【摘要】：阿里巴巴所提出的公司合伙人制度是創(chuàng)新型互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人團(tuán)隊(duì)在公司治理領(lǐng)域做出的一次創(chuàng)新。本文從這一制度出發(fā),研究在機(jī)構(gòu)投資者積極主義的這背景條件下,公司治理方式的創(chuàng)新對(duì)于整個(gè)市場的影響。由于公司控制權(quán)一直以來都是公司治理領(lǐng)域一個(gè)不能回避的熱點(diǎn)問題。其本身包含了非常豐富的法律價(jià)值和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)價(jià)值。而在公司治理領(lǐng)域的諸多問題中,公司控制權(quán)是核心問題,不僅對(duì)公司本身有著特殊的意義,更關(guān)乎如何保護(hù)投資者利益和優(yōu)化市場資源配置等諸多話題。本文第一部分首先對(duì)傳統(tǒng)公司治理方式的演進(jìn)過程進(jìn)行了回溯,梳理出現(xiàn)行公司治理方式的發(fā)展脈絡(luò)。現(xiàn)階段的公司治理方式與美國市場上各種類型公司的實(shí)踐密不可分。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家和法學(xué)家分別從不同的角度提出有關(guān)公司治理的理論,并通過市場上不同類型公司的實(shí)踐進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。具體而言,現(xiàn)階段的公司治理方式經(jīng)歷了一個(gè)漸進(jìn)的過程。文章通過對(duì)從股東中心主義到董事會(huì)中心主義過程的梳理,得出了公司治理方式與不同的市場條件存在著必然聯(lián)系這個(gè)結(jié)論。本文的第二部分首先提出在目前市場的兩個(gè)基本趨勢。第一是上市公司的股權(quán)越來越分散,第二是機(jī)構(gòu)投資者為了維護(hù)自己的利益變得愈發(fā)積極。接著,本文又介紹了阿里巴巴等創(chuàng)新型互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)的特點(diǎn),并認(rèn)為在現(xiàn)在股權(quán)分散、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者積極的市場下。創(chuàng)新型互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司若以傳統(tǒng)公司治理方式上市會(huì)失去控制權(quán)。隨后本文對(duì)于阿里巴巴公司合伙人制度的基本架構(gòu)和法律突破進(jìn)行了分析,提出了其制度對(duì)于現(xiàn)行公司治理的突破之處。文章的第三部分分析了公司合伙人制度的現(xiàn)實(shí)困境,即其運(yùn)行的障礙和可行性。在現(xiàn)行市場條件和法律制度下,公司合伙人制度這種公司治理方式將會(huì)在法律觀念、法律制度、監(jiān)管保護(hù)和司法保護(hù)四個(gè)方面遇到障礙。文章還在分析障礙的同時(shí)對(duì)在目前的市場下,合伙人制度運(yùn)行的可行性做了論述,指出合伙人制度運(yùn)行的方向。文章的第四部分首先論述了在傳統(tǒng)公司治理方式的制約下,創(chuàng)始人團(tuán)隊(duì)和管理層為實(shí)現(xiàn)自己控制權(quán)的做出的其他實(shí)踐,即事業(yè)合伙人制度和多層股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。隨后,本文介紹了與這幾種公司治理方式相比較公司合伙人制度的優(yōu)點(diǎn),指出公司合伙人是創(chuàng)新型互聯(lián)網(wǎng)企業(yè)進(jìn)行公司治理方式改革的一種較為合適的實(shí)踐方向。最后文章對(duì)于如何在公司合伙人制度的視角下保護(hù)投資者利益提出了建議。
[Abstract]:Alibaba's partnership system is an innovation made by the founder team of innovative Internet enterprises in the field of corporate governance. Based on this system, this paper studies the influence of innovation of corporate governance on the whole market under the background of institutional investor activism. Since corporate control has always been a hot issue in the field of corporate governance. It itself contains very rich legal value and economic value. In the field of corporate governance, corporate control is the core issue, which is not only of special significance to the company itself, but also related to how to protect the interests of investors and optimize the allocation of market resources. The first part of this paper reviews the evolution of the traditional corporate governance, combing out the development of the current corporate governance. The current corporate governance is closely related to the practice of various types of companies in the American market. Economists and jurists put forward the theory of corporate governance from different angles, and through the practice of different types of companies in the market for empirical analysis. Specifically, the current corporate governance has experienced a gradual process. By combing the process from shareholder centrism to boardroom centralism, the paper draws the conclusion that there is an inevitable connection between corporate governance and different market conditions. The second part of this paper first proposes two basic trends in the current market. The first is the increasing dispersion of shares in listed companies, and the second is that institutional investors are becoming more active to protect their own interests. Then, this paper introduces the characteristics of Alibaba and other innovative Internet enterprises, and believes that in the current market with decentralized equity and active institutional investors. Innovative Internet companies will lose control if they are listed in traditional corporate governance. Then this paper analyzes the basic structure and legal breakthrough of Alibaba's partner system, and puts forward the breakthrough of its system for current corporate governance. The third part of the article analyzes the practical dilemma of the corporate partner system, that is, the obstacles and feasibility of its operation. Under the current market conditions and legal system, the corporate partner system will encounter obstacles in four aspects: legal concept, legal system, regulatory protection and judicial protection. At the same time, the paper discusses the feasibility of the partner system under the present market, and points out the direction of the partner system. In the fourth part of the paper, the author first discusses the other practices of the founder team and the management in order to realize their own control under the restriction of the traditional corporate governance, that is, the enterprise partner system and the multi-layer ownership structure. Then, this paper introduces the advantages of the corporate partner system compared with these corporate governance methods, and points out that the corporate partner is a more suitable practical direction for innovative Internet enterprises to carry out corporate governance reform. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions on how to protect the interests of investors from the perspective of corporate partner system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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