本文選題：壟斷 + 聯(lián)合行為　； 參考：《天津大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：企業(yè)集團(tuán)化發(fā)展過程中,以各類形式所表現(xiàn)的存在于企業(yè)內(nèi)部的聯(lián)合行為一度演變?yōu)閷?shí)施限制競爭行為的工具,此種形式的聯(lián)合行為具有相當(dāng)程度的復(fù)雜性和穩(wěn)定性,對壟斷認(rèn)定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)提出了更高的要求,對企業(yè)內(nèi)部共謀的相關(guān)問題進(jìn)行梳理和研究,是成熟市場經(jīng)濟(jì)國家反壟斷法立法和執(zhí)法的重要環(huán)節(jié)。通常而言,共謀屬當(dāng)然違法行為,盡管也可以其他規(guī)則來管制企業(yè)內(nèi)部聯(lián)合實(shí)施的反競爭行為,但要受制于合理原則,這將大大降低規(guī)制的效率,從相反角度看,當(dāng)然違法行為的認(rèn)定是會(huì)在相當(dāng)程度上影響公平的,如何在效率與公平之間做出平衡,是企業(yè)內(nèi)部共謀理論和規(guī)則的核心,平衡的基礎(chǔ)則是具體的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平和市場競爭環(huán)境。在美國訴黃色出租車公司案中,美國法院確立了企業(yè)內(nèi)部共謀理論的雛形,那個(gè)時(shí)期美國法院認(rèn)為,共謀者之間的相互關(guān)系并不能排除《謝爾曼法》的適用。從Copperweld訴獨(dú)立鋼管公司案之后,企業(yè)內(nèi)部共謀理論得到了革新,一直到今天為止,美國法院都認(rèn)為母公司與其全資子公司之間的聯(lián)合行為不能被認(rèn)定為是《謝爾曼法》第1條所稱的共謀。對于企業(yè)從屬關(guān)系的其他情形,美國法院并無統(tǒng)一結(jié)論,而是在具體案件中看各行為主體是否具有完全一致的利益。歐盟與美國不同,其在司法實(shí)踐中發(fā)展出了“單一經(jīng)濟(jì)體”原則來判定具有相互關(guān)系的企業(yè)間的聯(lián)合行為是否屬于歐盟競爭法所禁止的共謀。歐盟對于此問題的關(guān)注不在于形式,而是看行為各方主體在實(shí)質(zhì)上是否屬于“單一經(jīng)濟(jì)體”。我國《反壟斷法》存在壟斷認(rèn)定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)模糊等問題,影響其實(shí)際操作性。從國內(nèi)市場看,我國大量存在企業(yè)集團(tuán)利用企業(yè)間的相互關(guān)系公然進(jìn)行限制競爭的行為。從國際市場看,跨國公司也利用各種內(nèi)部安排沖擊我國的國際競爭環(huán)境。在現(xiàn)階段,我國應(yīng)當(dāng)結(jié)合經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展水平和市場競爭環(huán)境對企業(yè)內(nèi)部共謀的認(rèn)定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行界定,確定企業(yè)間的相互關(guān)系與共謀的認(rèn)定無關(guān),明確關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)間的共謀屬當(dāng)然違法行為,肯定在當(dāng)前形勢之下用共謀規(guī)制關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)間聯(lián)合行為的效率優(yōu)勢,在增強(qiáng)我國反壟斷法實(shí)際操作性的同時(shí),保障和促進(jìn)母子公司間和企業(yè)集團(tuán)內(nèi)部關(guān)系的健康發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In the process of enterprise collectivization development, the joint behavior which exists in the enterprise in various forms once evolved into a tool to restrict competition behavior, and this kind of joint behavior has a considerable degree of complexity and stability. It is an important link for the legislation and enforcement of antitrust law in mature market economy countries to carve out and study the related problems of collusion in enterprises. Generally speaking, collusion is an offence of course. Although other rules can also be used to regulate joint anti-competitive behavior within an enterprise, it is subject to the principle of reasonableness, which will greatly reduce the efficiency of regulation. Of course, the determination of illegal behavior will affect fairness to a certain extent. How to strike a balance between efficiency and fairness is the core of the theory and rules of collusion within an enterprise. The basis of balance is the specific level of economic development and market competition environment. In the case of American v. Yellow Taxi Company, the United States court established the embryonic form of the theory of complicity within the enterprise. In that period, the American court held that the mutual relationship between the conspirators could not exclude the application of Sherman Act. Since the case of Copperweld v. Independent Steel Tube Company, the theory of internal conspiracy has been innovated to this day. U.S. courts have held that a joint act between the parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary cannot be considered complicity within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act. For other cases of corporate subordination, the United States courts do not have a unified conclusion, but in a specific case to see whether the actors have completely consistent interests. Different from the United States, the European Union has developed the principle of "single economy" in judicial practice to determine whether the joint acts between enterprises with mutual relations belong to the collusion prohibited by the EU competition law. The EU's focus is not on form, but on whether the actors are essentially "single economies." China's Anti-monopoly Law has some problems, such as vague standards of monopoly recognition, which affect its practical operation. From the point of view of domestic market, there are a large number of enterprise groups in our country to make use of the interrelationship between enterprises to restrict competition. From the international market point of view, multinational corporations also use various internal arrangements to impact China's international competitive environment. At the present stage, China should define the criteria for the identification of collusion within enterprises in the light of the level of economic development and the market competition environment, and make sure that the mutual relationship between enterprises is independent of the recognition of complicity. It is of course illegal to make clear the collusion among affiliated enterprises, to affirm the efficiency advantage of using collusion to regulate the joint behavior of affiliated enterprises under the current situation, and to enhance the practical operation of anti-monopoly law in our country at the same time. To ensure and promote the healthy development of relationships between parent and subsidiary companies and within enterprise groups.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.294

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