家族企業(yè)控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的規(guī)制
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the family enterprises account for 90% of the total number of private enterprises, and private enterprises account for more than 63% of the total national economy. However, due to the improper exercise of family business control, the average survival life of family business is only 2.9 years, so the fatalism of "rich but three generations" is widely spread in society. The rapid development but low survival rate of family enterprises not only have a negative impact on society, but also waste scarce economic resources, which should be highly concerned by the whole society. This article is based on the improper exercise of the control rights of the family enterprises, the non-public economic benefits, the inability of enterprises to retain talents, and the lack of technology needed by enterprises due to the non-socialization of management and management. The traditional exercise of control right and modern enterprise system can not be well regulated, leading to the problem of enterprise fatalism. The article is divided into four parts: the first part mainly introduces: family business control and business management. This paper mainly expounds the necessity that family enterprises should have control rights and set up control rights scientifically according to the company law, and that family enterprises can survive and develop only if they have and properly implement the control rights. The second part mainly introduces the consequences of improper exercise of family business control. This paper mainly expounds the practical cases and phenomena of family business entrepreneurs who exercise control power in transition and are lazy to exercise control power. This situation leads to the severe consequences of the short life of the enterprise. The third part mainly introduces: the family business improper exercise control power reason analysis. This paper mainly expounds the reasons why the entrepreneurs of the family business can not be set up scientifically and properly implement the control right, analyzes the case of out of control, and finds out the reasons leading to the fatalism of the enterprise. The fourth part mainly introduces: the family firm control right and the modern enterprise system regulation. This paper mainly expounds that the entrepreneurs of family enterprises should come out of the misunderstanding of enterprise fatalism, take practical measures, seize the good opportunity of current reform and opening up, make the enterprises bigger and stronger, and cultivate a century-old shop.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:蘭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2011
【分類號】:D922.291.91
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