【摘要】：公司機(jī)會(huì)規(guī)則,是指公司的董事負(fù)有不得篡奪公司商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)的義務(wù)。公司機(jī)會(huì)規(guī)則是英美法系國(guó)家在眾多相關(guān)判例的基礎(chǔ)上逐步發(fā)展起來(lái)的公司治理制度,其目的在于保護(hù)公司的利益不受董事的侵害。近年來(lái),大陸法系國(guó)家也有逐步將其引入的趨勢(shì)。我國(guó)現(xiàn)行《公司法》確立了公司機(jī)會(huì)規(guī)則,但由于法條規(guī)定過(guò)于簡(jiǎn)單,仍有繼續(xù)進(jìn)行相關(guān)理論研究的必要。 本文主要包括引言、正文和結(jié)論三部分。其中,正文部分共有五個(gè)章節(jié)。 第一章對(duì)禁止董事篡奪公司機(jī)會(huì)的理論基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行了梳理。董事與公司的關(guān)系主要有信托關(guān)系說(shuō)、代理關(guān)系說(shuō)和委任關(guān)系說(shuō),公司機(jī)會(huì)規(guī)則與自我交易限制、競(jìng)業(yè)禁止規(guī)則同屬董事忠實(shí)義務(wù)的具體要求,皆解決董事與公司利益沖突問(wèn)題,但在調(diào)整對(duì)象、構(gòu)成要件以及法律后果等方面存在差別。 第二章對(duì)公司機(jī)會(huì)的認(rèn)定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行了界定與分析。對(duì)于如何甄別公司機(jī)會(huì),主要存在利益和期待利益標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、經(jīng)營(yíng)范圍標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、公平標(biāo)準(zhǔn)等不同學(xué)說(shuō),本章對(duì)英美兩國(guó)對(duì)公司機(jī)會(huì)判斷標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的判例、學(xué)說(shuō)進(jìn)行了分析和比較,并介紹了我國(guó)司法實(shí)踐中針對(duì)公司機(jī)會(huì)的認(rèn)定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。 第三章探討了董事利用公司機(jī)會(huì)的正當(dāng)情形以及正當(dāng)化程序設(shè)計(jì)。在英美判例法中,對(duì)于董事利用公司機(jī)會(huì)并非絕對(duì)無(wú)條件禁止,理論上也越來(lái)越傾向于從董事利用公司商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)的絕對(duì)禁止義務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)槔霉旧虡I(yè)機(jī)會(huì)的相對(duì)禁止義務(wù),董事對(duì)于公司機(jī)會(huì)的利用不應(yīng)當(dāng)被一律禁止,在諸如公司放棄機(jī)會(huì)、無(wú)法利用機(jī)會(huì)等特定情形下并經(jīng)合法程序允許其利用的前提下,董事有權(quán)利用公司機(jī)會(huì)。 第四章分析了董事篡奪公司機(jī)會(huì)的法律后果和救濟(jì)途徑。法律后果主要包括董事篡奪公司機(jī)會(huì)后與第三方進(jìn)行的交易本身的效力和違反義務(wù)的董事應(yīng)對(duì)公司承擔(dān)的責(zé)任。作為受害方的公司及公司股東,可以利用公司法上特殊的救濟(jì)途徑向侵權(quán)董事主張權(quán)利。 第五章是關(guān)于我國(guó)相關(guān)立法的不足和完善建議。主要探討了如何確立公司機(jī)會(huì)的認(rèn)定標(biāo)準(zhǔn),明確董事合理利用公司機(jī)會(huì)的例外規(guī)定,完善董事篡奪公司機(jī)會(huì)的救濟(jì)途徑,以及增加對(duì)離任董事的規(guī)制。
[Abstract]:Corporate opportunity rules refer to the obligation of directors not to usurp business opportunities. Corporate opportunity rule is a system of corporate governance developed by Anglo-American law countries on the basis of many relevant cases. Its purpose is to protect the interests of companies from being infringed by directors. In recent years, civil law countries have gradually introduced it. The present Company Law of our country has established the company opportunity rule, but because the stipulation of the law is too simple, it is necessary to continue to carry on the related theory research. This article mainly includes the introduction, the text and the conclusion three parts. Among them, the body part has five chapters. The first chapter combs the theoretical basis of prohibiting directors from usurping corporate opportunities. The relationship between directors and companies mainly includes fiduciary relationship theory, agency relationship theory and appointment relationship theory, company opportunity rules and self-dealing restrictions, and non-competition rules are both specific requirements of directors' duty of loyalty. All of them solve the conflicts of interests between directors and companies, but there are differences in the object of adjustment, the elements of constitution and the legal consequences. The second chapter defines and analyzes the standards of corporate opportunity. There are different theories on how to identify the company opportunity, such as interest and expectation interest standard, business scope standard, fair standard and so on. This chapter analyzes and compares the jurisprudence of the British and American countries on the corporate opportunity judgment standard. And introduced our country judicial practice regarding the company opportunity confirmation standard. The third chapter discusses the proper situation of the directors' taking advantage of the company's opportunity and the design of the proper procedure. In Anglo-American case law, directors' use of corporate opportunities is not absolutely and unconditionally prohibited, and in theory they tend to change from the absolute prohibition of directors' taking advantage of corporate business opportunities to the relative prohibition obligations of utilizing corporate business opportunities. Directors should not be prohibited from taking advantage of the company's opportunity, and they have the right to take advantage of the company's opportunity under certain circumstances such as the company giving up the opportunity and not being able to take advantage of the opportunity and allowed to use it by legal procedure. The fourth chapter analyzes the legal consequences and remedies of directors usurping corporate opportunities. The legal consequences mainly include the validity of the transaction with the third party after the directors usurp the opportunity of the company and the liability of the directors who violate their obligations. As the injured party, the company and its shareholders can claim the rights of the infringing directors through the special remedy in the company law. The fifth chapter is about our country related legislation insufficiency and the consummation proposal. This paper mainly discusses how to establish the standard of corporate opportunity, clarify the exception of directors' reasonable use of company's opportunity, perfect the relief way of directors usurping the company's opportunity, and increase the regulation to the outgoing directors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：上海交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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