【摘要】：在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化和市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)日趨白熱化的環(huán)境下,經(jīng)營(yíng)者集中如雨后春筍般蓬勃發(fā)展。對(duì)于達(dá)到法定申報(bào)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的經(jīng)營(yíng)者集中案,世界各個(gè)國(guó)家和地區(qū)的反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)幾乎無(wú)條件予以批準(zhǔn),并盡量減少被直接禁止的案件,以滿足企業(yè)對(duì)規(guī)模效應(yīng)的合理需求和提升本國(guó)企業(yè)的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。反壟斷審查結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)制度便是為了兼顧經(jīng)營(yíng)者集中的正面效果和負(fù)面效果而產(chǎn)生的“中間機(jī)制”,其改變了二元選擇(禁止或同意)的硬性干預(yù)模式。該制度自產(chǎn)生以來(lái),受到各國(guó)反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)和反壟斷法學(xué)界的廣泛認(rèn)可,中國(guó)也逐步出臺(tái)相關(guān)文件對(duì)其加以確認(rèn),并多次運(yùn)用于實(shí)際案件。本文從反壟斷審查結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)的基本概念和內(nèi)容入手,著重對(duì)其主體和客體方面存在的法律問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究,以期對(duì)我國(guó)反壟斷審查結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)加以反思和完善。 全文除引言和結(jié)語(yǔ)外,共分四部分： 第一部分“反壟斷審查結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)概述”。從反壟斷審查結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)的概念、內(nèi)容入手,指出其具有多方面的作用,并分析其產(chǎn)生的理論基礎(chǔ)。 第二部分“反壟斷審查結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)主體法律問(wèn)題”。本部分首先指出第三方買家和受托人兩個(gè)主體的選擇直接影響反壟斷審查結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)實(shí)施效果。其次,通過(guò)考察西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的立法和指南,研究第三方買家的選擇標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和機(jī)制,以及受托人的選任和職責(zé),以期明確主體在結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)制度中的作用。 第三部分“反壟斷審查結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)客體法律問(wèn)題”�？腕w是影響結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)成功與否的另一重大因素。本部分首先借鑒西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的經(jīng)驗(yàn),明確結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)客體的認(rèn)定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。其次,劃定客體具體范圍,分析獨(dú)立經(jīng)營(yíng)的資產(chǎn)或業(yè)務(wù)、關(guān)鍵的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)和必要的人力資源三種主要資產(chǎn)類型。最后,探析結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)客體追加機(jī)制產(chǎn)生的原因,考察西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家“皇冠寶石條款”的應(yīng)用。 第四部分“我國(guó)反壟斷審查結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)的完善”。本部分筆者回歸我國(guó)反壟斷審查的視野。首先對(duì)我國(guó)結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)的立法和執(zhí)法現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行梳理,在此基礎(chǔ)上,指出我國(guó)結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)制度中主體和客體方面存在的不足。最后,結(jié)合西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的經(jīng)驗(yàn)提出我國(guó)反壟斷審查結(jié)構(gòu)性救濟(jì)的完善建議。
[Abstract]:In the environment of economic globalization and increasingly fierce market competition, the concentration of operators is booming. For cases of concentration of operators that meet the statutory reporting standards, the antitrust law enforcement agencies in various countries and regions of the world have almost unconditionally approved them, and have minimized the number of cases that have been directly prohibited. In order to meet the reasonable demand for scale effect and enhance the market competitiveness of domestic enterprises. The structural relief system of anti-monopoly examination is a "intermediate mechanism" which aims to balance the positive and negative effects of the concentration of operators, which changes the dualistic choice (prohibition or consent) of hard intervention mode. Since its emergence, the system has been widely recognized by anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies and anti-monopoly law scholars. China has gradually issued relevant documents to confirm it, and it has been used in practical cases many times. Starting with the basic concept and content of the structural relief of antimonopoly review, this paper focuses on the legal problems existing in its subject and object in order to reflect on and perfect the structural relief of antimonopoly review in China. In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the full text is divided into four parts: the first part, "Overview of the structural relief of antitrust review". Starting with the concept and content of anti-monopoly review structural relief, this paper points out that it has various functions and analyzes its theoretical basis. The second part is about the legal problems of the main body of antitrust review. This part first points out that the choice of the third party buyer and the trustee directly affects the effect of antitrust review on the implementation of structural relief. Secondly, by investigating the legislation and guidance of western developed countries, the paper studies the selection criteria and mechanism of third-party buyers, as well as the selection and duties of trustees, in order to clarify the role of the subject in the structural relief system. The third part is the legal problem of the object of anti-monopoly review. The object is another important factor influencing the success of structural relief. This part first draws lessons from the western developed countries' experience, and clarifies the identification standard of the structural relief object. Secondly, define the specific scope of the object, analyze the independent operation of assets or business, key intellectual property rights and necessary human resources three main types of assets. Finally, the paper analyzes the causes of the supplementary mechanism of structural relief object, and examines the application of the Crown Gem Clause in western developed countries. The fourth part is the perfection of structural relief of anti-monopoly review in China. In this part, the author returns to the field of view of anti-monopoly review in China. Firstly, the author combs the current situation of legislation and law enforcement of structural relief in China, and then points out the deficiency of the subject and object in the system of structural relief in China. Finally, based on the experience of the western developed countries, the paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the structural relief of antitrust review in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D922.294

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