本文關(guān)鍵詞： 電子廢棄物 逆向物流 政府補(bǔ)貼 斯塔克伯格博弈 供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)　出處：《東華大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著科學(xué)技術(shù)的不斷進(jìn)步以及生產(chǎn)力的飛速發(fā)展,加上大眾消費(fèi)水平的提高以及產(chǎn)品生命周期的縮短,大量的電子廢棄物也隨著產(chǎn)生。導(dǎo)致資源浪費(fèi)和環(huán)境污染的問題也日益嚴(yán)重。如果這些電子廢棄物得不到有效的處理,不儀浪費(fèi)了大量的資源也將給環(huán)境造成嚴(yán)重的污染。 然而目前我國電子廢棄物的回收處理大多數(shù)落在高污染、低資源再用的小作坊手中,正規(guī)的回收處理企業(yè)卻得不到有效資源。雖然國家實(shí)施“以舊換新”政策促使一部分電子廢棄物流入正規(guī)渠道,但后政策時代如何促進(jìn)正規(guī)渠道回收同時規(guī)范非正規(guī)渠道的回收行為,成為諸多學(xué)者關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)。 基于上述背景,本文首先深入研究了國內(nèi)外電子廢物回收處理相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),基于理論基礎(chǔ)：逆向供應(yīng)鏈理論、博弈論以及供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)理論,分析并指出不同回收模式的優(yōu)勢和劣勢。其次,分析了我國電子廢棄物回收處理產(chǎn)業(yè)的現(xiàn)狀并指出問題：即大量廢棄物被非正規(guī)流動商販回收,并且很大程度上未得到妥善處置,而正規(guī)回收商及處理商在回收競爭中不具備價格優(yōu)勢。因此本文重點(diǎn)研究回收環(huán)節(jié)中雙渠道模式下的回收商和處理商的二級逆向供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng),建立了回收量受正規(guī)和非正規(guī)回收商回收價格競爭影響的Stackelberg博弈模型,討論了有無政府補(bǔ)貼情形下的幾種決策情況,并比較分析了補(bǔ)貼機(jī)制對系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)決策的影響,進(jìn)一步考慮供應(yīng)鏈內(nèi)部處理商和回收商間加入二部定價激勵契約模型和基于目標(biāo)回收量的獎懲激勵契約模型對供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)分析。 研究結(jié)果表明,分散式系統(tǒng)存在的雙重邊際化問題；政府實(shí)行補(bǔ)貼政策可以提高逆向供應(yīng)鏈的回收量,并且同等條件下,政府補(bǔ)貼第三方回收商比補(bǔ)貼處理商對整個回收系統(tǒng)的效果更加顯著；回收商和處理商間制定二部定價契約可以消除邊際效應(yīng),實(shí)現(xiàn)整體效益達(dá)到集中化決策水平；處理商和第三方回收商之間建立回收量閥值的獎懲契約無法協(xié)調(diào)整個逆向供應(yīng)鏈,即系統(tǒng)總回收量和利潤并未增加,但可以協(xié)調(diào)非正規(guī)回收商和正規(guī)回收商在回收競爭中的強(qiáng)弱關(guān)系,實(shí)現(xiàn)優(yōu)化電子廢棄物逆向供應(yīng)鏈的目的。 本文旨在找出政府補(bǔ)貼決策的合理實(shí)施對象,對流動商販引導(dǎo)和監(jiān)督以及對正規(guī)回收企業(yè)進(jìn)行激勵和扶持,運(yùn)用激勵契約對整體供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)。達(dá)到使電子廢棄物回收產(chǎn)業(yè)向正確的方向發(fā)展的最終目標(biāo),研究成果可為我國政府對電子廢棄物回收處理的管制提供決策建議和方法支持。
[Abstract]:With the continuous progress of science and technology and the rapid development of productivity, coupled with the improvement of the level of mass consumption and the shortening of product life cycle. A large amount of e-waste is also produced. The problems that lead to waste of resources and environmental pollution are becoming more and more serious. If these e-waste can not be effectively treated. The waste of a lot of resources will also cause serious pollution to the environment. However, at present, most of the recycling and disposal of e-waste in China is in the hands of small workshops with high pollution and low resource reuse. Formal recycling enterprises do not have access to effective resources, although the implementation of the "old for new" policy has prompted a portion of e-waste to flow into formal channels. However, in the post-policy era, how to promote the recovery of formal channels and regulate the recovery behavior of informal channels has become a hot topic for many scholars. Based on the above background, this paper first deeply studies the domestic and foreign electronic waste recovery and disposal related literature, based on the theoretical basis: reverse supply chain theory, game theory and supply chain coordination theory. The advantages and disadvantages of different recycling modes are analyzed and pointed out. Secondly, the current situation of electronic waste recovery and disposal industry in China is analyzed and the problems are pointed out: that is, a large number of wastes are recovered by informal mobile vendors. And to a large extent has not been properly disposed of. Formal recyclers and processors do not have a price advantage in the recovery competition, so this paper focuses on the two-stage reverse supply chain system of recyclers and processors in the two-channel mode of recycling. This paper establishes the Stackelberg game model of the recovery amount affected by the competition of the recovery price between the formal and the informal recyclers, and discusses several kinds of decision-making situations under the situation of anarchic subsidy. The effects of subsidy mechanism on the optimal decision of the system are compared and analyzed. Furthermore, the supply chain coordination is analyzed by adding two models of pricing incentive contract and reward and punishment incentive contract model based on target payback amount between the processors and recyclers in the supply chain. The results show that there is a double marginalization problem in decentralized systems. Government subsidy policy can improve the recovery of the reverse supply chain, and under the same conditions, the government subsidizes the third-party recyclers more effectively than the subsidy handlers to the whole recovery system. The establishment of two pricing contracts between recyclers and processors can eliminate the marginal effect and realize the overall benefit to the level of centralized decision-making. The reward and punishment contract between the processor and the third party recycler can not coordinate the whole reverse supply chain, that is, the total recovery and profit of the system has not increased. However, it can coordinate the relationship between informal recyclers and regular recyclers in the competition of recycling, so as to optimize the reverse supply chain of electronic wastes. The purpose of this paper is to find out the reasonable implementation object of the government subsidy decision, to guide and supervise the mobile vendors and to encourage and support the formal recycling enterprises. The use of incentive contracts to coordinate the overall supply chain to achieve the final goal of e-waste recycling industry to the correct direction of development. The research results can provide decision suggestion and method support for our government to control the recycling and disposal of electronic waste.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：X705

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