發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-03 07:12

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：給予政府補(bǔ)貼的家電行業(yè)供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策研究　出處：《現(xiàn)代商業(yè)》2015年27期 　論文類型：期刊論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 供應(yīng)鏈 博弈論 收人分享契約 供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào) 政府補(bǔ)貼

【摘要】：由于消費(fèi)人群對(duì)于電子產(chǎn)品外觀,功能,質(zhì)量等方面提出多元化需求,各種類型的新產(chǎn)品應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。隨著更新?lián)Q代速度的加快,家電產(chǎn)業(yè)就產(chǎn)生了諸多問(wèn)題,比如耗電量過(guò)高、廢掉家電處理不妥等。在這樣的形勢(shì)下,政府根據(jù)社會(huì)生活需要推出了以舊換新的活動(dòng)。本文以博弈理論為基本的工具,對(duì)政府補(bǔ)貼下的供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策進(jìn)行分析、探討。論文首先分別構(gòu)建了政府補(bǔ)貼下的供應(yīng)鏈斯坦科爾伯格分散決策模型和集中決策模型。經(jīng)過(guò)分析非合作定價(jià)時(shí)讓零售商負(fù)責(zé)銷售的產(chǎn)品定價(jià)問(wèn)題,將結(jié)果與聯(lián)合定價(jià)時(shí)的結(jié)果比較,發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)中存在雙重邊際加價(jià)效應(yīng)。為避免供應(yīng)鏈中存在雙重邊際加價(jià)以改善整個(gè)系統(tǒng)失調(diào),文中建議通過(guò)制定銷售收入分享契約來(lái)綜合協(xié)調(diào)管理供應(yīng)鏈各個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)。該收入分享契約有效地改善了供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)д{(diào)的狀況,使制造商和零售商共同分享利益,從而達(dá)到供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)績(jī)效。在最后對(duì)政府補(bǔ)貼額變動(dòng)對(duì)于定價(jià)決策的影響進(jìn)行分析,并利用數(shù)值算例驗(yàn)證了本文的研究結(jié)論。。
[Abstract]:As consumers put forward diversified demand for the appearance, function and quality of electronic products, various types of new products emerge as the times require. With the acceleration of the speed of upgrading, many problems have arisen in the household appliance industry. For example, excessive consumption of electricity, improper disposal of discarded household appliances and so on. In such a situation, according to the needs of social life, the government launched the old for new activities. This paper based on the game theory as a basic tool. This paper analyzes the pricing decision of supply chain under government subsidy. First of all, the paper constructs a decentralized decision model and a centralized decision model of the supply chain, which are supported by the government. After analyzing the non-cooperative pricing, retailers are responsible for the pricing of the products sold. By comparing the results with the results of joint pricing, it is found that there is a double marginal mark-up effect. In order to avoid the existence of double marginal price increase in the supply chain to improve the whole system imbalance. It is suggested that the sales revenue sharing contract should be used to coordinate and manage all aspects of the supply chain. The revenue sharing contract can effectively improve the imbalance of the supply chain and enable manufacturers and retailers to share the benefits together. Finally, the effect of the change of government subsidy on pricing decision is analyzed, and the numerical example is used to verify the conclusion of this paper.
【作者單位】： 山西師范大學(xué);
【分類號(hào)】：F426.6;F274
【正文快照】： 本文以博弈理論為基本的工具,對(duì)政府補(bǔ)貼下的供應(yīng)鏈定價(jià)決策進(jìn)行分析、探討。論文首先分別構(gòu)建了政府補(bǔ)貼下的供應(yīng)鏈斯坦科爾伯格分散決策模型和集中決策模型。經(jīng)過(guò)分析非合作定價(jià)時(shí)讓零售商負(fù)責(zé)銷售的產(chǎn)品定價(jià)問(wèn)題,將結(jié)果與聯(lián)合定價(jià)時(shí)的結(jié)果比較,發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)中存在雙重邊際加價(jià)效

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本文編號(hào)：1372910