科學(xué)證據(jù)的訴訟認知論
發(fā)布時間：2019-02-22 17:39
【摘要】：新《刑事訴訟法》要求必須堅持統(tǒng)籌處理懲治犯罪與保障人權(quán)關(guān)系的原則，即在應(yīng)對日益科技化、信息化、復(fù)雜化的犯罪活動時，要在尊重和保障人權(quán)的基礎(chǔ)上，綜合運用科學(xué)技術(shù)，實現(xiàn)司法證明的科學(xué)化。當(dāng)然，上述要求不僅適用于刑事案件，也同樣為民事訴訟所接受。這是因為在民事證據(jù)材料發(fā)現(xiàn)、提取、解讀、質(zhì)證和認證的一系列工作過程中，經(jīng)常需要借助法庭科學(xué)技術(shù)對涉案痕跡、文書、微量物證、DNA等進行司法鑒定來再現(xiàn)和確認案件事實。但在現(xiàn)實生活中，由于欠缺法庭科學(xué)的相關(guān)知識，無論是司法官員還是代理律師在對鑒定意見的認知上經(jīng)常會產(chǎn)生偏差：一方面，法官常常會視司法鑒定意見為唯一真理而草率使用�；诋�(dāng)前司法鑒定行業(yè)尚存的諸如利益尋租、管理混亂、鑒定技能良莠不齊等現(xiàn)象的綜合考量，這種態(tài)度極有可能導(dǎo)致因采信錯誤鑒定意見而影響案件事實準(zhǔn)確認定的情形出現(xiàn)；另一方面，如果律師對法庭科學(xué)基本原理一無所知，就會使其在提請鑒定委托要求時不具有針對性，要么貽誤最佳鑒定時機，要么致使重新鑒定和補充鑒定，要么不能對鑒定意見作出對其有利的質(zhì)證，這既降低了訴訟效率，也有失為保護當(dāng)事人合法權(quán)益提供司法服務(wù)的職業(yè)本性。 鑒于此，本文旨在通過對科學(xué)證據(jù)基本理論范疇的系統(tǒng)闡述和訴訟認知結(jié)構(gòu)的宏觀搭建，力求探尋在訴訟活動中對科學(xué)證據(jù)的認知究竟癥結(jié)存于何處以及具體解決方法應(yīng)作何安排兩大核心問題。就文章結(jié)構(gòu)來講，第一部分建立在馬克思辯證唯物主義的基礎(chǔ)之上，意在借助于對科學(xué)證據(jù)概念、分類、屬性、科學(xué)與法律關(guān)系的論述，初步揭示出采信疑難之原因——科學(xué)證據(jù)的不確定度。第二部分緊扣以科學(xué)的態(tài)度對待科學(xué)的指導(dǎo)思想，構(gòu)建出科學(xué)證據(jù)訴訟認知的兩個層次，，即法官從知識的角度對檢驗原理與方法的可靠性做出初次審查和從法律的角度就技術(shù)人員的專業(yè)解答給予系統(tǒng)的二次評判。第三部分立足于我國當(dāng)前司法實踐的現(xiàn)實情況，欲闡述本文的核心觀點——一味地追求統(tǒng)一的科學(xué)證據(jù)訴訟認知標(biāo)準(zhǔn)缺乏實際意義，應(yīng)該以證明目的為基準(zhǔn)，探究裁判者在評價過程中自由心證的運用才更符合需要。
[Abstract]:The new Code of Criminal procedure requires that the principle of comprehensively dealing with the relationship between the punishment of crimes and the protection of human rights must be adhered to, that is, when dealing with increasingly scientific, informational and complex criminal activities, we should respect and protect human rights on the basis of, Comprehensive use of science and technology to achieve scientific judicial proof. Of course, these requirements apply not only to criminal cases, but also to civil proceedings. This is because in the course of a series of work on the discovery, extraction, interpretation, cross-examination and certification of civil evidence materials, it is often necessary to use court science and technology to deal with traces, documents, and trace material evidence involved. DNA and other forensic expertise to reproduce and confirm the facts of the case. But in real life, due to the lack of relevant knowledge of forensic science, both judicial officials and lawyers often have deviations in their understanding of expert opinions: on the one hand, Judges often use judicial opinions hastily as the only truth. Based on the comprehensive consideration of the remaining phenomena in the forensic expertise industry, such as rent-seeking, confusion in management, mixed identification skills, and so on, This attitude is likely to lead to the adoption of false opinion and affect the accurate identification of the facts of the case; On the other hand, if a lawyer knows nothing about the basic principles of court science, he or she will not be targeted when submitting requests for accreditation, either by delaying the best time of identification, or by leading to reappraisal and supplemental identification, Either the appraisal opinion can not make favorable cross-examination, which not only reduces the litigation efficiency, but also loses the professional nature of providing judicial services for the protection of the parties' legitimate rights and interests. In view of this, the purpose of this paper is to systematically expound the basic theoretical category of scientific evidence and to set up the macroscopic structure of litigation cognition. This paper tries to find out where the crux of cognition of scientific evidence lies in litigation activities and how to arrange the concrete solution. As far as the structure of the article is concerned, the first part is based on Marxist dialectical materialism and is intended to be based on the discussion of the concept, classification, attributes, relationship between science and law of scientific evidence. The uncertainty of scientific evidence is preliminarily revealed. The second part closely links to the scientific attitude towards the guiding ideology of science, and constructs two levels of cognition of scientific evidence litigation. That is to say, the judge makes the first examination on the reliability of the inspection principle and method from the angle of knowledge and gives a systematic secondary judgment on the technical personnel's professional solution from the angle of law. The third part is based on the actual situation of our country's current judicial practice, and wants to expound the core point of view of this article-the lack of practical significance in blindly pursuing the unified cognitive standard of scientific evidence litigation, which should be based on the purpose of proof. To explore the use of free heart evidence in the evaluation process is more in line with the need.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D925.2
本文編號：2428449
[Abstract]:The new Code of Criminal procedure requires that the principle of comprehensively dealing with the relationship between the punishment of crimes and the protection of human rights must be adhered to, that is, when dealing with increasingly scientific, informational and complex criminal activities, we should respect and protect human rights on the basis of, Comprehensive use of science and technology to achieve scientific judicial proof. Of course, these requirements apply not only to criminal cases, but also to civil proceedings. This is because in the course of a series of work on the discovery, extraction, interpretation, cross-examination and certification of civil evidence materials, it is often necessary to use court science and technology to deal with traces, documents, and trace material evidence involved. DNA and other forensic expertise to reproduce and confirm the facts of the case. But in real life, due to the lack of relevant knowledge of forensic science, both judicial officials and lawyers often have deviations in their understanding of expert opinions: on the one hand, Judges often use judicial opinions hastily as the only truth. Based on the comprehensive consideration of the remaining phenomena in the forensic expertise industry, such as rent-seeking, confusion in management, mixed identification skills, and so on, This attitude is likely to lead to the adoption of false opinion and affect the accurate identification of the facts of the case; On the other hand, if a lawyer knows nothing about the basic principles of court science, he or she will not be targeted when submitting requests for accreditation, either by delaying the best time of identification, or by leading to reappraisal and supplemental identification, Either the appraisal opinion can not make favorable cross-examination, which not only reduces the litigation efficiency, but also loses the professional nature of providing judicial services for the protection of the parties' legitimate rights and interests. In view of this, the purpose of this paper is to systematically expound the basic theoretical category of scientific evidence and to set up the macroscopic structure of litigation cognition. This paper tries to find out where the crux of cognition of scientific evidence lies in litigation activities and how to arrange the concrete solution. As far as the structure of the article is concerned, the first part is based on Marxist dialectical materialism and is intended to be based on the discussion of the concept, classification, attributes, relationship between science and law of scientific evidence. The uncertainty of scientific evidence is preliminarily revealed. The second part closely links to the scientific attitude towards the guiding ideology of science, and constructs two levels of cognition of scientific evidence litigation. That is to say, the judge makes the first examination on the reliability of the inspection principle and method from the angle of knowledge and gives a systematic secondary judgment on the technical personnel's professional solution from the angle of law. The third part is based on the actual situation of our country's current judicial practice, and wants to expound the core point of view of this article-the lack of practical significance in blindly pursuing the unified cognitive standard of scientific evidence litigation, which should be based on the purpose of proof. To explore the use of free heart evidence in the evaluation process is more in line with the need.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D925.2
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