本文選題：控制股東 + 關(guān)聯(lián)交易�。� 參考：《福州大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】：控制股東是隨著現(xiàn)代公司的發(fā)展而逐漸產(chǎn)生的，并且現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)廣泛的存在于各種類型的公司之中。由于控制股東的普遍存在，控制股東與公司之間的關(guān)聯(lián)交易也不可避免，這既包括控制股東與公司之間的交易，也包括與其控股公司子公司之間的交易，表現(xiàn)形式繁多。控制股東的關(guān)聯(lián)交易既有降低交易成本、提高交易效率的積極作用，也有降級(jí)企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)能力、犧牲公平原則的不利影響。為了充分發(fā)揮其積極的作用，必須對(duì)控制股東的關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行法律規(guī)制。針對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)現(xiàn)在規(guī)制控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易法律的不足之處，通過(guò)借鑒國(guó)外的立法經(jīng)驗(yàn)并且結(jié)合我國(guó)具體的國(guó)情，提出完善我國(guó)的控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易的立法建議。本文分為四個(gè)部分，主要內(nèi)容包括： 第一部分，介紹控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易的法律界定。通過(guò)對(duì)控制股東和關(guān)聯(lián)交易概念內(nèi)涵和外延的界定，系統(tǒng)的論述了控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易的法律特征，為進(jìn)一步介紹規(guī)制控制股東的關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行鋪墊。 第二部分，分析控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易法律規(guī)則的必要性�？刂乒蓶|的管理交易盡管有其存在的合理性，，但是其弊端也需要規(guī)制。控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易存在的弊端主要體現(xiàn)在以下幾個(gè)方面：虛構(gòu)信息，擾亂市場(chǎng)調(diào)節(jié)機(jī)制；不公平的關(guān)聯(lián)交易損害公司以及中小股東、公司利益相關(guān)人的利益；關(guān)聯(lián)交易在合法形式下，可能掩蓋著非法目的。并且結(jié)合我國(guó)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)狀，說(shuō)明我國(guó)是典型的集中式的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，在法律規(guī)制控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易還不完善的情況下，控制股東的關(guān)聯(lián)交易很可能對(duì)公司和其他中小股東權(quán)益的造成損害。通過(guò)考察近幾年我國(guó)上市公司控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易的實(shí)證，反映出控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易的普遍性以及存在大量的不公平的管理交易，說(shuō)明規(guī)制控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易的必要性。 第三部分，討論了我國(guó)現(xiàn)行法律制度對(duì)控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易規(guī)制存在的不足之處。我國(guó)現(xiàn)行的法律制度對(duì)控制股東的關(guān)聯(lián)交易有所規(guī)定，但是還是存在著不足，主要表現(xiàn)在：公司法對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易制度設(shè)計(jì)存在缺失、規(guī)制關(guān)聯(lián)交易制度操作性不強(qiáng)、規(guī)制外延范圍過(guò)窄并且欠缺體系性這三個(gè)方面。 第四部分，提出了完善控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易法律規(guī)制的具體建議。主要從審查控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易的前期、監(jiān)管控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易的過(guò)程以及完善控制股東關(guān)聯(lián)交易事后法律救濟(jì)這三個(gè)階段提出完善立法的建議。
[Abstract]:With the development of modern companies, controlling shareholders have emerged gradually, and have been widely existed in various types of companies. Due to the widespread existence of controlling shareholders, related party transactions between controlling shareholders and companies are inevitable, which includes transactions between controlling shareholders and companies as well as transactions with subsidiaries of their holding companies. The related party transaction of controlling shareholders not only has the positive effect of reducing transaction cost and improving the transaction efficiency, but also has the adverse effect of demoting the enterprise's management ability and sacrificing the principle of fairness. In order to give full play to its positive role, the related party transactions of controlling shareholders must be regulated by law. In view of the deficiency of the domestic law of regulating the related party transactions of controlling shareholders at present, this paper puts forward some legislative suggestions to perfect the related party transactions of controlling shareholders in our country by referring to the legislative experience of foreign countries and combining with the specific conditions of our country. This paper is divided into four parts, the main contents include: The first part introduces the legal definition of related transactions of controlling shareholders. Through the definition of the connotation and extension of the concept of controlling shareholder and related party transaction, this paper systematically discusses the legal characteristics of the related party transaction of controlling shareholder, and paves the way for the further introduction of regulating the related party transaction of controlling shareholder. The second part analyzes the necessity of controlling shareholders' related transactions. Although the management transaction of controlling shareholders has its rationality, its drawbacks also need to be regulated. The disadvantages of the related transactions of controlling shareholders are mainly reflected in the following aspects: fictitious information, disturbing the market regulation mechanism, unfair related party transactions harm the interests of the company, the minority shareholders, the stakeholders of the company, and the interests of the relevant parties of the company; Related party transactions in the legal form, may cover up the illegal purpose. And combined with the current situation of China's equity structure, it shows that our country is a typical centralized ownership structure, in the case of legal regulation of the related transactions of shareholders is not perfect. Related party transactions of controlling shareholders are likely to damage the rights and interests of the company and other minority shareholders. By examining the related party transactions of controlling shareholders of listed companies in China in recent years, it reflects the universality of the related transactions of controlling shareholders and the existence of a large number of unfair management transactions, which shows the necessity of regulating the related transactions of controlling shareholders. In the third part, the author discusses the deficiency of the regulation of the related transactions of controlling shareholders in the current legal system of our country. The current legal system of our country has some regulations on the related party transactions of controlling shareholders, but there are still some shortcomings, such as: the lack of the design of the related party transaction system in the company law, and the weak operability of the regulation of the related party transaction system. The regulation extension scope is too narrow and lacks the system these three aspects. In the fourth part, the author puts forward some specific suggestions on how to improve the legal regulation of the related transactions of controlling shareholders. This paper puts forward some suggestions on how to perfect the legislation mainly from the three stages of examining the related party transactions of controlling shareholders, supervising the process of related transactions of controlling shareholders and perfecting the legal relief after the related transactions of controlling shareholders.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：福州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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