【摘要】：隨著社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,公司制度也在不斷地變遷,其中最引人注目的是公司的治理中心從股東會(huì)向董事會(huì)、經(jīng)理層的轉(zhuǎn)變,這一轉(zhuǎn)變不僅獲得了國(guó)內(nèi)外廣大學(xué)者的普遍認(rèn)可,也為我們普通老百姓所感受。在現(xiàn)實(shí)的生活中,人們對(duì)一個(gè)公司,尤其是知名公司的認(rèn)識(shí)往往是和該公司的高管聯(lián)系在一起的。例如,提起萬(wàn)科、海爾、淘寶我們自然就會(huì)想到王石、張瑞敏和馬云,由此可見(jiàn),公司的高管對(duì)于公司的影響是巨大的。當(dāng)然,公司法中的這一轉(zhuǎn)變是經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,公司規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大,股權(quán)的分散以及公司治理的專業(yè)化等各種因素所促成的,適應(yīng)了現(xiàn)代公司治理的需求。一方面,公司的專業(yè)化經(jīng)營(yíng)為公司提供了高效的治理模式,但另一方面,所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)的分離使公司的董事、監(jiān)事、高級(jí)管理人員的權(quán)力膨脹,從而可能導(dǎo)致權(quán)力的濫用,給公司、股東、債權(quán)人等主體的利益造成損失,尤其對(duì)與不直接參與公司經(jīng)營(yíng)管理的債權(quán)人的威脅更大。因此,如何構(gòu)建與公司高管權(quán)利相平衡的義務(wù)與責(zé)任、研究高管對(duì)公司以外的第三人的義務(wù)與責(zé)任,尤其是對(duì)債權(quán)人的義務(wù)與責(zé)任顯得尤為重要和迫切。 本文一共分為三章,第一章著重探討公司高管對(duì)債權(quán)人承擔(dān)責(zé)任的理論基礎(chǔ),即引入該制度的原因,從三個(gè)方面進(jìn)行了說(shuō)明,首先是對(duì)現(xiàn)代公司治理模式對(duì)公司債權(quán)人保護(hù)的局限性進(jìn)行了分析,得出股東有限責(zé)任和公司現(xiàn)行的治理結(jié)構(gòu)導(dǎo)致公司高管的權(quán)利義務(wù)嚴(yán)重不平衡,權(quán)利過(guò)于膨脹,而義務(wù)和責(zé)任的承擔(dān)較少,直接對(duì)債權(quán)人的債權(quán)產(chǎn)生了威脅,從而說(shuō)明了引入該制度的必要性。在本章的第二部分分析了現(xiàn)行公司法對(duì)公司利益相關(guān)者利益平衡的制度設(shè)計(jì),通過(guò)分析得出現(xiàn)階段的這些制度并不能夠有效保護(hù)債權(quán)人的利益,第三部分則分析了高管對(duì)債權(quán)承擔(dān)責(zé)任的意義,因此得出需要引入該制度的結(jié)論。文章第二章是公司高管對(duì)債權(quán)人義務(wù)的內(nèi)容以及責(zé)任性質(zhì)的辨析,通過(guò)閱讀大量文獻(xiàn),發(fā)現(xiàn)大家認(rèn)為高管對(duì)債權(quán)人的義務(wù)應(yīng)為兩個(gè)方面,即信義義務(wù)和注意義務(wù),所以在這一章的第一部分介紹了信義義務(wù)和注意義務(wù)的概念以及公司高管對(duì)債權(quán)人義務(wù)的具體內(nèi)容,在第二部分分析了高管對(duì)債權(quán)人承擔(dān)損害賠償責(zé)任的性質(zhì),通過(guò)分析得知,其性質(zhì)要區(qū)別不同的情形,可以歸納為一般侵權(quán)責(zé)任和特別法定責(zé)任。文章的最后一部分對(duì)我國(guó)公司高管對(duì)債權(quán)人責(zé)任制度進(jìn)行了構(gòu)建,提出在構(gòu)建時(shí)需要解決的幾個(gè)問(wèn)題,并建議借鑒股東派生訴訟制度,在前置程序和主體資格方面進(jìn)行限定。
[Abstract]:With the development of the society and economy, the company system is changing constantly. The most striking thing is the transformation of the corporate governance center from the shareholders' meeting to the board of directors and the manager, which has not only been generally recognized by the vast number of scholars at home and abroad. It is also felt by ordinary people. In real life, people's knowledge of a company, especially a well-known company, is often associated with its executives. For example, the mention of Vanke, Haier, Taobao, we will naturally think of Wang Shi, Zhang Ruimin and Ma Yun, this shows that the company's executives to the company's impact is huge. Of course, this change in company law is caused by various factors, such as the development of economy, the expansion of company scale, the dispersion of stock rights and the specialization of corporate governance, which meet the needs of modern corporate governance. On the one hand, the specialized management of the company provides an efficient governance model for the company, but on the other hand, the separation of ownership and management rights expands the power of the directors, supervisors and senior managers of the company, which may lead to the abuse of power. To the interests of the company, shareholders, creditors and other subjects caused losses, especially to the creditors who do not directly participate in the management of the company is a greater threat. Therefore, how to construct the obligation and responsibility to balance the rights of company executives, and to study the obligations and responsibilities of executives to the third party outside the company, especially to the creditors, is particularly important and urgent. This paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter focuses on the theoretical basis of the company executives' responsibility to creditors, that is, the reasons for the introduction of the system, and explains from three aspects. First of all, it analyzes the limitation of the modern corporate governance model on the protection of corporate creditors, and concludes that the limited liability of shareholders and the current governance structure of the company lead to serious imbalance of rights and obligations of company executives and excessive expansion of rights. However, the obligation and responsibility are less, which directly threaten the creditor's rights, thus explaining the necessity of introducing the system. In the second part of this chapter, the author analyzes the system design of the current company law to balance the interests of the stakeholders, and draws the conclusion that these systems can not effectively protect the interests of creditors at the present stage. The third part analyzes the significance of senior executives' liability for creditor's rights, and draws the conclusion that it is necessary to introduce this system. The second chapter is the analysis of the content and nature of corporate executives' obligations to creditors. Through reading a large number of documents, it is found that executives' obligations to creditors should be two aspects, namely, fiduciary obligation and duty of care. So in the first part of this chapter, it introduces the concept of fiduciary duty and duty of care and the specific content of company executives' obligation to creditors. In the second part, it analyzes the nature of executives' liability for damages to creditors. Its nature to distinguish different situations, can be summed up as general tort liability and special legal liability. In the last part of the article, the author constructs the liability system of senior executives to creditors in our country, puts forward several problems that need to be solved in the process of construction, and suggests to use the shareholder derivative litigation system for reference to limit the pre-procedure and subject qualification.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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本文編號(hào)：2286271