發(fā)布時間：2018-07-03 06:11

  本文選題：雙重股權(quán)架構(gòu) + 普通股股份��； 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：雙重股權(quán)架構(gòu)(Dual Class Stock Structure)隨著阿里巴巴集團上市,吸引了財經(jīng)媒體的眼球。雙重股權(quán)架構(gòu)的支持者認為,雙重股權(quán)架構(gòu)的優(yōu)點在于:(1)使公司創(chuàng)始人/管理層在公開的資本市場融資的同時,維持其對公司的控制權(quán);(2)使公司創(chuàng)始人/管理層可實施長期戰(zhàn)略(long-term strategy),專注于公司整體發(fā)展前景,而不必迫于普通股股東的壓力,因短期回報而犧牲了長期戰(zhàn)略。雖然雙重股權(quán)架構(gòu)已經(jīng)得到諸多國家監(jiān)管的許可,但對于雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)可能造成的管理層濫用控制權(quán)的顧慮,阻礙了該架構(gòu)得到更廣泛的適用和認可。本文在梳理雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)邏輯基礎(chǔ)之上,通過對雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和其他不同投票權(quán)架構(gòu)進行分析,對如何平衡管理層對控制權(quán)的需要和投資者利益做出研究,并得出結(jié)論:雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)本身具有中立性,如何合理運用雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是公司治理和法規(guī)監(jiān)管的關(guān)鍵。在此基礎(chǔ)上,筆者提出了如何構(gòu)建雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的具體制度建議。首先,需要闡明的是“一股一權(quán)”原則和雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)�！耙还梢粰�(quán)”原則也被稱為“一股一票”原則,其內(nèi)涵為:股東享有的表決權(quán)、利潤分配權(quán)等權(quán)利與其所持有的股份比例呈嚴格得正相關(guān)對應(yīng)。具體包含兩方面內(nèi)容:其一,每一股都享有一個表決權(quán);其二,不允許一股享有多個表決權(quán)。與“一股一權(quán)”相對的,則是不同投票權(quán)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。公司發(fā)行不同類型的股票,各類型的股票,其持有者享有的表決權(quán)和紅利分配權(quán)是不相同的。雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),即按照每股附著的表決權(quán)大小,普通股被劃分為A、B股兩類:A類普通股的表決權(quán)遵循“一股一票”原則,B類普通股則具有數(shù)倍于A類股的表決權(quán),比率多為10:1。具有高價投票權(quán)的B類普通股一般由企業(yè)創(chuàng)始人或管理層持有,一般不能對外轉(zhuǎn)讓;若要對外轉(zhuǎn)讓,這些B類普通股需先行轉(zhuǎn)換成“一股一票”的普通股;而遵循“一股一票”的A類普通股則面向公眾發(fā)售,可自由流通。其次,筆者梳理了雙重股權(quán)受到管理層青睞及世界各地不同監(jiān)管者的原因。雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)之所以被采納的一個主要原因在于控股股東希望維持控制權(quán)而不必承擔(dān)過度的現(xiàn)金流風(fēng)險�？刂茩�(quán)對于創(chuàng)始人/管理層而言,相較于普通投票權(quán)的股東,有獨特的價值。De Angelo和De Angelo在1985年的論著中發(fā)現(xiàn),高級投票權(quán)股票在被并購時,有較高的溢價。De Angelo和De Angelo在該篇文章中總結(jié)了雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)為公司帶來的效率性因素。首先,創(chuàng)始人/管理層出于對公司長期發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的考慮,而維持控制權(quán),是合法的需要。其次,關(guān)于保障管理層對于公司投入的特殊人力資本。在公眾公司,投票權(quán)可以保護現(xiàn)有的管理層免受挑戰(zhàn),從而鼓勵這些特殊的人力資本可以在未來得到相應(yīng)的回報。第三,管理層掌握公司控制權(quán)時,可以克服集體行動難題,使股東獲得更高的收購溢價雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)并非新鮮產(chǎn)物。早在二十世紀20年代就在美國受到了歡迎,至今在世界多個證券市場得到不同程度的認可。NYSE(紐約證券交易所)、NASDAQ(納斯達克交易所)、AMEX(美國證券交易所)和加拿大的證券交易允許采取上市公司在首次發(fā)行(IPO)中采取多重表決權(quán)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu);歐洲的瑞典、愛爾蘭、英國也原則上允許雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)公司在各自的證券市場上市;香港、新加坡和中國內(nèi)地的證券交易所目前均不認可上市公司采取多重表決權(quán)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。雖然各界對雙重股權(quán)制度的評價褒貶不一,但這一制度被不少國際資本市場接納,具有合法地位。長期來看,雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)也受到大量企業(yè)和投資者的歡迎。對于中立的監(jiān)管者來說,不能忽視這一制度對不同市場和交易所的監(jiān)管競爭產(chǎn)生的影響——在日益加劇的國際競爭壓力下,交易所傾向于制定受投資者歡迎的規(guī)則,如2014年8月香港聯(lián)交所頒布了名為《概念文件:不同投票權(quán)架構(gòu)》,就是否允許在港交所上市的公司采納雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)進行了公眾意見咨詢�？梢钥隙ǖ氖�,在資本市場全球化的今天,各國（地區(qū)）企業(yè)不斷進行“監(jiān)管套利”(regulatory arbitrage),根據(jù)自身的商業(yè)需要和面臨的監(jiān)管差異選擇市場和監(jiān)管主體。筆者在第二章重點分析了中國企業(yè)采納雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)狀,并結(jié)合現(xiàn)行法律,對允許中國內(nèi)地企業(yè)采納雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)可能產(chǎn)生的后果提出了觀點。根據(jù)彭博和美國證監(jiān)會上市公司披露的數(shù)據(jù)來看,中國內(nèi)地公司赴美上市的數(shù)量在過去五年中逐步增加,這些上市公司多數(shù)采納了雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)以滿足其融資和維持控制權(quán)的雙重需要,另外阿里巴巴“棄港赴美”上市在一定程度上反映了如果我們完全禁止雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),無疑會讓中國的證券市場流失不少的優(yōu)質(zhì)企業(yè)。因此,有必要重視如何發(fā)揮這一結(jié)構(gòu)積極功能的同時,抑制其可能產(chǎn)生的負面影響——即可能增高的代理成本,和小股東(公眾投資者)的利益侵害。至于如何平衡管理層控制權(quán)利益和外部投資者的投資權(quán)益,則是監(jiān)管制度的關(guān)鍵所在。在本文的第三章,筆者從以下兩個方面提出了雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)在中國適用的制度建議,在允許公司自行采納雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)這一公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)的情況下,一方面,在某種情勢下,若雙重股權(quán)架構(gòu)不能服務(wù)于管理層合理控制公司的目的,即當雙重股權(quán)架構(gòu)淪為管理層私相授受,傳遞私人利益的工具時,有必要以法定的形式,強制高級投票權(quán)股份轉(zhuǎn)換為“一股一權(quán)”的單一股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),尤其是高級投票權(quán)股份轉(zhuǎn)讓給非關(guān)聯(lián)人士和創(chuàng)始人/管理層拋售高級投票權(quán)股份的情形下,法律不能坐視高級投票權(quán)股份所附著的控制權(quán)溢價流入控制權(quán)人的囊中。另一方面,對于雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)可能造成的風(fēng)險,如因管理人追求“私人利益”“掘壕自�！�,導(dǎo)致外部股東利益受損等問題,則應(yīng)該從有效公司治理方面,從而降低公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)可能造成的風(fēng)險,而不應(yīng)該“因噎廢食”,拒絕靈活性強,有效性高的雙重股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),從而錯失將中國內(nèi)地資本市場邁向成熟的國際化資本市場的契機。
[Abstract]:Dual Class Stock Structure (Dual) has attracted financial media with the listing of the Alibaba group. The dual ownership structure's supporters believe that the dual ownership structure has the advantages of: (1) maintaining the company's control over the company's founder / management in the open capital market; (2) the company's founding. Human / management can implement the long-term strategy (long-term strategy) to focus on the overall development prospects of the company, rather than under the pressure of the common shareholders, and sacrifice the long-term strategy for short-term returns. Although the dual ownership structure has been licensed by many national regulators, the control over the management of the dual ownership structure may be abused. On the basis of combing the logic of dual ownership structure, this paper analyzes the dual ownership structure and other different voting rights structure, and makes a study on how to balance the management needs of control and the interests of investors, and draws a conclusion that the dual ownership structure is based on the structure of the dual equity structure. As a matter of neutrality, how to rationally use dual ownership structure is the key to corporate governance and regulation. On this basis, the author puts forward a specific system proposal on how to construct dual ownership structure. First, the principle of "one right" and dual ownership structure should be clarified. The principle of "ticket" is that the right to vote and the right to distribute profit is strictly related to the proportion of shares held by the shareholders. It contains two aspects: one, each share has a voting right; and second, it is not allowed to enjoy multiple decisions. Share structure. The company issue different types of stock, all types of stock, the holder's right to vote and dividend distribution rights are different. The dual ownership structure, that is, according to the size of the voting rights attached to each share, is divided into A, B shares two categories: the voting rights of a common stock follows the principle of "one share one vote", and the common stock of class B There are many times the right to vote in the class a share, the ratio is that the common stock of class B with high price of 10:1. is generally held by the founder or management of the enterprise, and generally cannot be transferred to the outside world. If we want to transfer the common stock, these B common shares should be converted into "one share one ticket". The main reason why the dual ownership structure is adopted is that the controlling shareholders want to maintain control without having to take over the excessive cash flow risk. The control right is for the founder / management. Compared with the shareholders of ordinary voting rights, there is a unique value.De Angelo and De Angelo in the 1985 book that the high premium shares have a higher premium of.De Angelo and De Angelo in the merger and acquisition. In this article, the dual equity structure is the efficiency factor for the company. First, the founder / management is out of the public. It is a legitimate need to maintain control over the long-term development strategy. Secondly, on the special human capital that guarantees management to the company. In public companies, the right to vote can protect the existing management from the challenge, so that these special human capital can be rewarded in the future. Third, management When mastering corporate control, the problem of collective action can be overcome, and the double ownership structure of a higher purchase premium is not a fresh product. As early as 20s twentieth Century, it was welcomed in the United States, so far,.NYSE (New York stock exchange), NASDAQ (NASDAQ), has been accepted in various securities markets in the world. The AMEX (US stock exchange) and Canadian securities transactions allow listed companies to take multiple voting rights in the first issue (IPO); European Sweden, Ireland, and the UK are in principle allowed double equity companies to be listed in their respective stock markets; Hongkong, Singapore and China's mainland stock exchanges It is not recognized that the listed companies adopt multiple voting rights structure. Although the evaluation of the dual equity system is different, the system is accepted by many international capital markets and has legal status. In the long run, the dual ownership structure is also welcomed by a large number of enterprises and investors. For neutral regulators, it can not be ignored. In view of the impact of this system on the regulatory competition in different markets and exchanges - under increasing pressure of international competition, exchanges tend to formulate rules that are welcomed by investors, such as the August 2014 Hongkong Stock Exchange issued a "concept document: different voting rights framework > to allow companies to be listed on Hong Kong exchanges." The dual ownership structure has been consulted by the public opinion. It is certain that in the globalization of the capital market, the enterprises of various countries (regions) continue to carry out "regulatory arbitrage" (regulatory arbitrage), choose the market and supervision subject according to their own commercial needs and the regulatory differences facing them. In the second chapter, the author focuses on the analysis of Chinese enterprises. The present situation of the dual ownership structure and the current law, put forward views on the possible consequences of allowing Chinese mainland enterprises to adopt dual ownership structure. According to the data disclosed by Bloomberg and the US Securities Regulatory Commission, the number of Chinese companies listed in the United States has gradually increased over the past five years. Most of these listed companies are listed. The dual ownership structure is adopted to meet the dual needs of its financing and control. In addition, the listing of the Alibaba "abandoning the port to the United States" reflects to some extent that if we completely prohibit the dual ownership structure, it will undoubtedly let the Chinese stock market lose a lot of high quality enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to how to use this structure. In the third chapter, the third chapter of this paper, the author from the following two aspects: how to suppress the possible negative effects - the possible increase of the agency cost and the interests of the small shareholders (public investors). Under the circumstances of allowing the company to adopt the dual ownership structure of the company's capital structure, on the one hand, in a certain situation, if the dual ownership structure can not serve the purpose of controlling the company reasonably, that is, when the dual ownership structure is reduced to the management level, it is transmitted to the management. When a tool of personal interest is delivered, it is necessary to convert the shares of the high voting right into a single ownership structure in the form of a statutory form, especially when the senior voting rights are transferred to the non associated persons and the founder / management to sell the high voting shares, and the law cannot sit on the high voting shares. On the other hand, on the other hand, the possible risks caused by the dual ownership structure, such as the manager's pursuit of "private interest", "entrenching self insurance", and the loss of the interests of the external shareholders, should be taken from the effective corporate governance to reduce the possible risk of the company's capital structure. The "choking", the dual ownership structure that refuses to be flexible and effective, has missed the opportunity to move China's capital market into a mature international capital market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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