本文選題：制造商主導(dǎo)　切入點(diǎn)：零售商主導(dǎo)　出處：《中國(guó)礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：實(shí)施閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈管理不僅能夠節(jié)約資源,而且能夠提高企業(yè)運(yùn)作效率,在瞬息萬(wàn)變的市場(chǎng)上增強(qiáng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,因此對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的研究具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文分別建立了制造商主導(dǎo)和零售商主導(dǎo)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈決策模型,從弱勢(shì)企業(yè)對(duì)處于優(yōu)勢(shì)地位的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者具有公平關(guān)切行為的視角下研究閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈成員的決策,并結(jié)合低碳環(huán)保的時(shí)代背景,探討碳排放規(guī)制對(duì)零售商主導(dǎo)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的影響。本文主要采用Stackelberg博弈論的方法研究了公平關(guān)切行為和碳排放規(guī)制對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈成員決策問(wèn)題的影響,主要從以下幾方面進(jìn)行了研究和探索:(1)在制造商處于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中,建立了弱勢(shì)企業(yè)零售商和回收商具有公平關(guān)切行為的決策模型,對(duì)公平關(guān)切行為從嫉妒心理和同情心理兩個(gè)方面進(jìn)行討論,研究表明:嫉妒公平關(guān)切行為能夠提高決策者在閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中討價(jià)還價(jià)的能力,同情公平關(guān)切行為則是一種利他行為,零售價(jià)隨著嫉妒系數(shù)的增加而增加,回收率隨著同情心理系數(shù)的提高而提高。(2)在零售商處于領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中,建立了弱勢(shì)企業(yè)制造商和回收商具有公平關(guān)切行為的決策模型,對(duì)具有公平關(guān)切行為的主體從嫉妒心理和同情心理分析對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的影響,研究表明:回收商的公平關(guān)切行為對(duì)零售商主導(dǎo)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈無(wú)影響,零售商單位產(chǎn)品利潤(rùn)是制造商嫉妒心理系數(shù)的減函數(shù),隨著同情心理系數(shù)的增加而提高。(3)將碳排放規(guī)制引入到零售商主導(dǎo)的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中,研究表明:回購(gòu)價(jià)不受碳排放規(guī)制的影響,回收率、零售價(jià)、單位產(chǎn)品利潤(rùn)以及批發(fā)價(jià)是關(guān)于減排系數(shù)的增函數(shù),零售商和回收商能從制造商減排措施中收益,利潤(rùn)高于無(wú)碳排放規(guī)制,制造商則由于減排成本的投入,利潤(rùn)要低于無(wú)碳排放規(guī)制的情形。
[Abstract]:The implementation of closed-loop supply chain management can not only save resources, but also can improve the operational efficiency of enterprises, enhance the competitiveness in a rapidly changing market, so the research of the closed-loop supply chain has important practical significance. This paper establishes a decision model of closed-loop supply chain manufacturer led and retailer led, from weak enterprises with a perspective on the behavior of fairness concerns in the dominant position of the leader of the members of the closed-loop supply chain decision-making, combined with low carbon environmental background, explore the impact of carbon emission regulation of the closed-loop supply chain retailer. This paper mainly uses the method of game theory Stackelberg to study the influence of behavior of fairness concerns and carbon emissions regulations on the decision problem of closed-loop supply chain members. Mainly from the following several aspects of research and exploration: (1) the manufacturer is a closed-loop supply chain leadership in building The weak enterprise retailers and recyclers have decision-making model behavior of fairness concerns, the behavior of fairness concerns from the two aspects of jealousy and sympathy psychological discussion, research shows that the ability of jealousy can improve the behavior of fairness concerns policymakers bargaining in the closed-loop supply chain, sympathy for the behavior of fairness concerns is a kind of altruistic behavior, retail price increases with envy coefficient, recovery rate increased with the increasing coefficient of empathy. (2) in the retailers in the closed-loop supply chain leadership, established the weak enterprises manufacturers and recyclers have decision-making model of behavior of fairness concerns, is the main behavior of fairness concerns analysis of the effect of the closed-loop supply chain from jealousy and sympathy psychology study shows that behavior of fairness concerns recycling business has no effect on the closed-loop supply chain retailer leading retailers, units of production Product profit is a decreasing function of the manufacturer jealousy coefficient, increased with the empathy factor. (3) carbon emissions regulation into the closed-loop supply chain dominated by retailers, the results show that the effects of carbon emissions, the repurchase price is not affected by the regulation of the recovery rate, the retail price of a single product profit and the wholesale price is increasing function on emissions reduction coefficient, retailers and recyclers can benefit from the manufacturers of emission reduction measures, profit is higher than non carbon emissions regulations, manufacturers are due to emission reduction cost, profit is lower than the non carbon emissions regulation.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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