本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管控　切入點(diǎn)：蒙特卡洛模擬　出處：《北京郵電大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在“外包”策略被普遍采用和全球化浪潮迭起的今天,對(duì)于任何一個(gè)企業(yè),供應(yīng)鏈都占據(jù)著影響企業(yè)運(yùn)營成本和效率的關(guān)鍵地位。在越來越復(fù)雜化、動(dòng)態(tài)化的供應(yīng)鏈中,供應(yīng)鏈中任意一方面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)都可能傳遞到供應(yīng)鏈其他各方,造成整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的損失。因此,需要對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈典型運(yùn)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的管控方式進(jìn)行研究,尋找通過供應(yīng)鏈各方之間的協(xié)調(diào)或協(xié)作保證供應(yīng)鏈整體的盈利性和連續(xù)性的方式。 為了研究供應(yīng)鏈典型運(yùn)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的管控方式,本文在一個(gè)由單個(gè)供應(yīng)商和單個(gè)零售商組成的兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中,分別建立了供應(yīng)商主導(dǎo)、零售商主導(dǎo)和系統(tǒng)主導(dǎo)三種供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)作模式下的供應(yīng)鏈各方期望利潤模型。采用了一種新的與仿真相結(jié)合的算法分析了不同協(xié)作模式下此兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈的兩時(shí)期最優(yōu)決策問題。討論了通過市場需求價(jià)格彈性系數(shù)、市場容量、需求均勻分布跨度和生產(chǎn)成本等參數(shù)的突變進(jìn)行模擬的供應(yīng)鏈典型運(yùn)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)不同協(xié)作模式下的供應(yīng)鏈各方利潤的影響。分析了在供應(yīng)鏈典型運(yùn)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響下,以供應(yīng)鏈某一方期望利潤最優(yōu)為目標(biāo)的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)作模式選擇方式；并設(shè)計(jì)了改進(jìn)的收益共享契約,得出了考慮供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)整體期望利潤的供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管控方式。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn),相對(duì)需求分布跨度和生產(chǎn)成本,供應(yīng)鏈各方期望利潤對(duì)需求價(jià)格彈性系數(shù)的波動(dòng)和市場需求總量的波動(dòng)更為敏感；而作為供應(yīng)鏈主導(dǎo)方承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)造成的影響并不總是帶來高昂的成本,相反,主導(dǎo)供應(yīng)鏈的一方總能夠獲得較多的利潤。另外,改進(jìn)的收益共享契約可以作為典型供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的管控方式,使供應(yīng)鏈各方進(jìn)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)、并使各方期望利潤達(dá)到相較于零售商主導(dǎo)或供應(yīng)商主導(dǎo)的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)作模式的帕累托改進(jìn)。研究成果可以為企業(yè)量化需求波動(dòng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和生產(chǎn)成本變動(dòng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)自身或其所在供應(yīng)鏈的影響提供幫助,或?yàn)槠髽I(yè)通過契約設(shè)計(jì)有效的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)作機(jī)制管控供應(yīng)鏈典型運(yùn)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提供參考。
[Abstract]:Nowadays, "outsourcing" strategy is widely adopted and the tide of globalization is rising. For any enterprise, supply chain plays a key role in affecting the operation cost and efficiency of enterprises. In the increasingly complex and dynamic supply chain, supply chain is becoming more and more complex and dynamic. The risks faced by either side of the supply chain may be transferred to other parties in the supply chain, resulting in the loss of the whole supply chain. Therefore, it is necessary to study the management and management of typical operational risks in the supply chain. To find ways to ensure the profitability and continuity of the supply chain through coordination or collaboration between the supply chain parties. In order to study the management mode of typical operational risk in supply chain, this paper establishes the supplier leading system in a two-level supply chain system composed of a single supplier and a single retailer, respectively. The expected profit model of the parties in the supply chain under the three cooperation modes of retailer leading and system leading. A new algorithm combined with simulation is used to analyze the two stages of the two levels of supply chain in different cooperation modes. The price elasticity coefficient of market demand is discussed. The effects of typical operational risks of supply chain on the profit of supply chain under different cooperation modes are simulated by the sudden changes of market capacity, uniform distribution of demand span and production cost, and the effects of typical operational risks of supply chain on the profits of all parties in supply chain are analyzed. The mode of supply chain cooperation is chosen aiming at the optimal expected profit of one side of the supply chain, and the improved revenue sharing contract is designed, and the supply chain risk management mode considering the overall expected profit of the supply chain system is obtained. It is found that relative to the span of demand distribution and the cost of production, the expected profits of all parties in the supply chain are more sensitive to the fluctuation of the price elasticity coefficient of demand and the fluctuation of the total market demand. However, the impact of taking risks on the supply chain does not always bring high cost. On the contrary, the leading party of the supply chain can always make more profit. In addition, The improved revenue-sharing contract can be used as a typical supply chain operation risk management method, so that all parties in the supply chain share the risk. It also makes the parties expect profits to reach Pareto improvement compared with the retailer-led or supplier-led supply chain collaboration mode. The research results can quantify the demand volatility risk and the production cost change risk to the enterprise or to itself or its. To help with the impact of the supply chain, It also provides a reference for enterprises to design effective supply chain cooperation mechanism through contract to manage the typical operational risks of supply chain.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京郵電大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F274

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 楊浩,諸葛建華;零售企業(yè)主導(dǎo)型供應(yīng)鏈的管理特征研究[J];財(cái)貿(mào)研究;2004年06期

2 何振;;供應(yīng)鏈的主導(dǎo)權(quán)與運(yùn)作模式分析[J];改革與戰(zhàn)略;2011年03期

3 趙金實(shí);霍佳震;趙瑩;段永瑞;;逆向主導(dǎo)型供應(yīng)鏈期權(quán)定價(jià)優(yōu)化的績效影響因素分析[J];管理工程學(xué)報(bào);2011年01期

4 曹細(xì)玉;覃艷華;;突發(fā)事件且非對(duì)稱信息下的供應(yīng)鏈回購契約模型[J];工業(yè)工程;2012年05期

5 劉詠梅;成尚汶;謝虎;;具有損失厭惡偏好零售商的供應(yīng)鏈彈性數(shù)量契約[J];控制與決策;2012年07期

6 劉玉霜;張紀(jì)會(huì);;零售商價(jià)格競爭下的最優(yōu)決策與收益共享契約[J];控制與決策;2013年02期

7 張菊亮;章祥蓀;王耀球;;一般需求函數(shù)下報(bào)童模型的定價(jià)與庫存控制[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐;2008年09期

8 邱若臻;黃小原;;供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)杖牍蚕砥跫s協(xié)調(diào)的隨機(jī)期望值模型[J];中國管理科學(xué);2006年04期

9 黃光明;劉魯;;兩階段價(jià)格和需求變動(dòng)產(chǎn)品的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)[J];中國管理科學(xué);2008年01期

10 趙曉敏;林英暉;蘇承明;;不同渠道權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)下的S-M兩級(jí)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈績效分析[J];中國管理科學(xué);2012年02期

，

本文編號(hào)：1566559