發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-09-17 12:25

【摘要】：我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)自上世紀(jì)九十年代開(kāi)始發(fā)展,二十多年來(lái)取得了舉世矚目的成就,蓬勃發(fā)展的同時(shí)也出現(xiàn)了許多問(wèn)題。由于上市公司數(shù)量的激增,證券市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管相對(duì)滯后,證券市場(chǎng)中侵害投資者權(quán)利的惡性事件頻發(fā),其中上市公司董事虛假陳述的違法行為就是表現(xiàn)最為嚴(yán)重的行為之一。董事的職務(wù)行為涉及到我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)中各個(gè)主體的利益,強(qiáng)調(diào)董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任追究機(jī)制意義重大,不僅能促進(jìn)他們?nèi)媛男行畔⑴读x務(wù),預(yù)防和制約虛假陳述違法行為的發(fā)生,而且為切實(shí)維護(hù)投資者的合法權(quán)益開(kāi)啟了司法途徑,為投資者尋求訴訟救濟(jì)提供法律上的理論支持。因此,本文就上市公司董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任追究機(jī)制展開(kāi)研究。本文由四部分組成:第一部分,從上市公司董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任的基本理論入手,概述上市公司董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任的概念、性質(zhì)、構(gòu)成要件以及追究上市公司董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任的意義。第二部分,通過(guò)梳理美國(guó)、日本和德國(guó)三個(gè)國(guó)家關(guān)于上市公司董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任追究機(jī)制,分別從投資者對(duì)董事可直接提起民事訴訟、投資者有獨(dú)特的訴訟形式和建立董事民事賠償責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度三個(gè)方面對(duì)有關(guān)上市公司董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任追究機(jī)制中的相關(guān)模式進(jìn)行探討和分析。第三部分,指出我國(guó)上市公司董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任追究機(jī)制現(xiàn)狀及存在的三點(diǎn)問(wèn)題。首先指出董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任追究機(jī)制的立法現(xiàn)狀和實(shí)施現(xiàn)狀,然后從投資者追究董事民事責(zé)任時(shí)前置程序的限制、訴訟形式的不足和董事財(cái)力不足以支付投資者損失三方面提出上市公司董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任追究機(jī)制的不足。第四部分,提出完善我國(guó)上市公司董事虛假陳述民事責(zé)任追究機(jī)制的三點(diǎn)建議。首先提出了完善和擴(kuò)展前置程序,擴(kuò)大前置程序的認(rèn)定主體和明確行政機(jī)關(guān)做出行政處罰期間;其次從擴(kuò)大代表人訴訟的適用范圍、修改權(quán)利登記的程序、拓展訴訟代表人的產(chǎn)生方式和訴權(quán)范圍三個(gè)方面建議改革完善現(xiàn)有的訴訟模式;最后建議完善董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)制度。
[Abstract]:The stock market of our country has been developing since 1990s, and has made great achievements in the past twenty years. Due to the rapid increase in the number of listed companies, the supervision of the securities market is relatively lagging behind, and the pernicious incidents of infringing the rights of investors occur frequently in the securities market, among which the illegal behavior of misrepresentation of directors of listed companies is one of the most serious behaviors. The duty behavior of directors is related to the interests of all subjects in the securities market of our country. It is of great significance to emphasize that the mechanism of investigating directors' civil liability for misrepresentation not only can promote them to fully fulfill the obligation of information disclosure. To prevent and restrict the occurrence of illegal behavior of false statements, and to effectively protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors to open a judicial approach, for investors to seek legal relief to provide legal theoretical support. Therefore, this article on the listed company director false statement civil liability investigation mechanism to carry on the research. This paper is composed of four parts: the first part, starting with the basic theory of the civil liability of the directors' misrepresentation of listed companies, summarizes the concept and nature of the civil liability of the directors' misrepresentation of listed companies. The constitutive elements and the significance of investigating the civil liability of directors of listed companies for misrepresentation. In the second part, by combing the civil liability investigation mechanism of the directors of listed companies in three countries, the United States, Japan and Germany, they can bring direct civil action against the directors from investors. Investors have a unique form of litigation and the establishment of civil liability insurance system for directors of listed companies in three aspects of the false statement of the director of the civil liability mechanism related to the discussion and analysis of the relevant models. In the third part, the author points out the present situation and three problems of the civil liability investigation mechanism of the directors' misrepresentation in listed companies in our country. First of all, it points out the legislative status and implementation status of the mechanism of investigating directors' civil liability for misrepresentation, and then points out the limitation of the pre-procedure when investigating the directors' civil liability from the investors. The deficiency of the litigation form and the director's financial ability to pay the investor's loss three aspects put forward the deficiency of the civil liability investigation mechanism of the director's false statement of the listed company. In the fourth part, three suggestions are put forward to perfect the civil liability investigation mechanism of directors' misrepresentation. First of all, it proposes to perfect and expand the pre-procedure, to expand the identification subject of the pre-procedure and to make clear the period of administrative punishment made by the administrative organ; secondly, to revise the procedure of right registration from expanding the scope of application of the representative action, The author proposes to reform and perfect the existing litigation mode in three aspects: to expand the way of producing representative litigation and to improve the scope of litigation right; finally, to perfect the director's liability insurance system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D925.1

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