本文關(guān)鍵詞： 閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈 主導(dǎo)模式 公平偏好 努力水平 定價(jià)決策　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)作實(shí)現(xiàn)了廢舊品回收和循環(huán)再利用,為越來(lái)越多的企業(yè)所采納。企業(yè)會(huì)積極投入回收努力和銷售努力,以促進(jìn)回收再制造和產(chǎn)品銷售。在市場(chǎng)需求與價(jià)格、回收努力和銷售努力相關(guān)的情況下,企業(yè)的定價(jià)和努力水平?jīng)Q定著閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的績(jī)效�？紤]到渠道主導(dǎo)模式、節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)是否具有公平偏好以及公平偏好的程度也對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的績(jī)效有重要影響,本文旨在探究節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)公平中性和具有公平偏好兩種情形下,具不同主導(dǎo)模式的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的決策和協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題。本文主要進(jìn)行了如下研究:1.公平中性下具不同主導(dǎo)模式的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的決策與協(xié)調(diào)。針對(duì)由一個(gè)公平中性的制造商和一個(gè)公平中性的零售商組成的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈,利用博弈論得出了集中決策和制造商主導(dǎo)、權(quán)力對(duì)等、零售商主導(dǎo)下分散決策模型的最優(yōu)定價(jià)、努力水平?jīng)Q策和利潤(rùn),進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析并提出了低價(jià)促銷協(xié)調(diào)契約,隨后進(jìn)行算例研究。研究表明:主導(dǎo)權(quán)向零售商轉(zhuǎn)移總是有利于零售商,也并非一直對(duì)制造商不利。分散決策時(shí)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)的主導(dǎo)模式與回收努力的需求擴(kuò)張效應(yīng)相關(guān)。當(dāng)此效應(yīng)較低時(shí),權(quán)力對(duì)等模式下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效最優(yōu);反之零售商主導(dǎo)模式最優(yōu)。低價(jià)促銷契約可以有效協(xié)調(diào)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈。2.公平偏好下具不同主導(dǎo)模式的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的決策與協(xié)調(diào)。在由一個(gè)具公平偏好的制造商和一個(gè)具公平偏好的零售商組成的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中,利用博弈論探究了不同主導(dǎo)模式和低價(jià)促銷契約下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的決策和利潤(rùn),進(jìn)行均衡解分析和算例研究。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):相比公平中性的情形,公平偏好(優(yōu)勢(shì)成員的同情心理和劣勢(shì)成員的嫉妒心理)會(huì)使分配結(jié)果趨向公平,其中同情心理對(duì)劣勢(shì)成員利潤(rùn)和效用的提升作用更大,嫉妒心理對(duì)優(yōu)勢(shì)成員利潤(rùn)和效用的降低作用更明顯。同情心理的增強(qiáng)有利于閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效的提升,實(shí)現(xiàn)高利潤(rùn)和效用下的分配公平;嫉妒心理的增強(qiáng)則不然。通過(guò)合理設(shè)定渠道費(fèi)用,公平偏好下低價(jià)促銷協(xié)調(diào)契約同樣有效。因此,企業(yè)不應(yīng)一味追求主導(dǎo)地位,應(yīng)積極投入回收努力或銷售努力、達(dá)成協(xié)作契約,實(shí)現(xiàn)共贏。優(yōu)勢(shì)企業(yè)應(yīng)提高自身的同情心理,以減小弱勢(shì)企業(yè)嫉妒心理的增強(qiáng)對(duì)自身和閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的不利影響,加強(qiáng)合作關(guān)系,提升整體績(jī)效。
[Abstract]:The operation of closed-loop supply chain realizes recycling and recycling of waste goods, which is adopted by more and more enterprises. Enterprises will actively invest in recycling efforts and sales efforts. To facilitate recycling and remanufacturing and product sales. Where market demand is related to price, recycling efforts and sales efforts. The pricing and effort level of enterprises determine the performance of closed-loop supply chain. Considering the channel-dominated mode, whether the node enterprises have fair preference and the degree of fair preference also have an important impact on the performance of closed-loop supply chain. The purpose of this paper is to explore the neutral and fair preference of nodal enterprises. Decision making and coordination of closed-loop supply chain with different dominant modes. 1.Decision-making and coordination of closed-loop supply chain with different dominant modes under fair neutrality, aiming at a closed-loop supply chain composed of a fair neutral manufacturer and a fair neutral retailer. By using game theory, we get the optimal pricing, effort level decision and profit of centralized decision, manufacturer-led, power-equal and retailer-led decentralized decision model. This paper makes a comparative analysis and puts forward the coordination contract of low price promotion, and then carries out a case study. The study shows that the transfer of dominant power to retailers is always beneficial to retailers. The dominant mode of closed-loop supply chain in decentralized decision is related to the demand expansion effect of recycling effort. When this effect is low, the closed-loop supply chain performance is optimal under power equivalence mode. On the contrary, the retailer-dominated model is optimal. The low-price promotion contract can effectively coordinate the decision-making and coordination of the closed-loop supply chain with different dominant modes under fair preference. In the case of a manufacturer with a fair preference. And a retailer with a fair preference in a closed-loop supply chain. By using game theory, this paper explores the decision-making and profit of closed-loop supply chain under different dominant modes and low price promotion contracts, and analyzes the equilibrium solution of the closed-loop supply chain. Fair preference (the sympathy of superior members and jealousy of inferior members) will make the distribution result tend to be fair, among which compassion will play a more important role in the promotion of profit and utility of inferior members. The effect of jealousy on the profit and utility of superior members is more obvious. The enhancement of sympathy is beneficial to the improvement of closed-loop supply chain performance and the realization of fair distribution under high profit and utility. The enhancement of jealousy is not. Through reasonable setting of channel cost, the coordination contract of low price promotion under fair preference is also effective. Therefore, enterprises should not blindly pursue the leading position. We should actively invest in recycling efforts or sales efforts to reach a cooperative contract to achieve win-win situation. The superior enterprises should improve their sympathy psychology. In order to reduce the adverse effects of the envious psychology of the weak enterprises on themselves and the closed-loop supply chain, strengthen the cooperative relationship and improve the overall performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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