本文選題：激勵(lì)有效期 + 行權(quán)條件�。� 參考：《上海金融》2017年07期

【摘要】：根據(jù)上市公司公布的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案,本文將行權(quán)條件劃分為"嚴(yán)格型"和"寬松型",以我國2006-2013年實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司為樣本,研究激勵(lì)有效期和行權(quán)條件對(duì)盈余管理程度的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):激勵(lì)期限與盈余管理程度呈顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系;"嚴(yán)格型"激勵(lì)條件與盈余管理程度呈顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。上述實(shí)證結(jié)果說明,適度延長股權(quán)激勵(lì)的有效期,以及設(shè)計(jì)較為"嚴(yán)格"的激勵(lì)條件有利于發(fā)揮其積極作用,抑制經(jīng)理人的盈余管理行為。
[Abstract]:According to the stock incentive scheme published by the listed companies, this paper divides the exercise conditions into strict type and loose type, taking the listed companies that implemented the equity incentive plan from 2006 to 2013 as samples. This paper studies the effect of incentive period and exercise conditions on earnings management. It is found that there is a significant negative correlation between incentive period and earnings management degree, and a significant negative correlation between "strict" incentive conditions and earnings management degree. The above empirical results show that the appropriate extension of the term of validity of equity incentives and the design of more "strict" incentive conditions are conducive to play a positive role and restrain managers' earnings management behavior.
【作者單位】： 上海海事大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;中國人民銀行沈陽分行;
【分類號(hào)】：D922.287
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本文編號(hào)：2015328