【摘要】：當(dāng)前社會技術(shù)創(chuàng)新不斷發(fā)展,企業(yè)對于先進(jìn)技術(shù)的追求與日俱增,與此同時(shí),世界范圍內(nèi)對于知識產(chǎn)權(quán)的保護(hù)制度逐步完善,技術(shù)授權(quán)成為很多企業(yè)獲得技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的主要途徑�，F(xiàn)如今,技術(shù)授權(quán)在各個(gè)行業(yè)中都非常普遍,在授權(quán)過程中,技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)獲取授權(quán)收費(fèi),同時(shí)技術(shù)接受者也可以通過接受授權(quán)改善自己的技術(shù)水平。 之前的研究基本上集中在企業(yè)之間采取產(chǎn)量競爭或者價(jià)格競爭,但市場中兩家企業(yè)的競爭行為,會出現(xiàn)一家企業(yè)采取產(chǎn)量策略,另一家企業(yè)采取價(jià)格策略的現(xiàn)象,這種競爭策略被稱之為“混合競爭策略”。市場中的兩家企業(yè)進(jìn)行混合競爭是有其現(xiàn)實(shí)意義的,目前來說,混合競爭模型得到的關(guān)注相對較少,但現(xiàn)實(shí)中的某些行業(yè),像小型車市場中Scion與Honda就是混合競爭的典型案例,另外某些技術(shù)部門或機(jī)構(gòu)勢力出于政策性考慮,會要求企業(yè)間選擇不同的競爭策略方式進(jìn)行競爭,這就使混合競爭這種競爭方式需要得到我們更多的關(guān)注。 本文研究一個(gè)非生產(chǎn)性的技術(shù)研發(fā)企業(yè)如何決定向進(jìn)行混合競爭(一家企業(yè)采取價(jià)格策略,另一家企業(yè)則采取數(shù)量策略)的兩個(gè)生產(chǎn)性企業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)讓其降低成本的技術(shù),其中兩生產(chǎn)性企業(yè)的產(chǎn)品具有水平差異性。我們探討技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)在每種授權(quán)合同下授權(quán)對象的選擇問題及福利變化情況,固定收費(fèi)與特許權(quán)收費(fèi)的比較及技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)最優(yōu)授權(quán)合同的選擇。 研究結(jié)論表明,固定收費(fèi)合同下,當(dāng)產(chǎn)品差異性較小且產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新程度相對較大時(shí),技術(shù)擁有者選擇授權(quán)給進(jìn)行價(jià)格競爭的企業(yè)是最優(yōu)的；當(dāng)產(chǎn)品差異性較小且產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新程度較小時(shí),選擇將技術(shù)授權(quán)給進(jìn)行產(chǎn)量競爭的企業(yè)是最優(yōu)選擇；其他情況下,技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)會選擇將技術(shù)同時(shí)授權(quán)給兩生產(chǎn)性企業(yè)。就社會福利水平而言,將技術(shù)同時(shí)授權(quán)給兩企業(yè)時(shí)消費(fèi)者剩余與社會總福利水平最高,將技術(shù)授權(quán)給進(jìn)行價(jià)格競爭的企業(yè)時(shí)消費(fèi)者剩余與社會總福利水平最低。 特許權(quán)收費(fèi)合同下,技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)選擇將技術(shù)同時(shí)授權(quán)給兩企業(yè)是最佳選擇,且比較排他性授權(quán)時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn),將技術(shù)授權(quán)給產(chǎn)量競爭的企業(yè)時(shí)技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)所獲利潤要大于授權(quán)給價(jià)格競爭的企業(yè)；雙重收費(fèi)合同下,技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)將技術(shù)同時(shí)授權(quán)給兩企業(yè)是最優(yōu)選擇,且技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)偏好于將技術(shù)授權(quán)給進(jìn)行產(chǎn)量競爭的企業(yè),只有在創(chuàng)新程度相對較高的微小區(qū)間內(nèi),技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)會選擇將技術(shù)授權(quán)給進(jìn)行價(jià)格競爭的企業(yè)。 混合競爭策略下,固定收費(fèi)合同不一定優(yōu)于特許權(quán)收費(fèi)合同。出于技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)授權(quán)收入最大化考慮,當(dāng)創(chuàng)新程度相對較低時(shí),特許權(quán)收費(fèi)合同下的授權(quán)收入高于固定收費(fèi)合同；技術(shù)創(chuàng)新程度較高時(shí),選擇固定收費(fèi)合同進(jìn)行技術(shù)授權(quán)是更優(yōu)選擇。 三種授權(quán)方式中,選擇雙重收費(fèi)合同授權(quán)是技術(shù)擁有企業(yè)的最優(yōu)選擇,且混合競爭策略下此種方式總是會提高社會福利水平。
[Abstract]:At present, with the continuous development of technological innovation, enterprises are pursuing more and more advanced technology. At the same time, the protection system of intellectual property rights around the world is gradually improved. Technology authorization has become the main way for many enterprises to obtain technological innovation. The technology ownership enterprise obtains the authorization fee, at the same time the technology acceptor may also improve own technical level by accepting the authorization.
Previous studies mainly focused on the adoption of output competition or price competition between enterprises, but the competition behavior of two enterprises in the market will lead to the phenomenon that one enterprise adopts output strategy and the other adopts price strategy. This kind of competition strategy is called "mixed competition strategy". Competition has its practical significance. At present, the mixed competition model has received relatively little attention. However, in reality, some industries, such as Scion and Honda in the small car market, are typical cases of mixed competition. Competition, which requires mixed competition, needs more attention.
This paper investigates how an unproductive R&D firm decides to transfer its cost-reducing technology to two producers with mixed competition (one firm adopts a price strategy and the other adopts a quantitative strategy). The products of the two producers are of different levels. We explore the difference between the two producers. The choice of authorized objects and welfare changes under such authorization contracts, the comparison between fixed fees and concession fees, and the choice of optimal authorization contracts for Technology-owned enterprises.
The results show that under the fixed fee contract, when the product difference is small and the product innovation degree is relatively large, the technology owner chooses to authorize the enterprise to compete in price, and when the product difference is small and the product innovation degree is small, the technology owner chooses to authorize the enterprise to compete in production is the best choice. In other cases, Technology-owned enterprises will choose to license technology to two productive enterprises at the same time. As far as social welfare level is concerned, the level of consumer surplus and social welfare is the highest when technology is licensed to two enterprises at the same time, and the level of consumer surplus and social welfare is the lowest when technology is licensed to a price-competitive enterprise.
Under the concession fee contract, the technology owner enterprise chooses to license the technology to the two enterprises at the same time, and when comparing exclusive license, it is found that the technology owner enterprise gains more profit than the technology owner enterprise when the technology is licensed to the production competition enterprise; under the double fee contract, the technology owner enterprise will license the technology to the price competition enterprise. Empowering technology to two enterprises is the best choice, and Technology-owned enterprises prefer to empower technology to production competition enterprises. Only in the relatively high degree of innovation within a small range, Technology-owned enterprises will choose to empower technology to price competition enterprises.
Under the mixed competition strategy, the fixed fee contract is not necessarily superior to the concession fee contract. Considering the maximization of the authorized income of the Technology-owned enterprises, when the degree of innovation is relatively low, the authorized income under the concession fee contract is higher than that under the fixed fee contract; when the degree of technological innovation is high, the fixed fee contract is chosen for the technology licensing. Better choice.
Among the three authorization modes, the choice of double-charge contract authorization is the best choice for Technology-owned enterprises, and this mode will always improve the level of social welfare under the mixed competition strategy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F273.1;F271

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本文編號：2237680