本文選題：發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略 + 產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)　； 參考：《西北大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：本文致力于為中國(guó)近代以來(lái)的長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)軌跡建立一個(gè)邏輯自洽的理論分析框架。我們認(rèn)為：由于忽略了經(jīng)濟(jì)和制度環(huán)境的不斷動(dòng)態(tài)演變,使得既有理論在解釋近代以來(lái)的長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)軌跡存在著局限性,并在回答下述問(wèn)題方面顯得力不從心：近代經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)停滯的原因是什么?如果國(guó)有企業(yè)的效率是低效的,那么近代以來(lái)的工業(yè)化任務(wù)為什么是由國(guó)有企業(yè),而不是民營(yíng)企業(yè)來(lái)完成(趕超戰(zhàn)略的合理性)?既然趕超戰(zhàn)略是合理的,那又是什么變化導(dǎo)致了趕超戰(zhàn)略的不可持續(xù)性和進(jìn)一步的改革,即：發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)變的內(nèi)生機(jī)制? 為了回答上述問(wèn)題,本文首先從微觀和宏觀兩個(gè)視角證明了國(guó)有企業(yè)的動(dòng)態(tài)效率,并進(jìn)一步從發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略、產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和最優(yōu)政府行為三個(gè)方面對(duì)近代以來(lái)的長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)軌跡進(jìn)行了解讀。本文發(fā)現(xiàn)： (1)在改制后,國(guó)有企業(yè)的績(jī)效已經(jīng)有了大幅度的提高,且與非國(guó)有企業(yè)績(jī)效的差異已經(jīng)不再明顯。除此之外,我們還探討了市場(chǎng)化水平和不同所有制企業(yè)績(jī)效進(jìn)行了探討。我們認(rèn)為,當(dāng)市場(chǎng)化水平較低時(shí),其將導(dǎo)致不同所有制企業(yè)生產(chǎn)率差異的擴(kuò)大；反之,其會(huì)導(dǎo)致不同所有制企業(yè)生產(chǎn)率差異的縮小。 (2)國(guó)有企業(yè)的低效率需要以市場(chǎng)的高效率為前提。在信息不完全的前提下,本文從“生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”和“交易風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”兩個(gè)方面對(duì)Yang and Ng(1995)的企業(yè)交易效率演進(jìn)模型進(jìn)行了擴(kuò)展,并證明出國(guó)有企業(yè)低效率的臨界交易效率條件：當(dāng)交易效率較低時(shí),生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成本較高,那么國(guó)有企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權(quán)安排將因?yàn)橛欣诠?jié)約生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成本而促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)；反之,交易風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成本較高,于是民營(yíng)企業(yè)將因?yàn)橛欣诠?jié)約交易風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成本而促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。 (3)鑒于現(xiàn)實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)中廣泛存在的金融約束和所有制歧視,本文重新從“生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”和“交易風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”兩個(gè)方面對(duì)Yang(1999)進(jìn)行了擴(kuò)展。我們認(rèn)為,金融深化和產(chǎn)權(quán)改革之所以能促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng),其得益于不斷推進(jìn)的市場(chǎng)化改革和日益完善的資源配給制度。當(dāng)市場(chǎng)缺失或失靈,生產(chǎn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成為效率損失的主要來(lái)源時(shí),金融抑制和傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)仍然有助于彌補(bǔ)私人投資不足,并實(shí)現(xiàn)次優(yōu)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。 (4)近代以來(lái)的長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)軌跡是一個(gè)完整的不可分割的整體�；谏鲜稣J(rèn)識(shí),本文利用“外部性”對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)的“增長(zhǎng)拖累”模型進(jìn)行了擴(kuò)展,并進(jìn)一步從發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略、產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和最優(yōu)政府行為三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行解讀。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),近代(1840-1949)的“增長(zhǎng)停滯”可以歸因于錯(cuò)誤的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略、低效的產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和政府的機(jī)會(huì)主義,建國(guó)前30年(1949-1978)的有限增長(zhǎng)歸因于趕超戰(zhàn)略、國(guó)有企業(yè)和政府的有效補(bǔ)貼,建國(guó)后30年(1978-至今)的快速增長(zhǎng)歸因于比較優(yōu)勢(shì)戰(zhàn)略、民營(yíng)企業(yè)和中性政府,而發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)變的內(nèi)生機(jī)制則在于彌補(bǔ)外部性超過(guò)了“軟預(yù)算約束”和由此產(chǎn)生的“道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”成本。 (5)鑒于知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)和在此基礎(chǔ)上的創(chuàng)新對(duì)于跨越“中等收入陷阱”中的重要性,本文對(duì)Sun and Lio(1996)的內(nèi)生投資品種類數(shù)分工模型進(jìn)行了拓展,通過(guò)剩余索取權(quán)的變化探討了知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)水平與長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)之間的非線性關(guān)系。我們認(rèn)為：在交易效率較低,分工經(jīng)濟(jì)尚未充分展開(kāi)的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展早期階段,投資品的生產(chǎn)遠(yuǎn)離世界技術(shù)前沿,那么有利于“模仿創(chuàng)新”投資品生產(chǎn)的模糊知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)將實(shí)現(xiàn)一定的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)；但隨著交易效率的演進(jìn)和分工經(jīng)濟(jì)的充分展開(kāi),投資品的生產(chǎn)將逐漸接近世界技術(shù)前沿并進(jìn)一步導(dǎo)致“模仿創(chuàng)新”促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的作用逐漸下降。如果沒(méi)有知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)水平的改進(jìn),傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)模式將面臨增長(zhǎng)停滯以及“中等收入陷阱”,那么實(shí)現(xiàn)有利于“自主創(chuàng)新”投資品生產(chǎn)的嚴(yán)格知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)制度的轉(zhuǎn)變將成為實(shí)現(xiàn)持續(xù)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的必然選擇。 綜上所述,通過(guò)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略、產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和最優(yōu)政府行為對(duì)于近代以來(lái)長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)軌跡的考察,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)不論是發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略還是產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),其對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的作用均表現(xiàn)出動(dòng)態(tài)性和“階段適宜性”。這就意味著：忽略發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略本身的演變,抽象的談?wù)搰?guó)有企業(yè)的低效率,其合理性是值得商榷的。因此,厘清不同經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展階段所依賴的經(jīng)濟(jì)和制度環(huán)境,科學(xué)的認(rèn)識(shí)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略和產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中的作用,才是我們跨越“中等收入陷阱”,實(shí)現(xiàn)“大國(guó)發(fā)展道路”向“強(qiáng)國(guó)發(fā)展道路”轉(zhuǎn)變的重中之重。
[Abstract]:This article is devoted to the establishment of a logical and consistent theoretical analysis framework for the long-term economic growth track in modern China. We think that, owing to the neglect of the continuous dynamic evolution of the economic and institutional environment, the existing theory has been limited in explaining the long-term economic growth track since modern times, and the following questions are answered. What is the reason for the stagnation of economic growth in modern times? If the efficiency of the state-owned enterprises is inefficient, then why is the modern industrialization task done by the state-owned enterprises, not the private enterprises (the rationality of catching up the strategy)? Since the overtaking strategy is reasonable, then what changes have led to the overtaking strategy The unsustainability and further reform, that is, the endogenous mechanism of transformation of development strategy?
In order to answer the above questions, this paper first proves the dynamic efficiency of the state-owned enterprises from two perspectives of microcosmic and macro, and further interprets the long-term economic growth track from three aspects: the development strategy, the property right structure and the optimal government behavior.
(1) after the restructuring, the performance of the state-owned enterprises has been greatly improved, and the difference from the performance of non-state-owned enterprises is no longer obvious. Besides, we also discuss the market level and the performance of different ownership enterprises. We think that when the market level is low, it will lead to the productivity of different ownership enterprises. The enlargement of differences will result in the narrowing of productivity differences among different ownership enterprises.
(2) the low efficiency of the state-owned enterprises should be based on the high efficiency of the market. Under the premise of incomplete information, this paper extends the enterprise transaction efficiency evolution model of Yang and Ng (1995) from the two aspects of "production risk" and "transaction risk". When the rate is low, the cost of production risk is high, so the property right arrangement of the state-owned enterprises will promote the economic growth because it is beneficial to saving the cost of production risk. On the contrary, the transaction risk cost is high, so the private enterprise will promote the economic growth because it is beneficial to saving the transaction risk cost.
(3) in view of the widespread financial constraints and ownership discrimination in the real economy, this article has expanded the Yang (1999) from two aspects of "production risk" and "transaction risk". We believe that financial deepening and property rights reform can promote economic growth, which is benefited from the continuous reform of the market and the increasingly perfect capital. When the market is missing or failed and production risk becomes the main source of efficiency loss, financial restraint and traditional property structure still help to make up for private investment and achieve suboptimal economic growth.
(4) the long-term economic growth track since modern times is an integral and inseparable whole. Based on the above understanding, this paper uses "externality" to expand the "growth drag" model of state-owned enterprises, and further interprets the three aspects of the development strategy, the property right structure and the optimal government line. The result is that the modern (1840-19) 49) the "growth stagnation" can be attributed to the wrong development strategy, the inefficient property rights structure and the opportunism of the government. The limited growth of the 30 years (1949-1978) before the founding of the people's Republic of China is attributable to the overtaking strategy, the effective subsidy of the state-owned enterprises and the government, the rapid growth of the 30 years after the founding of the people's Republic of China (1978-) is attributable to the comparative advantage strategy, the private enterprise and the neutrality. The endogenous mechanism of the government's development strategy transformation is to make up for the externalities beyond the "soft budget constraint" and the resulting "moral hazard" cost.
(5) in view of the importance of intellectual property protection and the innovation on this basis for crossing the "middle income trap", this paper extends the Sun and Lio (1996) model of endogenous investment category number division, and discusses the nonlinear relationship between the protection level of intellectual property rights and the long-term economic growth through the change of the residual claim right. We believe that, in the early stage of economic development with low transaction efficiency and undeveloped division of labor, the production of investment goods is far from the frontier of the world technology. Then the fuzzy intellectual property protection of "imitation innovation" will achieve certain economic growth, but with the evolution of transaction efficiency and the full division of labor economy If there is no improvement in the level of intellectual property protection, the traditional economic growth model will face growth stagnation and the "medium income trap", which is beneficial to "independent innovation". The transformation of strict intellectual property protection system for investment goods production will become an inevitable choice to achieve sustained economic growth.
To sum up, through the development strategy, the property right structure and the optimal government behavior, we find that both the development strategy and the property right structure play a dynamic and "stage suitability" for the economic growth, which means that the evolution of the development strategy itself is ignored. It is questionable to discuss the low efficiency of the state-owned enterprises in abstract terms. Therefore, to clarify the economic and institutional environment, the scientific understanding of the development strategy and the role of the property right structure in the economic development of different economic development stages, is that we cross the "middle income trap" and realize the "great power development road" to "the powerful country". The road to development is the most important change.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F279.2

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