【摘要】： 自國有企業(yè)公司化改革至今,國有股權(quán)制度的運(yùn)作取得了顯著的成果,同時也遭遇了尷尬的困境,而由于國家作為股東的身份,使得國有股權(quán)出現(xiàn)了大量與傳統(tǒng)股權(quán)不同的特征,這也使得對國有股權(quán)行使困境的法律思考有了更多的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義和理論意義。基于前述原因,筆者擬通過對國有股權(quán)的行使困境進(jìn)行分析,并思考這種困境產(chǎn)生的法制度根源,并提出對國有股權(quán)制度完善途徑的思考和見解。 本文分為引言、正文、結(jié)論三個部分。 引言主要闡述了選題意義、國內(nèi)研究現(xiàn)狀和文獻(xiàn)綜述,并對本文的研究范圍進(jìn)行了界定。 正文部分分為三章進(jìn)行論述。 第一章主要對國有股權(quán)行使的困境進(jìn)行論述。在對股東所享有的對公司控制的權(quán)利進(jìn)行解構(gòu)的基礎(chǔ)上,從中國《公司法》的規(guī)定出發(fā),從一般到特殊地論述了國有股權(quán)在行使過程中所面臨的各種困境。這一部分對股東的知情權(quán)、表決權(quán)以及訴訟權(quán)進(jìn)行了分別解讀,并且論述了國有股權(quán)的行使在《公司法》以及《企業(yè)國有資產(chǎn)法》中存在沖突,并指出國有股權(quán)行使過程中存在問題的兩個顯著特點(diǎn)：一是國有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理機(jī)構(gòu)對國有股權(quán)的行政行使造成了過度規(guī)制；二是股東權(quán)利對公司管理人員無法形成有效控制,管理人員的投機(jī)行為日趨增加。 第二章主要探析了我國國有股權(quán)行使困境產(chǎn)生的制度根源。在國有股權(quán)行使中存在著行政的過度干預(yù)和嚴(yán)重的內(nèi)部人控制的條件下,從四個方面論述了上述困境產(chǎn)生的原因。包括國有股權(quán)行使方式的錯誤、對政府定位的分析、對公司收益獲取的偏好導(dǎo)致對人力資源價值的忽視、規(guī)范的缺失和公司法定位的尷尬。在這一部分的敘述中,通過對國有股權(quán)以及相關(guān)制度的評述,以聯(lián)系的觀點(diǎn)提出國有股權(quán)行使過程中存在的制度性缺陷。 第三章主要闡述了重構(gòu)國有股權(quán)行使體系的一個制度設(shè)想,分為理念的變革和實(shí)踐的革新兩方面。在理念的變革中,提出了應(yīng)當(dāng)將國有股權(quán)的公共屬性置于重要的地位,這對于糾正經(jīng)濟(jì)利益至上的股權(quán)行使模式有著極為重要的作用。在實(shí)踐的革新方面,本文提出了應(yīng)當(dāng)使國有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理機(jī)構(gòu)的行為與法律體系形成互動、股權(quán)投資過程中應(yīng)當(dāng)對多種價值予以考量、完善國有企業(yè)經(jīng)營者激勵措施三個個主要觀點(diǎn),并且與第二章提出的內(nèi)容形成呼應(yīng),對第二章提出的問題進(jìn)行有針對性的解決。 結(jié)論部分提出國有企業(yè)的經(jīng)營問題與國有股權(quán)的行使和監(jiān)督問題是一系列長期以來形成的問題的總和,對于其解決,只能全面地加以考量,在處理這些問題時不應(yīng)當(dāng)簡單化地一概而論,而必須對其予以綜合考慮、全面變革。
[Abstract]:Since the reform of state-owned enterprises' corporatization, the operation of the state-owned equity system has made remarkable achievements, and has also encountered an awkward predicament, and because of the status of the state as a shareholder, It makes state-owned equity appear a large number of different characteristics from traditional equity, which also makes the legal thinking on the dilemma of state-owned equity exercise more practical and theoretical significance. Based on the above reasons, the author intends to analyze the dilemma of the exercise of state-owned equity, and consider the legal system root of this dilemma, and put forward some thoughts and opinions on how to perfect the state-owned equity system. This paper is divided into three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The introduction describes the significance of the topic, domestic research status and literature review, and defines the scope of this study. The text is divided into three chapters. The first chapter mainly discusses the dilemma of the exercise of state-owned equity. On the basis of the deconstruction of shareholders' right to control the company, and from the provisions of the Company Law of China, this paper discusses the various difficulties faced by the state-owned equity in the process of exercising it from general to special. In this part, the right to know, the right to vote and the right to litigation are respectively interpreted, and the conflict of the exercise of state-owned equity in the Company Law and the Enterprise State-owned assets Law is discussed. It also points out that there are two outstanding characteristics in the process of the exercise of state-owned equity: one is the excessive regulation of the administrative exercise of state-owned equity by the state-owned assets supervision and management agency, the other is the inability of shareholders' rights to form effective control over the managers of the company. Speculation by managers is on the rise. The second chapter mainly analyzes the institutional root of the predicament of the exercise of state-owned equity in China. Under the condition of excessive administrative intervention and serious insider control in the exercise of state-owned equity, the causes of the above difficulties are discussed from four aspects. It includes errors in the exercise of state-owned equity, analysis of government orientation, preference for corporate income, neglect of human resource value, lack of norms and embarrassment of company law positioning. In this part of the narrative, through the review of the state-owned equity and related systems, the paper puts forward the institutional defects in the process of the exercise of state-owned equity from the point of view of connection. The third chapter mainly expounds a system assumption of reconstructing the exercise system of state-owned equity, which is divided into two aspects: the change of idea and the innovation of practice. In the transformation of the concept, it is proposed that the public attribute of state-owned equity should be placed in an important position, which plays an extremely important role in correcting the mode of equity exercise in which economic interests are paramount. In the aspect of practice innovation, this paper puts forward that the behavior of state-owned assets supervision and management institutions should interact with the legal system, and the various values should be considered in the process of equity investment. There are three main points of view on how to perfect the incentive measures of the managers of the state-owned enterprises, which are echoed with the contents put forward in the second chapter, and the problems raised in the second chapter are solved pertinently. The conclusion is that the operation of state-owned enterprises and the exercise and supervision of state-owned equity are the summation of a series of problems which have been formed for a long time. These problems should not be dealt with in a simplistic way, but must be comprehensively considered and transformed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D922.291.91

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 郎田豐;國有股權(quán)行使研究[D];山西大學(xué);2011年

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本文編號：2287070