【摘要】：隨著我國(guó)社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)改革不斷深化,在經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮與經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)更為活躍的背景下,公司行賄犯罪(筆者針對(duì)我國(guó)《刑法》中的三種罪名的合稱)逐漸呈上升趨勢(shì)。然而,關(guān)于公司行賄犯罪,在基礎(chǔ)概念、基本理論和司法實(shí)踐等方面,仍存在重大爭(zhēng)議,如公司(國(guó)外所稱“法人”、國(guó)內(nèi)所稱“單位”范疇內(nèi)的一部分)在犯罪中的刑事責(zé)任依據(jù),提高自然人自由刑是否為解決“重受賄、輕行賄”的刑罰失衡問題的最優(yōu)方式,以及如何合理配置該類犯罪刑罰等。因此,本文運(yùn)用法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué),重新梳理公司行賄犯罪中的法人與自然人的刑事責(zé)任,分析行賄方與受賄方的深層關(guān)系與相互影響,從新的理論視角,構(gòu)建公司行賄犯罪的刑罰配置方案。第一部分,本文運(yùn)用法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)原理重新審視公司行賄犯罪的刑事責(zé)任依據(jù)及其原因。首先根據(jù)企業(yè)所有權(quán)理論對(duì)公司行賄犯罪的犯罪肌理與激勵(lì)問題進(jìn)行分析,闡明在公司行賄犯罪中對(duì)公司進(jìn)行懲罰的正當(dāng)性(有責(zé)性)與判決阻斷后對(duì)公司中自然人進(jìn)行處罰的合理性。第二部分,根據(jù)法定刑與收集的真實(shí)案例對(duì)我國(guó)“重受賄、輕行賄”現(xiàn)狀予以分析,并通過邊際效用方法研究目前我國(guó)公司行賄犯罪的罰金刑配置問題,及公司行賄犯罪與受賄犯罪之間的內(nèi)在關(guān)系。最后,根據(jù)供需理論說明在實(shí)際情形中刑罰無論施加于哪一方均會(huì)加重雙方交易成本。第三部分,首先以理性犯罪模型為基礎(chǔ),建立符合公司行賄犯罪特征的理性行為模型,對(duì)我國(guó)司法實(shí)務(wù)中的案例進(jìn)行研判,得出當(dāng)前公司行賄犯罪刑罰威懾力不足與處斷肆意的結(jié)論。最后依據(jù)報(bào)應(yīng)刑決定刑罰上限,預(yù)防刑決定具體刑罰點(diǎn)的理論,提出應(yīng)以違法所得而非行賄數(shù)額為主要考量因素合理配置公司罰金刑的方法。本文的研究意義在于不再亟于厘清公司犯罪的刑法理論聚訟,而以功利主義的法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)方式對(duì)公司行賄犯罪的原因、刑事責(zé)任依據(jù)以及罰金刑等問題進(jìn)行分析,得出具體而非抽象的規(guī)制對(duì)策,再通過研究結(jié)果反哺刑法理論并進(jìn)行教義學(xué)的修正。本文的研究結(jié)論是針對(duì)公司行賄犯罪刑事責(zé)任依據(jù)的困境,與當(dāng)前我國(guó)公司行賄犯罪威懾力不足與處斷肆意的問題,重構(gòu)公司行賄犯罪的罰金刑體系,從而達(dá)成公司行賄犯罪懲治威懾力最優(yōu)的研究目的。申言之,根據(jù)對(duì)我國(guó)刑事案例中違法所得與行賄數(shù)額進(jìn)行一元線性回歸分析,構(gòu)建符合我國(guó)公司行賄犯罪特征的理性行為模型,再依據(jù)報(bào)應(yīng)刑決定刑罰上限,特殊預(yù)防決定具體刑罰的理論提出合理配置公司罰金刑的方法,將我國(guó)目前針對(duì)公司行賄犯罪的無限數(shù)額罰金標(biāo)準(zhǔn)改為限額罰金制,將違法所得作為罪狀內(nèi)容,取代行賄數(shù)額作為決定公司行賄犯罪罰金刑數(shù)額的依據(jù),分為兩種情況判處罰金刑:第一,審判時(shí)存在可供沒收的違法所得;第二,審判時(shí)沒有可供沒收的違法所得。第一種情況又分為兩種:一是全額違法所得可供沒收,則判處少量罰金刑數(shù)額僅為消除公司再犯可能性即可;二是部分剩余違法所得可供沒收,則以犯罪發(fā)生時(shí)該類犯罪懲罰概率判處差額罰金數(shù)額。第二種情況則以違法所得為罰金數(shù)額上限根據(jù)特殊預(yù)防必要性確定具體數(shù)額。就自然人刑罰而言,只有遭遇判決阻斷時(shí)才具有判處自然人自由刑必要,除此之外應(yīng)以消除自然人再犯可能性有限制條件地判處刑罰(沒收因行賄犯罪獲取的非法所得、判處適當(dāng)罰金刑、資格刑并處以相關(guān)保安處分等)。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of China's socialist market economy reform and the more active economic prosperity and economic activity, the company's bribery crime (the author of the three crimes in the criminal law of China) has gradually increased. However, the crime of bribery in the company still exists in the basic concept, basic theory and judicial practice. Major disputes, such as the company (foreign name "legal person", the part of the domestic "unit") in the category of criminal responsibility in the crime, to improve the free punishment of natural persons is the best way to solve the problem of "heavy bribery, light bribery" and how to rationally configure the criminal penalty. Therefore, this article is used in this paper. Economics, recombing the criminal responsibility of the legal person and the natural person in the bribery crime of the company, analyzing the deep relationship and mutual influence between the bribe party and the bribe party, and constructing the penalty allocation scheme of the bribe crime from the new theoretical perspective. In the first part, this article uses the principle of law and economics to re examine the criminal responsibility of the bribe crime in the company. According to the reason and the reason. First, it analyzes the problem of the criminal texture and incentive of the company's bribery crime according to the theory of enterprise ownership, and clarifies the justifiability of punishing the company in the company's bribery crime and the rationality of punishing the natural person in the company after the judgment is blocked. The second part is based on the legal punishment and the truth of the collection. The case studies the current situation of "paying bribes heavily and taking bribes" in our country. Through the marginal utility method, we study the problem of the penalty allocation of the bribe crime of our company, and the internal relationship between the bribe crime and the bribery crime. Finally, according to the theory of supply and demand, it is shown which party will aggravate the double penalty in the actual situation. The third part, in the first part, based on the rational crime model, set up a rational behavior model which conforms to the characteristics of the bribery crime of the company, studies the cases in the judicial practice of our country, and draws the conclusion that the deterrent force of the criminal penalty is insufficient and the conclusion is disconnected. Finally, the penalty upper limit is determined on the basis of the retribution penalty, and the punishment will be prevented. The theory of specific penalty points is set up, and the method of rational allocation of fine penalty should be made by taking the illegal income rather than the amount of bribe as the main factor. The research significance of this paper is that it is no longer urgent to clarify the criminal law theory of the company, and the reasons for the crime of bribery by the utilitarianism and the law and economics, and the basis of the criminal responsibility. And the fine penalty and other issues to be analyzed, draw concrete and not abstract Regulation Countermeasures, and revise the theory of criminal law through the research results and revise the doctrine of teaching. The conclusion of this paper is the dilemma of the basis of the criminal responsibility of the bribe crime of the company, and the problem of the lack of deterrence and disconnection between the crime of bribery in our country and the reconfiguration of the public. The fine penalty system of bribery crime by the company, thus the purpose of the research on the optimal deterrence of the bribery crime by the Achieve Inc. In a word, according to the linear regression analysis of the illegal income and the amount of bribery in the criminal cases in China, a rational behavior model which conforms to the characteristics of the bribery crime in our country is constructed, and the penalty upper limit is determined according to the retribution penalty. In particular, the theory of specific penalty to determine the specific penalty is put forward to rationally configure the fine penalty of the company, and the unlimited fine standard of the company's current bribery crime is changed into the quota and penalty system, and the illegal income is taken as the content of the crime, and the amount of the bribe is replaced by the amount of the fine of the bribe of the company, which is divided into two cases. Penal punishment: first, there are illegal gains for confiscation in the trial; second, there is no illegal income for confiscation at trial. The first situation is divided into two types: first, the total amount of illegal income can be confiscated, and the amount of a small fine is only to eliminate the possibility of the company's repeated offense; and two is a part of the remaining illegal income for confiscation, then In the second case, the limit of the amount of the penalty amount is determined according to the necessity of special prevention. In terms of the penalty of natural persons, it is necessary for the natural person to be sentenced to freedom of punishment only when the sentence is blocked, except for the elimination of the second offense of natural persons. Penalty shall be imposed with limited possibilities (forfeiture of illegal gains obtained from bribery offences, appropriate fines, qualification penalties and related security measures, etc.).
【學(xué)位授予單位】：甘肅政法學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D924.3

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