本文關(guān)鍵詞： 供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴關(guān)系 治理 機制設(shè)計理論 信息不對稱 雙重邊際化　出處：《廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：二十世紀(jì)后半葉以來,隨著科學(xué)技術(shù)的迅猛發(fā)展,經(jīng)濟的高速增長,經(jīng)濟全球化進程的加速,市場競爭環(huán)境發(fā)生了重大的變革,企業(yè)處于日益復(fù)雜多變的競爭環(huán)境當(dāng)中。借助供應(yīng)鏈上下游企業(yè)的力量,建立供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴關(guān)系,整合各成員企業(yè)的優(yōu)勢資源,是處在競爭當(dāng)中的供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)為實現(xiàn)可持續(xù)發(fā)展而進行的一種戰(zhàn)略選擇。 供應(yīng)鏈成員企業(yè)間建立戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴關(guān)系,即供應(yīng)鏈中相互獨立的上下游企業(yè)之間基于信任和共同的目標(biāo),而共享資源、共擔(dān)分險、共同獲利的非正式長期協(xié)議關(guān)系,但是由于其中存在著集體理性與成員企業(yè)個體理性之間的對立統(tǒng)一,各成員企業(yè)間的關(guān)系在本質(zhì)上仍然是委托-代理關(guān)系,信息不對稱與雙重邊際化有可能導(dǎo)致合作伙伴關(guān)系運行不協(xié)調(diào)。因此,我們要對供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴關(guān)系進行治理,引入合理的機制促使成員企業(yè)在滿足個體收益的同時供應(yīng)鏈整體收益也達到了最優(yōu)值。因此,本文從機制設(shè)計理論的視角下研究供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴關(guān)系的治理,具有理論和實踐意義。 機制設(shè)計理論是博弈論與社會選擇理論的綜合運用,主要研究在信息不對稱、決策分散、自由選擇的條件下基于某種目標(biāo)如何設(shè)計一個激勵相容系統(tǒng)使得成員的決策和行為與整體目標(biāo)相一致,重點解決信息不對稱和激勵不相容這兩大問題。供應(yīng)鏈的系統(tǒng)特征與其相符,因此,機制設(shè)計理論為我們提供了新穎的研究視角和很好的思路方法。 本文在分析了供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴關(guān)系相關(guān)問題的基礎(chǔ)上,基于機制設(shè)計理論對供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴關(guān)系的治理進行了分析和探討。首先提出了基于成本控制、激勵相容以及信任機制的治理框架,然后分別對三部分進行了探討闡述。為防范信息不對稱可能引起的逆向選擇風(fēng)險,研究了信息不對稱條件下的供應(yīng)鏈合作伙伴的甄別與選擇。運用機制設(shè)計理論的顯示原理設(shè)計了能激勵供應(yīng)商揭示自身真實類型的合約機制,構(gòu)建了一個由初始支付、獎勵和懲罰三部分構(gòu)成的支付合約模型,從而促使供應(yīng)商在選擇合約的過程中就能主動揭示自身的真實類型。為降低由激勵不相容導(dǎo)致的雙重邊際化造成的不良影響,應(yīng)用了機制設(shè)計理論的分支理論博弈論的Shapely值法探討供應(yīng)鏈合作伙伴收益分配機制的設(shè)計。為保證供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴關(guān)系的健康穩(wěn)定發(fā)展,除了解決上述兩大問題外,還需要信任機制作為“粘合劑”,因此本文也討論了供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴關(guān)系信任機制的構(gòu)建。為促使供應(yīng)鏈上各成員了解和客觀準(zhǔn)確地評價供應(yīng)鏈績效,從而合理運用激勵、幫助、獎懲等手段實現(xiàn)治理目標(biāo),本文探討了供應(yīng)鏈績效評價的作用、含義、原則、評價系統(tǒng)的框架與模型。 總的來說,本文嘗試從機制設(shè)計理論的視角來研究供應(yīng)鏈戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴關(guān)系的治理,從而促進供應(yīng)鏈整體的協(xié)調(diào)運行。
[Abstract]:Since the second half of 20th century, with the rapid development of science and technology, the rapid growth of economy, the acceleration of the process of economic globalization, the market competition environment has undergone major changes. The enterprise is in the increasingly complex and changeable competition environment. With the strength of the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain, the strategic partnership of the supply chain is established to integrate the superior resources of each member enterprise. It is a strategic choice for supply chain enterprises in competition to realize sustainable development. Establishing strategic partnership among supply chain member enterprises, that is, the informal long-term agreement relationship between the independent upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain based on trust and common goal, sharing resources, sharing risks, and making common profits. However, due to the unity of opposites between collective rationality and individual rationality of member enterprises, the relationship among member enterprises is still principal-agent relationship in essence. Asymmetric information and double marginalization can lead to uncoordinated partnerships. Therefore, we need to govern supply chain strategic partnerships. The introduction of reasonable mechanism promotes the member enterprises to meet the individual income and achieve the optimal value of the whole supply chain. Therefore, this paper studies the governance of supply chain strategic partnership from the perspective of mechanism design theory. It has theoretical and practical significance. The theory of mechanism design is a comprehensive application of game theory and social choice theory. How to design an incentive compatible system based on a certain objective under the condition of free choice so that the decision and behavior of the members are consistent with the overall goal, The system characteristics of supply chain are consistent with the information asymmetry and incentive incompatibility. Therefore, the mechanism design theory provides us with a new perspective and a good way of thinking. Based on the analysis of supply chain strategic partnership, this paper analyzes and discusses the governance of supply chain strategic partnership based on the theory of mechanism design. In order to prevent the risk of adverse selection caused by asymmetric information, the governance framework of incentive compatibility and trust mechanism is discussed in this paper. This paper studies the selection and identification of supply chain partners under asymmetric information, designs a contract mechanism that can motivate suppliers to reveal their true types by using the display principle of mechanism design theory, and constructs an initial payment mechanism. In order to reduce the adverse effects caused by the double marginalization caused by incentive incompatibility, the payment contract model composed of three parts of reward and punishment enables suppliers to proactively reveal their true types in the process of selecting contracts. In order to ensure the healthy and stable development of strategic partnership of supply chain, the Shapely value method of game theory of branch theory of mechanism design is applied to discuss the design of profit distribution mechanism of supply chain partners. Trust mechanism is also needed as "glue", so this paper also discusses the construction of supply chain strategic partnership trust mechanism. In order to promote the members of supply chain to understand and evaluate supply chain performance objectively and accurately, so as to make rational use of incentives. This paper discusses the function, meaning, principle, framework and model of supply chain performance evaluation. In general, this paper attempts to study the governance of supply chain strategic partnership from the perspective of mechanism design theory, thus promoting the coordinated operation of the supply chain as a whole.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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