本文選題：技術(shù)授權(quán) + Hotelling模型��； 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著科技進(jìn)步日新月異、科技競(jìng)爭(zhēng)日漸加劇及對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的保護(hù)日趨完善,技術(shù)授權(quán)成為很多企業(yè)獲得技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的主要途徑。通過技術(shù)授權(quán),專利持有人獲得授權(quán)費(fèi)用,同時(shí)被授權(quán)的廠商也可以通過接受授權(quán)改善自己的技術(shù)水平。前人對(duì)專利授權(quán)的研究主要集中在追求利潤(rùn)最大化的私人廠商,很少有人關(guān)注混合所有制廠商。隨著我國(guó)混合所有制改革的推進(jìn),混合所有制廠商在市場(chǎng)上會(huì)越來越多。不同于國(guó)有制廠商和私有制廠商,混合所有制廠商追求的目標(biāo)并不單一,它既追求利潤(rùn)最大化,又追求社會(huì)福利最大化。在此背景下,本文通過建立空間異質(zhì)產(chǎn)品模型—Hotelling模型,分析當(dāng)模型中生產(chǎn)型廠商分別由兩個(gè)私有制寡頭廠商或者由私有制廠商、混合所有制廠商組成的混合寡頭廠商組成時(shí),專利持有廠商的授權(quán)行為和最優(yōu)模式的選擇。本文假定專利持有廠商為外部人,其獲得收益的方式是通過持有的技術(shù)進(jìn)行授權(quán),追求授權(quán)利潤(rùn)的最大化。本文最大的創(chuàng)新之處在于引入了混合所有制廠商,研究混合寡頭下的技術(shù)授權(quán)問題并且比較生產(chǎn)型廠商的所有制構(gòu)成不同時(shí),對(duì)授權(quán)行為和最優(yōu)授權(quán)模式的影響。通過分析我們發(fā)現(xiàn):在固定費(fèi)用制下,當(dāng)專利持有者授權(quán)給由私有化廠商組成的寡頭時(shí),最優(yōu)的技術(shù)授權(quán)模式是獨(dú)家授權(quán);當(dāng)專利持有者授權(quán)給由混合所有制廠商和私有制廠商構(gòu)成的混合寡頭時(shí),最優(yōu)的技術(shù)授權(quán)模式的選擇取決于混合所有制廠商的私有化程度、初始的技術(shù)水平和技術(shù)創(chuàng)新程度,其中,當(dāng)私有化程度比較高時(shí),專利持有廠商選擇獨(dú)家授權(quán)給私有制廠商,當(dāng)私有化比較低時(shí),被授權(quán)廠商選擇獨(dú)家授權(quán)給混合所有制廠商。在可變費(fèi)率制下,無論專利的創(chuàng)新程度如何、生產(chǎn)型廠商的所有制形式如何,外部的專利持有人都會(huì)選擇同時(shí)授權(quán)給兩個(gè)生產(chǎn)型廠商。在兩部收費(fèi)制下,無論生產(chǎn)型廠商的所有制形式如何、廠商A的私有化程度如何、專利的創(chuàng)新程度如何,專利持有者都傾向于同時(shí)授權(quán)。在最優(yōu)授權(quán)模式的確定上,出于自身利潤(rùn)最大化考慮,專利持有廠商都會(huì)選擇兩部收費(fèi)模式進(jìn)行授權(quán)。但是在生產(chǎn)型廠商為私有制廠商時(shí),兩部收費(fèi)制完全轉(zhuǎn)化為可變費(fèi)率制。由此本文可以得出,所有制結(jié)構(gòu)的不同會(huì)對(duì)專利持有廠商的授權(quán)行為產(chǎn)生影響,但是在最優(yōu)授權(quán)模式的選擇上,兩部收費(fèi)制都是最優(yōu)的授權(quán)模式。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of science and technology, the competition of science and technology is becoming more and more serious, and the protection of intellectual property rights is becoming more and more perfect. Technology authorization has become the main way for many enterprises to obtain technological innovation. Through technology licensing, patent holders receive licensing fees, and authorized manufacturers can improve their technology level by receiving licenses. Previous researches on patent licensing mainly focus on private firms that pursue profit maximization, and few people pay attention to mixed ownership firms. With the development of China's mixed ownership reform, there will be more and more mixed ownership manufacturers in the market. Different from state-owned and private ownership firms, mixed ownership firms pursue not only the goal of maximization of profit, but also the maximization of social welfare. In this context, this paper establishes a spatial heterogeneous product model, Hotelling model, and analyzes when the model consists of two private oligarchs or mixed oligarchs, which are composed of private ownership firms and mixed ownership firms, respectively. The licensing behavior of the patent holder and the choice of the optimal mode. This paper assumes that the patent holder is an outsider, and the way to obtain the profit is to license the technology held and to maximize the profit of the license. The biggest innovation of this paper is the introduction of mixed ownership firms, the study of technology authorization under mixed oligopoly, and the comparison of the different ownership structure of production firms on the influence of authorization behavior and optimal authorization mode. Through the analysis, we find that under the fixed fee system, when the patent holders license to the oligopoly composed of privatized firms, the optimal technology licensing mode is the exclusive licensing; When the patent holder authorizes the mixed oligopoly composed of the mixed ownership firm and the private ownership firm, the choice of the optimal technology authorization mode depends on the degree of privatization, the initial technology level and the technological innovation degree of the mixed ownership firm. Among them, when the degree of privatization is relatively high, the patent holder chooses the exclusive license to the private ownership firm, and when the privatization is relatively low, the authorized firm chooses the exclusive license to the mixed ownership firm. Under the variable rate system, regardless of the degree of innovation of the patent and the ownership form of the producer, the external patent holder will choose to license the two manufacturers at the same time. Under the two-part charging system, regardless of the ownership form of the producer, the degree of privatization of the manufacturer A, the degree of innovation of the patent, the patent holder is inclined to license at the same time. In order to determine the optimal licensing mode, the patent holders will choose two charging modes to license for their own profit maximization. However, when the producer is private-owned, the two-part charge system is completely transformed into variable rate system. Therefore, it can be concluded that the different ownership structure will have an impact on the licensing behavior of the patent holder, but in the choice of the optimal licensing mode, the two fee systems are the optimal licensing mode.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F273.1

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前6條

1 李和興;;傳統(tǒng)版權(quán)授權(quán)模式存在的問題研究[J];企業(yè)導(dǎo)報(bào);2012年15期

2 李和興;;關(guān)于完善網(wǎng)絡(luò)著作權(quán)授權(quán)模式的對(duì)策研究[J];企業(yè)導(dǎo)報(bào);2012年16期

3 劉燕;;Google Library版權(quán)政策對(duì)圖書館授權(quán)模式探索與創(chuàng)新的啟示[J];情報(bào)資料工作;2008年06期

4 Ansgar Dodt;;靈活的使用許可模式防止假冒偽劣[J];現(xiàn)代制造;2009年39期

5 明星;;SCA.探索版權(quán)交易自助的路徑[J];中關(guān)村;2010年01期

6 ;Sun發(fā)布Java2平臺(tái)的新授權(quán)模式[J];金融電子化;1999年02期

相關(guān)重要報(bào)紙文章 前8條

1 商報(bào)記者 崔嵬;多種授權(quán)模式帶來的利潤(rùn)[N];北京商報(bào);2008年

2 商報(bào)記者 董昆　陳杰 劉妮麗;數(shù)字出版需改進(jìn)著作權(quán)授權(quán)模式[N];北京商報(bào);2011年

3 中國(guó)政法大學(xué)博士生 駱電　胡夢(mèng)云;數(shù)字圖書館版權(quán)授權(quán)模式合法性與合理性判析[N];人民法院報(bào);2009年

4 河南省高級(jí)人民法院 關(guān)曉海;海量作品授權(quán),如何平衡傳播與保護(hù)[N];中國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)報(bào);2011年

5 曹增光;400學(xué)者訴侵權(quán) 數(shù)字版權(quán)管理懸空[N];中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)報(bào);2007年

6 本報(bào)記者 白羽;數(shù)字出版能否實(shí)現(xiàn)有法可依[N];新華書目報(bào);2014年

7 李薇;四大光盤商將起訴飛利浦[N];北京商報(bào);2007年

8 記者 王康;音著協(xié)與32家電視臺(tái)簽署音樂付酬協(xié)議[N];中國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)報(bào);2012年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前5條

1 周春陽;混合寡頭模型下企業(yè)的技術(shù)授權(quán)模式研究[D];山東大學(xué);2017年

2 張嬋;數(shù)字環(huán)境下多元化版權(quán)授權(quán)模式研究[D];湘潭大學(xué);2011年

3 王萃;圖書數(shù)字化傳播版權(quán)授權(quán)模式研究[D];東北師范大學(xué);2006年

4 朱娜娜;數(shù)字圖書館版權(quán)授權(quán)模式研究[D];黑龍江大學(xué);2010年

5 楊蓉;數(shù)字環(huán)境下的版權(quán)授權(quán)方式研究[D];北京郵電大學(xué);2008年

，

本文編號(hào)：1883301