【摘要】：我國(guó)2005年修訂的《中華人民共和國(guó)公司法》第148條規(guī)定了公司高管對(duì)公司負(fù)有勤勉義務(wù)。公司高管的勤勉義務(wù)是衡量其是否稱(chēng)職的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)�，F(xiàn)代公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)決策權(quán)越來(lái)越多的落到公司高管身上,對(duì)于一個(gè)依靠經(jīng)營(yíng)決策來(lái)決定企業(yè)發(fā)展甚至是生死存亡的現(xiàn)代公司來(lái)說(shuō),高管的勤勉義務(wù)是真正為股東創(chuàng)造價(jià)值、為社會(huì)創(chuàng)造財(cái)富、提升公司質(zhì)量的根本保障,它是一個(gè)更高層次的要求。盡管勤勉義務(wù)如此重要,但是我國(guó)公司法對(duì)勤勉義務(wù)的規(guī)定卻過(guò)于簡(jiǎn)單,沒(méi)有具體的判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn),在實(shí)踐中不具有可操作性。因此,應(yīng)尋找一個(gè)適合我國(guó)國(guó)情的公司高管勤勉義務(wù)的判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn),并在此基礎(chǔ)上明確公司高管違反勤勉義務(wù)的民事責(zé)任。本文主要包括三部分。 第一部分：“公司高管勤勉義務(wù)概述”。以明晰公司高管勤勉義務(wù)的內(nèi)涵為基礎(chǔ),借鑒英美法上的勤勉義務(wù)與大陸法上的勤勉義務(wù)的判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn),明晰我國(guó)判斷公司高管勤勉義務(wù)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)應(yīng)該是以客觀(guān)為主的綜合性標(biāo)準(zhǔn),即公司高管應(yīng)具有與其所任職務(wù)相當(dāng)?shù)募寄�、勤勉和注�?但當(dāng)公司高管實(shí)際具有的技能、勤勉和注意能力超出與其所任職務(wù)相當(dāng)?shù)乃綍r(shí),則其執(zhí)行職務(wù)行為應(yīng)達(dá)到這一實(shí)際水平,否則將被視為違反勤勉義務(wù)。 第二部分：“公司高管違反勤勉義務(wù)的民事責(zé)任”。首先,介紹了公司高管違反勤勉義務(wù)承擔(dān)民事責(zé)任的種類(lèi)：一為公司高管違反勤勉義務(wù)對(duì)公司的民事責(zé)任；二為公司高管違反勤勉義務(wù)對(duì)第三人的民事責(zé)任。其次,針對(duì)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)具有的天然風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性,公司高管在進(jìn)行商業(yè)決策時(shí),究竟何為盡到勤勉義務(wù),在實(shí)踐中判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)難以衡量,因此,應(yīng)規(guī)定公司高管違反勤勉義務(wù)責(zé)任免除與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)移轉(zhuǎn)制度,這樣有利于公司高管在經(jīng)營(yíng)決策中充分發(fā)揮其主觀(guān)能動(dòng)性,更好地保護(hù)公司與股東的權(quán)益。 第三部分：“我國(guó)公司高管違反勤勉義務(wù)民事責(zé)任制度存在的問(wèn)題與完善建議”。檢索我國(guó)公司立法關(guān)于公司高管民事責(zé)任規(guī)定的現(xiàn)狀,針對(duì)性地提出完善立法的建議,具體包括勤勉義務(wù)判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、公司高管違反勤勉義務(wù)對(duì)債權(quán)人承擔(dān)民事責(zé)任、公司高管違反勤勉義務(wù)的責(zé)任免除、公司高管違反勤勉義務(wù)責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)等。
[Abstract]:Article 148 of the Company Law of the people's Republic of China, amended in 2005, stipulates that the executives of the company bear the duty of diligence to the company. The duty of diligence is a measure of competence. More and more modern company's management decision-making power falls to the company executives. For a modern company that depends on the management decision to determine the development of the enterprise and even the survival of the company, the diligent duty of the executives is to truly create value for the shareholders. Create wealth for the society, improve the quality of the fundamental guarantee, it is a higher level of demand. Although the duty of diligence is so important, the stipulation of the duty of diligence in our company law is too simple, there is no concrete judgment standard, and it is not operable in practice. Therefore, we should look for a judgment standard of diligent duty of company executives suitable for our country's national conditions, and make clear the civil liability of company executives for violating the duty of diligence on this basis. This paper mainly includes three parts. The first part: an overview of the diligent duty of company executives. On the basis of clarifying the connotation of company executives' duty of diligence, and drawing lessons from the judgment standard of diligence duty in common law and continental law, it is clear that the standard of judging company executives' duty of diligence in our country should be an objective comprehensive standard. The executive of the company shall possess skills, diligence and attention comparable to the position he holds, but when the skills, diligence and attention of the executive are in fact greater than those of his or her position, The performance of his duties shall reach this practical level, otherwise it will be regarded as a breach of duty of diligence. The second part: the civil liability of company executives for violating the duty of diligence. First of all, it introduces the types of civil liability of corporate executives who violate the duty of diligence: first, the civil liability of corporate executives for violating the duty of diligence; second, the civil liability of corporate executives for violating the obligation of diligence to the third party. Secondly, in view of the natural risk of the company's business activities, it is difficult to measure what it is to fulfill the duty of diligence when making the business decision, so the standard of judgment is difficult to measure in practice. In order to protect the rights and interests of the company and shareholders, it should be stipulated that the company executives should be exempted from duty and risk transfer in violation of diligence obligation, which is helpful for the executives to give full play to their subjective initiative and to protect the rights and interests of the company and the shareholders. The third part: the problems and suggestions of the civil liability system of corporate executives violating the duty of diligence. To search the current situation of the civil liability of company executives in our company legislation, and to put forward some suggestions to perfect the legislation, including the judgment standard of diligence, the civil liability of company executives to creditors in violation of diligence obligations. The company executives are exempted from the duty of diligence, and the company executives are insured against the duty of diligence.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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