有限責(zé)任公司受壓制股東權(quán)利救濟(jì)研究
[Abstract]:Limited liability company is an important form of modern company, because of its unique superiority, from its emergence to the present, has been favored by investors. But the market is changing, and all kinds of contradictions among shareholders are inevitable. In the company practice, the company's plan decisions are often controlled by the majority of shareholders in the company, while the other shareholders are. There are not too many "voices" which are suppressed by other shareholders. Therefore, when there is abuse of rights by shareholders in a company, there should be an effective system to safeguard the rights and interests of suppressed shareholders. However, there is only one stipulation in the Company Law of China concerning the withdrawal rules of shareholders, and it is relatively simple. There are still many defects in the complicated company practice. The relevant system to suppress the relief of shareholders' rights.
Firstly, based on company contract theory, equity theory and stakeholder theory, the paper expounds the value of shareholder withdrawal mechanism of limited liability company; secondly, it mainly studies the shareholder withdrawal mechanism based on "major cause" in German judicial precedents and the system of the right of demurring shareholders to buy shares in the United States, and briefly introduces the system of demurring shareholders to withdraw from the system. This paper introduces the relevant laws and regulations of other foreign countries, and compares and analyzes the shareholder withdrawal mechanism of Germany and the United States, in order to find out the experience and advantages of the two countries in the shareholder withdrawal mechanism and the reference significance for our country; then, starting from the relevant provisions of the Company Law of China on the shareholder withdrawal mechanism, it analyzes the law of our country. What are the shortcomings of the relevant provisions of the law on shareholders'withdrawal mechanism? Finally, on the basis of drawing lessons from the advanced experience of foreign countries in the withdrawal mechanism of shareholders, this paper puts forward some pertinent suggestions on the shortcomings of the withdrawal mechanism of shareholders in China in terms of the applicable conditions of the rules, the applicable subjects, the determination of the share price and the applicable restrictions. It is suggested to perfect the relief system for shareholders' suppressed shareholder rights in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:揚(yáng)州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2011
【分類號(hào)】:D922.291.91
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