發(fā)布時間：2018-05-20 02:05

  本文選題：控制股東 + 控制權(quán)　； 參考：《天津商業(yè)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：公司在經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中的地位越來越重要。在公司內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)中，控制股東占據(jù)著主導(dǎo)地位，控制股東在參與公司治理中的角色日益重要�？刂乒蓶|在有效降低管理成本和提高上市公司治理效率的同時，他們對公司的控制力日益增強(qiáng)。然而，權(quán)力的增強(qiáng)和濫用似乎相乘相長，控制股東在追求公司最大利益的同時，也做出了一些濫用控制權(quán)侵犯公司長遠(yuǎn)利益的行為，引發(fā)了控制股東和中小股東的沖突，這種矛盾愈演愈烈，逐漸成為制約公司發(fā)展的瓶頸。 研究控制股東表決權(quán)，有助于我們從更深層次上把握表決權(quán)限制的本質(zhì)，理解表決權(quán)和控制權(quán)的關(guān)系；有助于我們從規(guī)范規(guī)制的層次上更好的把握公司立法和公司章程如何界分各自對控制股東表決權(quán)的限制，為約束控制股東濫用控制權(quán)提供一條思路，以達(dá)到公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)合理、公司有效運(yùn)行、維護(hù)中小股東權(quán)益、促進(jìn)我國經(jīng)濟(jì)健康有序發(fā)展。 本文采取語詞分析法、比較法，立足于我國控制股東表決權(quán)的規(guī)制現(xiàn)狀，對比國外控制股東表決權(quán)的規(guī)制，探索適合我國控制股東表決權(quán)限制的做法。本文除導(dǎo)論外，，包括三個部分。第一部分是控制股東表決權(quán)的界定及其性質(zhì)。介紹了控制股東、控股股東、實際控制人和控制股東表決權(quán)的性質(zhì)。第二部分是控制股東表決權(quán)限制的正當(dāng)性分析。介紹了控制股東表決權(quán)限制的理論依據(jù)、社會價值、實證分析。理論依據(jù)主要包括“一股一權(quán)”和“資本多數(shù)決”機(jī)制缺陷、平等原則、權(quán)利不得濫用。社會價值體現(xiàn)在控制股東表決權(quán)有利于引導(dǎo)中小投資者理性投資，保護(hù)中小股東利益，增強(qiáng)公司社會效益。實證分析介紹了控制股東濫用表決權(quán)的原因和表現(xiàn)。第三部分是控制股東表決權(quán)限制的解決途徑。首先介紹了公司立法、公司章程在限制控制股東表決權(quán)的界分依據(jù)和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)；其次介紹了借鑒域外控制股東表決權(quán)限制的做法；最后，分析章程限制控制股東表決權(quán)的可行性以及章程對控制股東表決權(quán)限制的設(shè)計思路。
[Abstract]:Companies are becoming more and more important in economic development. In the internal structure of the company, the controlling shareholder occupies the leading position, and the controlling shareholder plays an increasingly important role in the corporate governance. While controlling shareholders effectively reduce management costs and improve the efficiency of corporate governance, their control over the company is increasingly enhanced. However, the enhancement and abuse of power seem to multiply each other. While pursuing the best interests of the company, the controlling shareholders have also made some acts of abusing the control rights to infringe on the long-term interests of the company, which has caused the conflict between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders. This kind of contradiction becomes increasingly fierce, gradually becomes the bottleneck which restricts the company development. Studying the voting rights of controlling shareholders is helpful for us to grasp the essence of voting restriction and to understand the relationship between voting rights and control rights. It is helpful for us to better grasp the limitation of the voting rights of the controlling shareholders in the company legislation and the articles of association from the level of normative regulation, and to provide a way of thinking for restricting the abuse of the control rights by the controlling shareholders in order to achieve a reasonable corporate governance structure. The company operates effectively, protects the rights and interests of minority shareholders and promotes the healthy and orderly development of our economy. Based on the present situation of controlling shareholders' voting rights in our country, this paper adopts the word analysis method and comparative method, compares the control shareholders' voting rights in foreign countries, and explores the methods suitable for controlling shareholders' voting rights in our country. In addition to the introduction, this paper includes three parts. The first part is the definition and nature of controlling shareholders' voting rights. This paper introduces the nature of voting rights of controlling shareholders, actual controlling shareholders and controlling shareholders. The second part is the legitimate analysis of controlling shareholders' voting rights. This paper introduces the theoretical basis, social value and empirical analysis of controlling shareholders' voting rights. The theoretical basis mainly includes the defects of "one share, one right" and "capital majority decision" mechanism, equality principle and right can not be abused. The social value is reflected in controlling the voting rights of shareholders to guide the rational investment of small and medium investors, to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders, and to enhance the social benefits of the company. The empirical analysis introduces the reasons and performance of controlling shareholders' abuse of voting rights. The third part is the solution of controlling shareholders' voting rights. Firstly, it introduces the legislation of the company, the rules of the company in limiting the voting rights of the controlling shareholders. Secondly, it introduces the practice of drawing lessons from the restriction of the voting rights of the controlling shareholders. This paper analyzes the feasibility of controlling shareholders' voting rights by articles of association and the design ideas of articles of association to control shareholders' voting rights.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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本文編號：1912694