本文選題：反壟斷罰款 + 量化　； 參考：《湘潭大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：反壟斷罰款是最為重要的反壟斷行政責(zé)任,與同是金錢制裁的其他反壟斷責(zé)任形式相比,罰款能發(fā)揮最適度的懲罰、威懾功能。要充分發(fā)揮罰款的懲罰、威懾功能就不得不完善罰款數(shù)額的量化規(guī)則。無(wú)論在以罰金為主的美國(guó)還是以罰款為主的歐盟和日本,其對(duì)數(shù)額的量化都有較為詳細(xì)的規(guī)定。美國(guó)反壟斷罰金的計(jì)算一般分兩步:首先是基礎(chǔ)罰金的確定;然后對(duì)罰金數(shù)額進(jìn)行調(diào)整,即先計(jì)算涉案企業(yè)的犯罪點(diǎn)數(shù),進(jìn)而以犯罪點(diǎn)數(shù)確定系數(shù)區(qū)間,罰金基礎(chǔ)乘以系數(shù)區(qū)間可以得出一個(gè)罰金范圍,法院將以該企業(yè)在違法行為中擔(dān)任的角色以及刑罰的目的等因素為依據(jù),確定最后罰金數(shù)額;對(duì)于較為隱蔽的卡特爾行為,可以適用寬恕制度對(duì)其罰金數(shù)額進(jìn)行免除。歐盟委員會(huì)確定罰款數(shù)額也同樣分為兩步:首先確定基礎(chǔ)金額,即銷售價(jià)值的一定比例乘以涉案企業(yè)壟斷違法行為的年數(shù);然后在基礎(chǔ)金額之上考慮加重或者減輕事由以調(diào)整基礎(chǔ)金額最終確定罰款數(shù)額。對(duì)于卡特爾行為可運(yùn)用寬恕制度對(duì)罰款數(shù)額進(jìn)行減免。日本的課征金制度即為其反壟斷罰款制度,課征金數(shù)額由違法行為實(shí)施期間內(nèi)該行為所針對(duì)的商品或者服務(wù)的銷售額或者購(gòu)進(jìn)額乘以一定比率得出。針對(duì)不正當(dāng)交易限制行為,還規(guī)定了課征金減免制度。與美國(guó)、歐盟、日本相比,我國(guó)反壟斷罰款數(shù)額量化規(guī)則存在罰款威懾性不足、罰款設(shè)定方式不科學(xué)、罰款的具體規(guī)定缺乏可操作性以及罰款減免規(guī)定不完善的缺陷。要完善反壟斷罰款量化規(guī)則。首先,應(yīng)該完善反壟斷罰款量化規(guī)則的基本理念。其次,應(yīng)該完善反壟斷罰款量化規(guī)則的具體規(guī)定,使得反壟斷罰款數(shù)額的確定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)明確、具體。要使反壟斷罰款數(shù)額的量化規(guī)則完整、具體且可操作性強(qiáng),就必須有科學(xué)的罰款設(shè)定方式,必須從產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)維度、時(shí)間維度和空間維度來(lái)綜合考慮罰款基數(shù)的確定,必須明確不同壟斷違法行為所適用的罰款裁量因素和裁量比率。最后,應(yīng)該從減免比率和減免的適用條件兩個(gè)方面來(lái)完善寬恕制度。除了完善立法規(guī)定外,在執(zhí)法中還應(yīng)該考慮被處罰經(jīng)營(yíng)者的實(shí)際負(fù)擔(dān)能力以及競(jìng)爭(zhēng)合規(guī)制度對(duì)罰款數(shù)額的影響。
[Abstract]:Anti-monopoly penalty is the most important administrative responsibility of anti-monopoly. Compared with other forms of anti-monopoly liability, the penalty can play the most appropriate punishment and deterrent function. In order to give full play to the penalty of fine, the deterrent function has to perfect the quantitative rules of fine amount. Both the United States and the European Union and Japan, which mainly pay fines, have more detailed rules on the quantification of the amount. The calculation of antitrust fines in the United States is generally divided into two steps: first, the determination of the basic fine; and secondly, the amount of the fine is adjusted, that is, the crime points of the enterprises involved are first calculated, and then the coefficient range is determined by the number of crime points. A penalty range can be obtained by multiplying the penalty basis by the coefficient interval, and the court will determine the final amount of the fine based on factors such as the enterprise's role in the offence and the purpose of the penalty; in the case of a more covert cartel, The amount of the fine may be waived by the application of the leniency system. The European Commission's determination of the amount of the fine is equally divided into two steps: first, the base amount, that is, a percentage of the value of the sale multiplied by the number of years in which the enterprise has committed a monopoly offence; Then consider aggravating or mitigating reasons above the base amount to adjust the base amount to determine the amount of the fine. For cartel behavior, leniency can be used to reduce the amount of the fine. Japan's levy system is its antitrust penalty system. The amount of levy is obtained by multiplying the sales or purchase amount of goods or services targeted by the illegal act within the period of the illegal act. In view of the improper trading restrictions, it also stipulated a system of deductions and deductions. Compared with the United States, European Union and Japan, the quantitative rules for the amount of antitrust fines in our country have the defects of inadequate deterrence of fines, unscientific way of setting fines, lack of maneuverability of specific provisions of fines and imperfections of provisions on the reduction and reduction of fines. It is necessary to improve the rules for quantifying antitrust fines. First of all, we should improve the basic concept of anti-monopoly penalty quantitative rules. Secondly, we should perfect the specific regulation of the quantitative rules of antitrust penalty, so as to make the determination standard of the amount of antitrust penalty clear and specific. In order to make the quantitative rules of the amount of antitrust penalty complete, specific and operable, there must be a scientific way to set the penalty, and the determination of the penalty base must be considered synthetically from the dimensions of product or service, time and space. It is necessary to define the penalty discretion factors and the discretion ratio for different monopolistic violations. Finally, the forgiveness system should be perfected from two aspects: the relief rate and the applicable conditions. In addition to improving legislative provisions, the actual affordability of the penalized operator and the impact of the competition compliance system on the amount of the fine should also be taken into account in the enforcement of the law.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D922.294

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本文編號(hào)：2005842