本文選題：Nash討價(jià)還價(jià)解　切入點(diǎn)：談判破裂點(diǎn)　出處：《管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》2017年10期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：將考慮談判破裂點(diǎn)的Nash解作為公平參考點(diǎn),構(gòu)建了基于Stackelberg博弈的公平關(guān)切供應(yīng)鏈模型,分別在批發(fā)價(jià)契約和回購契約中探討了供應(yīng)鏈的決策和協(xié)調(diào)問題,分析了談判破裂點(diǎn)對公平關(guān)切供應(yīng)鏈的影響.研究發(fā)現(xiàn):當(dāng)批發(fā)價(jià)分別為外生、內(nèi)生變量時(shí),談判破裂點(diǎn)對最優(yōu)訂貨量的影響是完全相反的.此外,在批發(fā)價(jià)契約和回購契約中,基于Stackelberg博弈的公平關(guān)切供應(yīng)鏈均無法協(xié)調(diào),繼而文章采用價(jià)格補(bǔ)貼的方式進(jìn)行聯(lián)合契約設(shè)計(jì)使供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào).
[Abstract]:Considering the Nash solution of negotiation breakout point as the fair reference point, this paper constructs a fair concern supply chain model based on Stackelberg game, and discusses the decision-making and coordination of supply chain in wholesale price contract and repurchase contract, respectively. This paper analyzes the effect of negotiation break-up point on the supply chain of equity concern. It is found that when the wholesale price is exogenous and endogenous, the effect of negotiation breakout point on the optimal order quantity is completely opposite. In the wholesale price contract and the repurchase contract, the fair concern supply chain based on Stackelberg game can not be coordinated.
【作者單位】： 中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71601175;71571171) 教育部新世紀(jì)優(yōu)秀人才支持計(jì)劃資助項(xiàng)目(NCET-13-0538) 中國科學(xué)院青年創(chuàng)新促進(jìn)會(huì)專項(xiàng)基金資助項(xiàng)目(2015364)
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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1 何碧玉;多契約下考慮公平關(guān)切及其談判破裂點(diǎn)的供應(yīng)鏈決策與協(xié)調(diào)[D];中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué);2016年

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