論經(jīng)理對(duì)公司財(cái)產(chǎn)的誠(chéng)信義務(wù)
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-03-20 15:37
本文選題:經(jīng)理概念 切入點(diǎn):公司財(cái)產(chǎn) 出處:《中國(guó)政法大學(xué)》2006年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:現(xiàn)有學(xué)說(shuō)及立法上往往側(cè)重于對(duì)公司股東、董事誠(chéng)信義務(wù)的規(guī)定,國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者普遍認(rèn)為,在義務(wù)上“經(jīng)理與董事一樣,對(duì)公司負(fù)有謹(jǐn)慎和忠實(shí)義務(wù)。我國(guó)原《公司法》第五十九條至六十二條關(guān)于董事義務(wù)的規(guī)定,同樣適用經(jīng)理!币虼,雖然《中華人民共和國(guó)公司法》(2005年10月27日修訂通過(guò),自2006年1月1日起施行,以下簡(jiǎn)稱新《公司法》)中專章規(guī)定了“公司董事、監(jiān)事、高級(jí)管理人員的資格和義務(wù)”,對(duì)公司經(jīng)理等高級(jí)管理人員有了特別的規(guī)定,但是相對(duì)而言,論述董事義務(wù)的文章很多,而對(duì)經(jīng)理不履行職責(zé)、誠(chéng)信義務(wù)意識(shí)淡薄而導(dǎo)致對(duì)公司利益的侵害的研究并不是太多。 而現(xiàn)實(shí)生活當(dāng)中,經(jīng)理為了自己利益最大化,往往忽視公司利益,甚至以損害公司利益為手段來(lái)牟取一己私利。近些年來(lái),各種媒體不斷地報(bào)道在實(shí)踐中經(jīng)理層不遵守忠實(shí)和勤勉等誠(chéng)信義務(wù)、對(duì)公司利益進(jìn)行侵蝕的現(xiàn)象,諸如公司經(jīng)理篡奪公司商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì),與公司競(jìng)業(yè)十分嚴(yán)重,“跳槽”并策反公司主要職員,離職后侵犯公司商業(yè)秘密等等。在具體的司法實(shí)踐中,因我國(guó)公司法和其他法律法規(guī)中對(duì)經(jīng)理義務(wù)、責(zé)任的規(guī)定過(guò)于簡(jiǎn)單,很多義務(wù)、責(zé)任沒(méi)有規(guī)定,而使這些行為無(wú)法進(jìn)行規(guī)制、裁判,這種現(xiàn)象大有不斷蔓延的勢(shì)頭。 本文研究的目的就在于通過(guò)對(duì)經(jīng)理內(nèi)涵外延的界定,強(qiáng)調(diào)對(duì)經(jīng)理的誠(chéng)信義務(wù),從內(nèi)部和外部加強(qiáng)對(duì)經(jīng)理的約束和管制,試圖架構(gòu)民法中的帝王條款(民法典更多地負(fù)載安全理念,使所有者保持營(yíng)業(yè)控制力,實(shí)現(xiàn)所有與控制的緊密結(jié)合)和商法中公司制度(商法典強(qiáng)調(diào)經(jīng)理的自由決定權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)判斷力,從而使經(jīng)營(yíng)更專業(yè)、更有效率)的橋梁,以更好地保障公司財(cái)產(chǎn)的安全,維護(hù)社會(huì)秩序的穩(wěn)定,也有利于社會(huì)信用體系的建立和完善。 本文采用比較法(大陸法系、英美法系比較;新舊《公司法》比較等等)、實(shí)證法(案例研究等)、歸納法、演繹法、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(引用數(shù)據(jù)等)等研究方法,對(duì)經(jīng)理的概念、要素進(jìn)行全方位的闡述,同時(shí)運(yùn)用理論與實(shí)踐相結(jié)合的方法、定性研究和定量研究相結(jié)合的方法等,從經(jīng)理的誠(chéng)信義務(wù)角度方面來(lái)談對(duì)公司財(cái)產(chǎn)安全的保護(hù)問(wèn)題,以及幾方面對(duì)經(jīng)理的約束和經(jīng)理的責(zé)任追究機(jī)制,以期進(jìn)行較為全面的研究和分析。
[Abstract]:The existing theory and legislation often focus on the provisions of the obligation of good faith to the shareholders and directors of the company. The domestic scholars generally believe that in the obligation, "the manager is the same as the director," The provisions of articles 59th to 62 of the former Company Law of China concerning the obligations of directors also apply to the manager. "therefore, although the Company Law of the people's Republic of China (revised and passed in October 27th 2005), Effective from January 1st 2006, the "qualifications and obligations of directors, supervisors and senior managers of a company" are stipulated in the special chapter of the New Company Law, which has special provisions for senior management personnel such as company managers, but relatively speaking, There are many articles on directors' obligations, but not too much research on managers' failure to perform their duties and weak sense of good faith obligations which lead to the infringement of the company's interests. In real life, managers, in order to maximize their own interests, often ignore the interests of the company, or even harm the interests of the company as a means to make a private profit. In recent years, Various media continue to report that in practice managers do not abide by their obligations of loyalty and diligence and erode the interests of the company, such as the usurpation of business opportunities by company managers. Competing with the company is very serious, "changing jobs" and opposing the main staff of the company, infringing on the company's business secrets after employment, etc. In the specific judicial practice, because of the obligations of the manager in the company law and other laws and regulations of our country, the regulation of responsibility is too simple. Many obligations, responsibilities are not stipulated, and make these acts can not be regulated, referees, this phenomenon is spreading momentum. The purpose of this paper is to define the connotation and extension of manager, emphasize the duty of good faith to manager, and strengthen the restriction and control of manager from inside and outside. Try to construct the imperial clause in the civil law (the Civil Code is more loaded with the concept of security, so that the owner to maintain business control, To achieve all the close integration with control and the corporate system in commercial law (the commercial code emphasizes the managers' free decision and business judgment, thus making their operations more professional and efficient), in order to better safeguard the safety of the company's property, Maintaining the stability of social order is also conducive to the establishment and improvement of social credit system. This paper uses comparative method (civil law system, Anglo-American law system comparison, comparison of old and new company law, etc.), empirical method (case study etc.), inductive method, deductive method, economics (citing data, etc.), to the concept of manager. At the same time, using the methods of combining theory with practice, qualitative research and quantitative research, the paper discusses the protection of company property safety from the perspective of manager's good faith obligation. And several aspects to the manager's restraint and the manager's responsibility investigation mechanism, in order to carry on the more comprehensive research and the analysis.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:中國(guó)政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2006
【分類號(hào)】:D922.291.91
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本文編號(hào):1639717
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