本文選題：股份公司 + 公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)　； 參考：《南開大學(xué)》2010年博士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)中的社會(huì)化大生產(chǎn)使投資規(guī)模大大超過了個(gè)人的投資能力,同時(shí)出于分散投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的需要產(chǎn)生了以有限責(zé)任為基礎(chǔ)的股份公司,其突出的特征是財(cái)產(chǎn)所有權(quán)與企業(yè)控制權(quán)的分離,由此產(chǎn)生了所有者與經(jīng)營者利益不一致所導(dǎo)致的委托—代理問題。為解決這一委托—代理問題,以企業(yè)控制權(quán)分配為核心的公司治理機(jī)制應(yīng)運(yùn)而生,并在各國的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展過程中和經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的約束下,產(chǎn)生了不同類型的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)。其中現(xiàn)代日本的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),在日本經(jīng)濟(jì)陷入長期蕭條以及為走向復(fù)蘇而進(jìn)行包括企業(yè)制度在內(nèi)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革的背景下,引起了學(xué)術(shù)界的重視,成為日本經(jīng)濟(jì)研究中最為重要的研究領(lǐng)域之一。 本文的研究即屬于上述范疇,但與以往的同類研究有所不同,本文將在一個(gè)公司法及其變革的視角下,以戰(zhàn)后日本的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)及其演化為研究對象,分析公司法變革與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)演化之間的關(guān)系。通過這種公司法視角下的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)研究,將有可能在更大的學(xué)術(shù)空間內(nèi)闡釋現(xiàn)代日本經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的微觀基礎(chǔ),從中揭示出政府與法制、政府與市場、政府與企業(yè)之間更為細(xì)微、復(fù)雜的關(guān)系,對這些問題的闡明,可以在相當(dāng)大程度上解釋現(xiàn)代日本經(jīng)濟(jì)體制不同于其它類型經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的特征。 本文的結(jié)構(gòu)如下。 在緒論闡述了本文的研究背景、研究意義、研究現(xiàn)狀、研究思路、研究方法的基礎(chǔ)上,第一章首先在一般意義上論述了公司制度、公司法、公司治理的產(chǎn)生和內(nèi)在的邏輯關(guān)系,系統(tǒng)地梳理了近代以來日本移植西方公司法的歷史過程,并詳細(xì)闡述了直到戰(zhàn)后1950年代初期歷次公司法的修訂及其對公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的影響,特別指出了公司法語境下的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與現(xiàn)實(shí)中的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)在觀念上、機(jī)制上、運(yùn)行上的差異。 第二章論述了現(xiàn)代日本企業(yè)制度以及相應(yīng)的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)起源于戰(zhàn)后由美國占領(lǐng)軍主導(dǎo)的外生強(qiáng)制的民主化改革,但是由美國占領(lǐng)軍依據(jù)美國模式設(shè)計(jì),并通過廣泛分散的個(gè)人所有制、企業(yè)控制權(quán)再分配建立起來的日本企業(yè)制度以及相應(yīng)的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),在由統(tǒng)制經(jīng)濟(jì)向市場經(jīng)濟(jì)過渡完成后發(fā)生了適應(yīng)性演化,在產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、融資結(jié)構(gòu)、控制權(quán)分配等各個(gè)方面均發(fā)生了對美國模式的偏離。 第三章承接上一章論述了日本公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)適應(yīng)性演化的后果,是形成了相互持股的法人所有制、由銀行進(jìn)行相機(jī)治理的主銀行制、“內(nèi)部人控制”的層級結(jié)構(gòu),這些制度安排不僅是對戰(zhàn)后日本公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行經(jīng)驗(yàn)觀察所得到的特征化事實(shí),而且是構(gòu)成了日本傳統(tǒng)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的最為關(guān)鍵的要素,在戰(zhàn)后日本由后發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)向工業(yè)化經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)變的過程中發(fā)揮了重要作用。 第四章論述了在完成向工業(yè)化經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)變之后,圍繞日本企業(yè)運(yùn)行和公司治理的經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢、制度環(huán)境發(fā)生了重大變化,在資本市場日益替代主銀行制對企業(yè)進(jìn)行監(jiān)管、穩(wěn)定股東不斷趨于消散而使公司控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移成為現(xiàn)實(shí)威脅的條件下,日本傳統(tǒng)的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)面臨困境,在長期蕭條中開始進(jìn)行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)改革,同時(shí)迎來了公司法變革的時(shí)代。 第五章著重論述了1990年代初開始的公司法修訂及其與日本公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)新一輪演化之間的關(guān)系,這是戰(zhàn)后數(shù)十年來第一次真正意義上的公司法變革,本章詳細(xì)介紹了包括董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)改革、激勵(lì)機(jī)制改革、信息披露制改革、股東訴訟條件改革在內(nèi)的公司法變革內(nèi)容,在此基礎(chǔ)上闡述了公司法變革對日本傳統(tǒng)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)改革及其演化方向的影響。 第六章帶有全文總結(jié)的性質(zhì),探討日本公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)演化的趨勢,在經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化和國際市場競爭的作用下,在世界范圍內(nèi)的確出現(xiàn)了公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)趨同的傾向,并且在日本公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的演化方向上反映出來,但本章強(qiáng)調(diào)指出了公司法變革背景下日本公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)改革的特征是,屬于外部市場約束的改革迅速,但屬于內(nèi)部監(jiān)管機(jī)制的改革滯后,即外部治理結(jié)構(gòu)和內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)是非均衡演化的,兩者之間的磨合增大了公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)演化方向的不確定性,到目前為止沒有確切的證據(jù)表明會(huì)收斂于盎格魯—撒克遜模式。
[Abstract]:The large-scale social production in the modern economy makes the investment scale more than the individual's investment ability. At the same time, the joint stock company based on the limited liability is produced out of the need of the limited liability. The prominent feature is the separation of property ownership and the control right of the enterprise, thus producing the inconsistency between the owner and the proprietor. In order to solve this principal-agent problem, in order to solve this principal-agent problem, the corporate governance mechanism, which takes the distribution of enterprise control as the core, arises at the historic moment, and has produced different types of corporate governance structure under the constraints of economic development and economic system in various countries. Under the background of the long-term depression and the economic system reform, including the enterprise system for the recovery, it has attracted the attention of the academic circle and became one of the most important research fields in the Japanese economic research.
The study of this paper belongs to the above category, but it is different from the previous studies of the same kind. This article will take the corporate governance structure and its evolution as the research object in the perspective of a company law and its change, and analyze the relationship between the change of corporate law and the evolution of corporate governance. It is possible to explain the microcosmic basis of the modern Japanese economic system in a larger academic space. It reveals that the government and the legal system, the government and the market, the government and the enterprise are more subtle and complex, and the clarifying of these problems can explain to a considerable extent that the modern Japanese economic system is different from other categories. The characteristics of the type of economic system.
The structure of this article is as follows.
On the basis of the introduction of the research background, research significance, research status, research ideas and research methods, the first chapter first discusses the production of company system, company law, corporate governance and internal logical relationship in general meaning, and systematically combs the historical process of Japan's transplantation of western company law in modern times and detailed the process of modern Japan. This paper expounds the revision of the company law and its influence on the corporate governance in the early 1950s, and especially points out the differences in the concept, mechanism and operation of corporate governance structure in the context of the company law and the corporate governance structure in the reality.
The second chapter discusses that the modern Japanese enterprise system and the corresponding corporate governance structure originate from the post-war foreign compulsory democratization reform dominated by the American occupying forces, but the Japanese enterprise system established by the American occupation army, based on the American model, and by the widely dispersed individual ownership and the redistribution of the right of enterprise control. As well as the corresponding corporate governance structure, the adaptive evolution has taken place after the transition from the unified economy to the market economy. The deviation of the American model has occurred in all aspects of the structure of property rights, the structure of financing, the distribution of the right of control and so on.
The third chapter deals with the consequences of the adaptive evolution of the corporate governance structure in Japan, which is the formation of a mutual shareholding system of corporate ownership, the main banking system governed by the bank and the hierarchical structure of "insider control". These institutional arrangements are not only a special experience of the post-war Japanese corporate governance structure. It is the most critical element of the Japanese traditional corporate governance structure, which has played an important role in the process of post-war Japan from the post development economy to the industrialized economy.
The fourth chapter discusses the economic situation surrounding the operation of Japanese enterprises and corporate governance after the completion of the transition to the industrialized economy. The institutional environment has changed greatly. In the condition that the capital market is increasingly substitutes for the main bank system to supervise the enterprises, the stable shareholders tend to dissipate to make the control of the company a real threat. The traditional corporate governance structure is in a predicament. In the long run, the company began to reform its corporate governance structure and ushered in the era of corporate law reform.
The fifth chapter focuses on the revision of the company law and its relationship with the new evolution of Japanese corporate governance in the early 1990s. This is the first real change in corporate law in the last few decades. This chapter describes in detail the reform of the board of directors, the reform of the incentive mechanism, the reform of the information disclosure system, and the shareholder's lawsuit. On the basis of the reform of company law, the impact of corporate law reform on the reform and evolution of Japanese traditional corporate governance is expounded.
The sixth chapter, with the nature of the full text summary, discusses the trend of the evolution of corporate governance in Japan. Under the effect of economic globalization and international market competition, the tendency of the convergence of corporate governance has appeared in the world, and it is reflected in the evolution of corporate governance in Japan. However, this chapter emphasizes the company law. Under the background of change, the reform of corporate governance in Japan is characterized by the rapid reform of the external market constraints, but the reform of the internal regulatory mechanism is lagging behind, that is, the external governance structure and internal governance structure are unbalanced, and the combination between them increases the uncertainty of the evolution direction of the corporate governance structure. There is definite evidence that it will converge on the Anglo Saxon model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：F276.6;D912.29

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