本文關(guān)鍵詞： 收益共享契約 公平偏好 供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào) 行為供應(yīng)鏈管理　出處：《重慶交通大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著科學(xué)技術(shù)的高速發(fā)展和經(jīng)濟(jì)的全球化,使得供應(yīng)鏈之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)逐漸替代了企業(yè)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng),供應(yīng)鏈管理中的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)也變的越來(lái)越重要。又因?yàn)楣⿷?yīng)鏈中的各成員之間存在信息不對(duì)稱和自私性行為,所以在各成員之間需要建立協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制非常重要。關(guān)于供應(yīng)鏈契約的研究以往多數(shù)是基于決策者完全理性的研究:即決策者總以利益最大化作為行為準(zhǔn)則。然而近年來(lái),人類行為因素對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈決策的影響引起了眾學(xué)者的關(guān)注,因?yàn)榭紤]行為因素使得決策者不僅僅是追求最大的收益,有時(shí)他們還會(huì)考慮收益是否分配公平,這為傳統(tǒng)的供應(yīng)鏈契約提出了新的研究課題。論文第一部分研究供應(yīng)商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的一對(duì)一的供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu),研究以Nash均衡解作為公平偏好參考點(diǎn),分別對(duì)只考慮零售商公平偏好,以及同時(shí)考慮零售商和供應(yīng)商公平偏好這兩種情況下,在以往文獻(xiàn)基礎(chǔ)上加入殘值和缺貨成本這兩個(gè)參數(shù),建立收益共享契約的協(xié)調(diào)模型。首先,研究只考慮零售商關(guān)注公平的時(shí)候,收益共享契約的協(xié)調(diào)性。此時(shí)供應(yīng)鏈要想實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào),只要批發(fā)價(jià)格和收益共享系數(shù)之間建立一定的等式關(guān)系,而與零售商的公平偏好程度沒(méi)有任何關(guān)系。然后,同時(shí)考慮供應(yīng)鏈中的兩個(gè)決策者都具有公平偏好行為情形下,研究供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)情況,以及供應(yīng)鏈成員的最優(yōu)決策。此情形下的收益共享契約只有在零售商的公平偏好大于供應(yīng)商的公平偏好,并且零售商公平偏好不能太大,供應(yīng)商公平偏好不能太小時(shí),供應(yīng)鏈才能實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)。最后通過(guò)數(shù)值分析驗(yàn)證了前面的推論。論文第二部分,研究一對(duì)二的稍復(fù)雜的供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu),考慮兩個(gè)零售商與供應(yīng)商順序展開(kāi)博弈,在此基礎(chǔ)上引入公平偏好理論。只考慮兩個(gè)零售商具有公平偏好行為傾向時(shí),建立收益共享契約的協(xié)調(diào)模型。通過(guò)數(shù)值仿真得到結(jié)論:零售商1考慮分布式公平偏好,零售商2考慮分布式公平偏好關(guān)切和同行誘導(dǎo)公平偏好,公平偏好系數(shù)都不會(huì)對(duì)兩個(gè)零售商和供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的最優(yōu)訂貨量產(chǎn)生影響,供應(yīng)鏈能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)。本文將傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈契約與公平偏好行為緊密結(jié)合在一起,并且將供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)從一對(duì)一擴(kuò)展到一對(duì)多二的情況,豐富和完善了傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈契約理論。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of science and technology and the globalization of economy, the competition between supply chains has gradually replaced the competition among enterprises. Supply chain coordination in supply chain management is becoming more and more important, and because of the information asymmetry and selfish behavior among the members of the supply chain. Therefore, it is very important to establish coordination mechanism among members. Most of the researches on supply chain contract are based on the complete rationality of decision makers:. That is, policy makers always take the maximization of interests as the code of conduct. However, in recent years. The influence of human behavior factors on supply chain decision-making has attracted the attention of many scholars, because consideration of behavioral factors makes decision makers not only pursue the maximum benefits, but also consider whether the benefits are distributed fairly. This brings forward a new research topic for the traditional supply chain contract. The first part of this paper studies the one-to-one supply chain structure with the supplier as the leader and takes the Nash equilibrium solution as the fair preference reference point. Considering only retailer's fair preference and retailer's and supplier's fair preference, two parameters, residual value and shortage cost, are added on the basis of previous literature. Firstly, the coordination model of revenue sharing contract is established. Firstly, the coordination of revenue sharing contract is considered only when retailers are concerned about fairness. At this time, the supply chain wants to achieve coordination. As long as the wholesale price and income sharing coefficient establish a certain equality relationship, and there is no relationship with the retailer's fair preference. Then. At the same time, considering the two decision makers in the supply chain have fair preference behavior, the coordination of the supply chain is studied. In this case, only the retailer's fair preference is greater than the supplier's fair preference, and the retailer's fair preference can't be too large. Supplier fair preference can not be too small supply chain coordination. Finally through numerical analysis to verify the above inference. The second part of this paper studies the one-to-two slightly complex supply chain structure. Considering the two retailers and suppliers in the order of game, on the basis of the introduction of fair preference theory, only consider the two retailers have the tendency of fair preference behavior. Through numerical simulation, we conclude that retailer 1 considers distributed fairness preference, retailer 2 considers distributed fair preference concern and peer induced fairness preference. The fair preference coefficient has no effect on the optimal order quantity of the two retailers and the supply chain system, and the supply chain can achieve coordination. In this paper, the traditional supply chain contract and fair preference behavior are closely combined. The supply chain structure is extended from one to one to one to many two, which enriches and perfects the traditional supply chain contract theory.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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本文編號(hào)：1454941