要的影響； 2、針對(duì)監(jiān)督機(jī)制和信譽(yù)機(jī)制分別設(shè)計(jì)了實(shí)驗(yàn)，并對(duì)實(shí)驗(yàn)中發(fā)現(xiàn)的規(guī)律性現(xiàn)象進(jìn)行總結(jié)，通過(guò)實(shí)驗(yàn)我們發(fā)現(xiàn)： （1）監(jiān)督機(jī)制對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)間的競(jìng)合關(guān)系具有一定的保障作用，但是由于監(jiān)督機(jī)制的局限性（不是所有的背叛行為都會(huì)被發(fā)現(xiàn)），只要存在監(jiān)督不嚴(yán)的情況，背叛行為就會(huì)一直存在于系統(tǒng)中，部分行為主體采取背叛行為后取得高于常規(guī)的收益，這種行為就會(huì)被系統(tǒng)中的其他行為主體學(xué)習(xí)，進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致了背叛行為的泛濫。但是高監(jiān)督水平可以使系統(tǒng)的合作率維持在比較高的水平上；低監(jiān)督水平下，系統(tǒng)中的背叛行為最終會(huì)在系統(tǒng)中泛濫。 （2）在信譽(yù)機(jī)制下，良好的信譽(yù)環(huán)境是企業(yè)采取合作策略的前提條件，在較差的信譽(yù)環(huán)境中，企業(yè)因?yàn)閷?duì)于合作的收益預(yù)期不樂(lè)觀，害怕遭遇背叛而寧愿采取背叛策略獲得較少的收益；同時(shí)，在企業(yè)采取合作策略時(shí)，對(duì)企業(yè)采取一定的信譽(yù)激勵(lì)也是十分必要的，通過(guò)實(shí)驗(yàn)發(fā)現(xiàn)，對(duì)于企業(yè)信譽(yù)采取懲罰措施反而加速了企業(yè)采取背叛策略。 3、結(jié)合上文的結(jié)論對(duì)聯(lián)想供應(yīng)鏈控制采購(gòu)成本失敗的原因進(jìn)行了研究并提出了相應(yīng)的建議。
[Abstract]:With the acceleration of the process of market economy integration, the competition between enterprises has been transformed into the competition between supply chain and supply chain. The complexity of environment and the change of competition mode have changed the operation mode of supply chain management. At the same time, it brings challenges to supply chain management. Based on the method of computational experiment, this paper starts from the special relationship of competition and cooperation among enterprises, and on the basis of the important factors that affect the relationship between enterprises in the supply chain network. The main contents of this paper are as follows:. 1. On the basis of constructing the game model of manufacturer and seller, the computational experiment method is introduced into the research of supply chain system. Through the bottom-up research method, the multi-agent modeling technology is used to establish the supply chain model. This paper designs a computational experiment on the competitive relationship between enterprises in the supply chain network, tries to study the relationship between the enterprises in the supply chain network by the experimental method, and the rule found by the experiment is basically consistent with the conclusion of the evolutionary game method. The feasibility of the experiment is proved. Through the experiment, we find that the payment matrix and the initial cooperation ratio of the enterprise cooperation have an important influence on the competition and cooperation relationship between the enterprises in the supply chain network. 2. According to the supervision mechanism and reputation mechanism, the experiment is designed, and the regular phenomena found in the experiment are summarized. Through the experiment, we find that:. (1) the supervision mechanism can guarantee the competition and cooperation relationship among the enterprises in the supply chain network, but because of the limitation of the supervision mechanism (not all betrayal will be found, as long as there is a situation of lax supervision, Betrayal will always exist in the system, some of the behavior subjects take betrayal behavior to obtain higher than the conventional benefits, and this behavior will be learned by other actors in the system. But the high level of supervision can keep the cooperation rate of the system at a relatively high level; under the low level of supervision, the betrayal behavior in the system will eventually spread in the system. 2) under the reputation mechanism, a good reputation environment is a prerequisite for enterprises to adopt cooperative strategies. In a poor reputation environment, enterprises are not optimistic about the benefits of cooperation. At the same time, it is necessary to take a certain credit incentive when enterprises adopt cooperative strategy. On the other hand, punitive measures for corporate reputation accelerate the adoption of betrayal strategy. 3. Based on the above conclusions, the causes of the failure of Lenovo supply chain to control purchasing cost are studied and the corresponding suggestions are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：寧波大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F273.7

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 張慶一;李貴春;蹤程;;供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與合作的博弈分析[J];統(tǒng)計(jì)與決策;2010年09期

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