本文選題：限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格 + 本身違法原則�。� 參考：《中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)院研究生院》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格行為屬于縱向限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)協(xié)議的范疇。傳統(tǒng)上對(duì)該行為的違法性認(rèn)定遵循本身違法原則。這是因?yàn)閺?qiáng)調(diào)該行為便利生產(chǎn)商和經(jīng)銷(xiāo)商形成壟斷協(xié)議從而產(chǎn)生限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的消極影響。但是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究成果發(fā)現(xiàn)限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格行為同時(shí)具有促進(jìn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的積極效果和限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的消極效果。國(guó)內(nèi)相關(guān)案件的出現(xiàn)也有利于深入分析該行為。本文首先從限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格行為的法理分析入手,探究該行為的概念和對(duì)市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的影響。其次,通過(guò)分析美國(guó)和歐盟對(duì)此類(lèi)行為違法性認(rèn)定的經(jīng)驗(yàn),一窺反壟斷法先行國(guó)家對(duì)此問(wèn)題形成的共識(shí)。同時(shí),通過(guò)案例分析我國(guó)反壟斷法執(zhí)法中對(duì)該行為違法性認(rèn)定的實(shí)際做法。接著,在對(duì)《反壟斷法》規(guī)范分析的基礎(chǔ)上,總結(jié)了我國(guó)司法和執(zhí)法過(guò)程中存在的問(wèn)題。最后提出了對(duì)此問(wèn)題進(jìn)行違法性認(rèn)定的建議。本文的主要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新點(diǎn):第一,明確了限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格行為為“交易雙方”之間的限價(jià)。限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格行為是上游企業(yè)和下游企業(yè)間相互博弈的動(dòng)態(tài)過(guò)程。上游企業(yè)依靠其產(chǎn)品優(yōu)勢(shì)對(duì)下游經(jīng)銷(xiāo)商限價(jià),或者下游企業(yè)憑借其信息和銷(xiāo)售渠道優(yōu)勢(shì)對(duì)供應(yīng)商的限價(jià)。交易雙方力量的此消彼長(zhǎng)帶來(lái)了多樣的方式。第二,限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格行為對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的影響方面從三方面即供應(yīng)商或經(jīng)銷(xiāo)商、消費(fèi)者以及市場(chǎng)三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行分析。在目前我們傾向于對(duì)限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格行為進(jìn)行合理性評(píng)價(jià)的背景下,對(duì)該行為的影響分析越具體越有利于作出更加科學(xué)、有說(shuō)服力的結(jié)論。第三,通過(guò)具體案例,總結(jié)我國(guó)司法和行政執(zhí)法過(guò)程中對(duì)限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格行為違法性認(rèn)定的實(shí)際做法,提出我國(guó)《反壟斷法》規(guī)范和實(shí)際操作中存在的突出問(wèn)題。針對(duì)這些問(wèn)題提出了三點(diǎn)建議:首先要準(zhǔn)確解釋《反壟斷法》文本;其次行政機(jī)關(guān)執(zhí)法應(yīng)逐步走向統(tǒng)一,完善執(zhí)法的信息公開(kāi);最后提出了限制轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)格行為進(jìn)行合理性分析的框架。
[Abstract]:The behavior of restricting resale price belongs to the category of vertical restrictive competition agreement.Traditionally, the illegality of the act is determined according to its own illegal principle.This is due to the fact that this behavior facilitates monopoly agreements between manufacturers and distributors, which has a negative effect on limiting competition.However, economic research results show that restricting resale price behavior has both positive and negative effects of promoting competition and restricting competition.The emergence of domestic related cases is also conducive to in-depth analysis of this behavior.This paper begins with the legal analysis of the behavior of restricting resale price, and probes into the concept of this behavior and its influence on market competition.Secondly, through the analysis of the experience of the United States and the European Union regarding the illegality of this kind of behavior, we can see the consensus of the leading countries of the antimonopoly law on this issue.At the same time, this paper analyzes the practice of illegality in the enforcement of anti-monopoly law.Then, on the basis of analyzing the norms of Anti-monopoly Law, the problems in the process of judicature and law enforcement in China are summarized.Finally, the author puts forward some suggestions on the illegality of this problem.The main innovations of this paper are as follows: firstly, the behavior of restricting resale price is defined as the price limit between the two parties.The behavior of restricting resale price is a dynamic process of mutual game between upstream and downstream enterprises.The upstream enterprise depends on its product superiority to limit the price to the downstream dealer, or the downstream enterprise to limit the price to the supplier with the advantage of its information and sales channel.The rise and fall of power on both sides of the deal has brought a variety of ways.Secondly, the influence of restricting resale price behavior on competition is analyzed from three aspects: supplier or dealer, consumer and market.At present, we tend to evaluate the rationality of the behavior of restricting resale price, the more specific the impact analysis of the behavior, the more conducive to making a more scientific and persuasive conclusion.Third, through the concrete case, summarizes our country judicature and the administrative law enforcement process to limit the resale price behavior illegal confirmation actual practice, proposed our country "the antimonopoly law" the norm and the actual operation existence prominent question.In view of these problems, three suggestions are put forward: firstly, the text of Anti-monopoly Law should be accurately interpreted; secondly, the law enforcement of administrative organs should be unified step by step, and the information publicity of law enforcement should be perfected.Finally, the framework of rationality analysis of restricting resale price behavior is put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)社會(huì)科學(xué)院研究生院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D922.294

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