本文選題：國(guó)有企業(yè) + 高管薪酬　； 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：國(guó)有企業(yè)是國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的中流砥柱,在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和社會(huì)穩(wěn)定方面均發(fā)揮著舉足輕重的作用。國(guó)家將大量資源、資本甚至是經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)力給予了國(guó)有企業(yè),從某種程度上講,國(guó)有企業(yè)具有企業(yè)和公共組織的雙重特點(diǎn),同時(shí),國(guó)有企業(yè)的高管人員作為企業(yè)的直接領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,也就具有企業(yè)家和行政官員的雙重身份。為了充分調(diào)動(dòng)高管人員的積極性,必須有一套行之有效的激勵(lì)體系與之配套。然而,現(xiàn)行的激勵(lì)機(jī)制過于簡(jiǎn)單機(jī)械,從而引發(fā)許多社會(huì)問題。國(guó)企高管薪酬的節(jié)節(jié)攀升引起了社會(huì)公眾的強(qiáng)烈不滿,而且對(duì)薪酬形成機(jī)制的公平性、合理性、科學(xué)性和透明性也產(chǎn)生了質(zhì)疑。究其原因有以下四個(gè)方面：一是國(guó)企高管任免過度行政化,難以適應(yīng)國(guó)有企業(yè)參與市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的能動(dòng)性。二是國(guó)企高管“富”與“貴”兼得,難以體現(xiàn)社會(huì)公平。三是缺乏科學(xué)合理薪酬管理體系,企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)和高管薪酬之間難以有效鏈接。四是高管薪酬信息披露制度的匱乏,國(guó)家機(jī)構(gòu)和社會(huì)公眾難以對(duì)其有效的監(jiān)督。應(yīng)該如何改變當(dāng)下國(guó)企高管薪酬的種種弊端,本文認(rèn)為,應(yīng)該在充分結(jié)合我國(guó)基本國(guó)情基礎(chǔ)上,積極合理的借鑒外國(guó)先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn),制定專門的法律法規(guī)和完善相關(guān)的管理制度,建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度,通過對(duì)高管人員薪酬的雙軌激勵(lì),實(shí)現(xiàn)對(duì)企業(yè)高管管理的制度化,實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)運(yùn)行的科學(xué)化,提高國(guó)企的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,體現(xiàn)國(guó)企的社會(huì)價(jià)值。本文分為四章對(duì)相關(guān)問題進(jìn)行論述第一章,把我國(guó)建國(guó)至今的國(guó)企高管薪酬制度進(jìn)程分為三個(gè)階段：完全行政化階段；逐步市場(chǎng)化階段；以及市場(chǎng)化和行政化的雙軌制探索階段。旨在通過對(duì)以上三個(gè)階段優(yōu)勢(shì)和不足之處的總結(jié)、分析和比較,為下一步的改革奠定基礎(chǔ),指明方向。第二章,通過對(duì)美國(guó),英國(guó),法國(guó),德國(guó),新加波五個(gè)國(guó)家國(guó)有企業(yè)薪酬制度的解讀和探究,為我國(guó)國(guó)企高管薪酬改革帶來些許啟示,希望在借鑒企業(yè)高管制度設(shè)立比較成熟國(guó)家的先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,制定出適合我國(guó)國(guó)情的薪酬制度。第三章,對(duì)當(dāng)下我國(guó)國(guó)企高管薪酬欠缺之處進(jìn)行了總結(jié),希望通過國(guó)有企業(yè)分類制度、企業(yè)治理結(jié)構(gòu)、激勵(lì)方式及職業(yè)經(jīng)理人制度的缺失,信息披露不全面五個(gè)方面的分析,找出問題的根源,以求對(duì)癥下藥。第四章,本章在上文研究的基礎(chǔ)上,建議通過建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度,完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),在國(guó)企高管薪酬雙軌管理的前提下,完善職業(yè)經(jīng)理人制度,制定有效的薪酬激勵(lì)方式,和信息披露制度等幾個(gè)方面的改革,為我國(guó)國(guó)企高管薪酬創(chuàng)設(shè)一個(gè)完備有序的法律體系,制定出適合我國(guó)國(guó)情的國(guó)企高管薪酬制度。
[Abstract]:State-owned enterprises are the mainstay of national economy and play an important role in economic development and social stability. The state has given a great deal of resources, capital and even operating power to state-owned enterprises. To a certain extent, state-owned enterprises have the dual characteristics of enterprises and public organizations. At the same time, senior executives of state-owned enterprises are the direct leaders of enterprises. It also has the dual identity of entrepreneur and administrator. In order to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of senior executives, we must have an effective incentive system. However, the current incentive mechanism is too simple and mechanical, thus causing many social problems. The rising executive compensation of state-owned enterprises has aroused the strong dissatisfaction of the public, and the fairness, rationality, science and transparency of the salary formation mechanism have also been questioned. The reasons are as follows: first, the senior executives of state-owned enterprises are too administrative to adapt to the market competition of state-owned enterprises. Second, state-owned executives "rich" and "expensive" both, difficult to reflect social equity. Third, the lack of scientific and reasonable compensation management system, enterprise performance and executive compensation is difficult to effectively link. Fourth, the lack of executive compensation information disclosure system, the state institutions and the public difficult to effectively supervise it. How to change the malpractice of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises at present? this paper holds that we should make special laws and regulations and perfect the relevant management system on the basis of fully combining the basic national conditions of our country, actively and reasonably drawing lessons from foreign advanced experience. To establish the modern enterprise system, to realize the institutionalization of the executive management, to realize the scientific operation of the enterprise, to improve the market competitiveness of the state-owned enterprises, and to reflect the social value of the state-owned enterprises through the dual-track incentive to the compensation of the executives. This paper is divided into four chapters to discuss the related issues. The first chapter divides the process of executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises into three stages: the stage of complete administration, the stage of marketization, the stage of marketization. And the market-oriented and administrative dual-track system exploration stage. The purpose of this paper is to summarize, analyze and compare the advantages and disadvantages of the above three stages, to lay the foundation for the next step of the reform and to point out the direction. The second chapter, through to the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Singapore five countries state-owned enterprise compensation system interpretation and exploration, for our state-owned enterprise executive compensation reform brought some inspiration, It is hoped that on the basis of drawing lessons from the advanced experiences of the mature countries in the establishment of the executive management system of enterprises, a salary system suitable for the national conditions of our country can be formulated. The third chapter summarizes the lack of executive compensation in China's state-owned enterprises, hoping to pass the state-owned enterprise classification system, corporate governance structure, the lack of incentives and professional managers system, information disclosure is not comprehensive analysis of five aspects. Find out the root of the problem and find the right remedy. In the fourth chapter, on the basis of the above research, it is suggested that through the establishment of modern enterprise system, the improvement of corporate governance structure, under the premise of dual-track management of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises, the professional manager system should be perfected, and an effective way of salary incentive should be formulated. The reform of the system of information disclosure and other aspects creates a complete and orderly legal system for the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises in our country, and formulates the system of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises which is suitable for the national conditions of our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D922.287;D922.291.91

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