限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格違法性認(rèn)定適用原則研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-02 13:16
【摘要】：反壟斷法作為經(jīng)濟(jì)憲法,其核心價(jià)值在于維護(hù)市場競爭秩序和實(shí)現(xiàn)社會整體效率。而限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格作為縱向價(jià)格限制競爭協(xié)議的典型,其帶來的經(jīng)濟(jì)效果具有雙重性,既限制和排除競爭,又具有促進(jìn)競爭的可能性。因此,規(guī)制限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格成為世界范圍內(nèi)具有爭議的難題。美國通過司法實(shí)踐,確立了兩種基本原則判定其違法性;世界其他國家也確立了自己的規(guī)制原則和模式;中國作為實(shí)施反壟斷法的新興體,也在逐步確立和完善相關(guān)判定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。筆者首先介紹了限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格的基本理論,然后分析域外對該行為的規(guī)制原則,重點(diǎn)是如何認(rèn)定限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格協(xié)議或行為的違法性。最后,結(jié)合我國對該問題的反壟斷法規(guī)制現(xiàn)狀,研究應(yīng)如何從適應(yīng)本國國情的角度完善判定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)及相關(guān)立法。具體說,文章共分為四部分:第一章主要介紹限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格的基本理論。首先介紹了限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格的基本概念,然后闡述了特征及分類。最后,詳細(xì)敘述了限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格帶來的雙重經(jīng)濟(jì)效果。一方面,指明其帶來的積極效果,即如何促進(jìn)競爭、提高整體經(jīng)濟(jì)效率等;另一方面,分析該行為是如何限制、排除競爭的,譬如鞏固價(jià)格卡特爾、損害消費(fèi)者利益等。第二章為本身違法原則和合理原則的相關(guān)理論。本章詳細(xì)闡述了兩種原則的基本定義及發(fā)展歷程。此外,著重比較了兩種原則在判定行為是否構(gòu)成壟斷時的優(yōu)勢和劣勢。最后,指出理論界和實(shí)踐中的爭議性,即對限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格違法性的認(rèn)定是直接適用嚴(yán)格的本身違法原則,還是考慮到促進(jìn)競爭性而適用合理原則。第三章為外國認(rèn)定限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格行為違法適用的原則。首先詳細(xì)闡述了美國認(rèn)定該行為違法適用原則的發(fā)展,其基本規(guī)律是適用何種原則取決于當(dāng)時所處的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境和制定的經(jīng)濟(jì)政策。之后,簡要介紹了其他國家諸如歐盟、德國、日本對該行為的規(guī)制情況。最后得出結(jié)論:世界范圍內(nèi)對于限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格的反壟斷規(guī)制沒有采取絕對的本身違法原則,而是在適用本身違法原則的基礎(chǔ)上規(guī)定豁免情況,這類似于合理原則。第四章為我國限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格違法性認(rèn)定適用原則的分析及完善。首先從立法上介紹與我國規(guī)制限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格相對應(yīng)的法律條文。其次,以縱向限制競爭協(xié)議案——“銳邦訴強(qiáng)生”為例,分析法院在審理限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格協(xié)議是否構(gòu)成壟斷時適用的原則及審理路徑。然后評析不同學(xué)者對原則適用的不同觀點(diǎn)。最后,結(jié)合我國實(shí)際情況,提出自己的觀點(diǎn),即對限制最低轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格應(yīng)逐步適用合理原則判定其違法性。同時提出了適用合理原則的完善建議,包括明確分析要素,公平分配舉證責(zé)任,“安全港”制度的建立以及專家制度的引入等。
[Abstract]:As an economic constitution, the core value of anti-monopoly law lies in maintaining the order of market competition and realizing the overall social efficiency. As a typical example of vertical price restriction competition agreement, restricted minimum resale price has dual economic effect, which not only limits and excludes competition, but also has the possibility of promoting competition. Therefore, the regulation of limiting the minimum resale price has become a controversial problem worldwide. Through judicial practice, the United States has established two basic principles to judge its illegality; other countries in the world have also established their own principles and models of regulation; China, as a new body implementing anti-monopoly law, is also gradually establishing and perfecting relevant criteria. The author first introduces the basic theory of restricting resale price, and then analyzes the principles of the regulation of this behavior outside the territory, focusing on how to determine the illegality of the restricted minimum resale price agreement or behavior. Finally, according to the current situation of anti-monopoly law regulation in China, this paper studies how to perfect the judgment standard and relevant legislation from the angle of adapting to the national conditions of our country. Specifically, the article is divided into four parts: the first chapter mainly introduces the basic theory of resale price restriction. This paper first introduces the basic concept of restricted resale price, and then expounds the characteristics and classification. Finally, the double economic effect of restricting resale price is described in detail. On the one hand, it points out the positive effects, that is, how to promote competition and improve the overall economic efficiency. On the other hand, it analyzes how the behavior restricts and excludes competition, such as consolidating price cartels and harming consumers' interests. The second chapter is the related theories of the principle of illegality and the principle of reasonableness. This chapter describes the basic definition and development of the two principles in detail. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of the two principles in determining whether behavior constitutes monopoly or not are compared. Finally, the author points out the controversy in theory and practice, that is, whether the determination of the illegality of limiting the minimum resale price should be directly applied to the strict illegality principle, or the reasonable principle should be applied in consideration of promoting competition. Chapter three is the principle of illegal application of limiting minimum resale price by foreign countries. First of all, it expounds the development of the principle of the illegal application of the act in the United States. The basic law of the principle is that the application of the principle depends on the economic environment and the economic policy formulated at that time. Then, it briefly introduces the regulation of this behavior in other countries such as EU, Germany and Japan. Finally, the conclusion is drawn that the antitrust regulation that limits the minimum resale price in the world does not adopt the absolute principle of illegality, but stipulates the immunity on the basis of applying the principle of illegality, which is similar to the principle of reasonableness. The fourth chapter is the analysis and perfection of the applicable principle of illegal determination of the restricted minimum resale price in our country. Firstly, it introduces the legal provisions corresponding to the restriction of minimum resale price in our country. Secondly, taking the case of Vertical restriction of Competition Agreement-"Ruibang v. Johnson" as an example, this paper analyzes the principle and the trial path that the court applies in the trial of whether the limited minimum resale price agreement constitutes a monopoly. Then it analyzes the different views of different scholars on the application of principles. Finally, according to the actual situation of our country, the author puts forward his own viewpoint that the reasonable principle should be applied step by step to limit the minimum resale price to judge its illegality. At the same time, some suggestions on how to apply the principle of reasonableness are put forward, including clear analysis elements, fair distribution of burden of proof, establishment of "safe harbour" system and introduction of expert system, etc.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.294
本文編號：2159557
[Abstract]:As an economic constitution, the core value of anti-monopoly law lies in maintaining the order of market competition and realizing the overall social efficiency. As a typical example of vertical price restriction competition agreement, restricted minimum resale price has dual economic effect, which not only limits and excludes competition, but also has the possibility of promoting competition. Therefore, the regulation of limiting the minimum resale price has become a controversial problem worldwide. Through judicial practice, the United States has established two basic principles to judge its illegality; other countries in the world have also established their own principles and models of regulation; China, as a new body implementing anti-monopoly law, is also gradually establishing and perfecting relevant criteria. The author first introduces the basic theory of restricting resale price, and then analyzes the principles of the regulation of this behavior outside the territory, focusing on how to determine the illegality of the restricted minimum resale price agreement or behavior. Finally, according to the current situation of anti-monopoly law regulation in China, this paper studies how to perfect the judgment standard and relevant legislation from the angle of adapting to the national conditions of our country. Specifically, the article is divided into four parts: the first chapter mainly introduces the basic theory of resale price restriction. This paper first introduces the basic concept of restricted resale price, and then expounds the characteristics and classification. Finally, the double economic effect of restricting resale price is described in detail. On the one hand, it points out the positive effects, that is, how to promote competition and improve the overall economic efficiency. On the other hand, it analyzes how the behavior restricts and excludes competition, such as consolidating price cartels and harming consumers' interests. The second chapter is the related theories of the principle of illegality and the principle of reasonableness. This chapter describes the basic definition and development of the two principles in detail. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of the two principles in determining whether behavior constitutes monopoly or not are compared. Finally, the author points out the controversy in theory and practice, that is, whether the determination of the illegality of limiting the minimum resale price should be directly applied to the strict illegality principle, or the reasonable principle should be applied in consideration of promoting competition. Chapter three is the principle of illegal application of limiting minimum resale price by foreign countries. First of all, it expounds the development of the principle of the illegal application of the act in the United States. The basic law of the principle is that the application of the principle depends on the economic environment and the economic policy formulated at that time. Then, it briefly introduces the regulation of this behavior in other countries such as EU, Germany and Japan. Finally, the conclusion is drawn that the antitrust regulation that limits the minimum resale price in the world does not adopt the absolute principle of illegality, but stipulates the immunity on the basis of applying the principle of illegality, which is similar to the principle of reasonableness. The fourth chapter is the analysis and perfection of the applicable principle of illegal determination of the restricted minimum resale price in our country. Firstly, it introduces the legal provisions corresponding to the restriction of minimum resale price in our country. Secondly, taking the case of Vertical restriction of Competition Agreement-"Ruibang v. Johnson" as an example, this paper analyzes the principle and the trial path that the court applies in the trial of whether the limited minimum resale price agreement constitutes a monopoly. Then it analyzes the different views of different scholars on the application of principles. Finally, according to the actual situation of our country, the author puts forward his own viewpoint that the reasonable principle should be applied step by step to limit the minimum resale price to judge its illegality. At the same time, some suggestions on how to apply the principle of reasonableness are put forward, including clear analysis elements, fair distribution of burden of proof, establishment of "safe harbour" system and introduction of expert system, etc.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.294
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