本文選題：關聯(lián)公司 + 關聯(lián)交易��； 參考：《吉林大學》2010年博士論文

【摘要】： 工業(yè)革命后期,連鎖企業(yè)的大量涌現(xiàn)標志著規(guī)模經(jīng)濟時代的到來。企業(yè)功能、價值已遠非單一公司所能實現(xiàn),以追求特定經(jīng)濟利益為目的,將若干獨立法人借由股權或契約紐帶聯(lián)結而成的關聯(lián)公司,已成為當代社會主流經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)象。關聯(lián)公司自成立之初就頗受爭議。一方面,關聯(lián)公司順應了規(guī)模經(jīng)濟下現(xiàn)代市場的發(fā)展趨勢,具有無可比擬的集團優(yōu)勢;另一方面,它又對公司法的基礎理論——公司人格獨立、股東有限責任提出挑戰(zhàn),非公平關聯(lián)交易和不平等的收益分配政策增加了控制公司、公司管理者逆向選擇的可能,也使從屬公司、從屬公司少數(shù)股東及債權人的利益面臨更大的風險。隨著商業(yè)實踐的發(fā)展,關聯(lián)公司立法狀況成為反映各國公司法制完善程度的重要標尺。自19世紀下半葉開始,各主要資本主義國家就開始了關聯(lián)公司立法的探索之旅。19世紀末20世紀初,德國康采恩法開創(chuàng)了大陸法系國家關聯(lián)公司專門立法的先河,第一次引入了契約康采恩、契約康采恩、平行康采恩等概念,并對不同類型康采恩中控制公司與從屬公司的歸責體系、權利分配規(guī)則進行系統(tǒng)規(guī)定,成為現(xiàn)代各主要公司法國家可資借鑒的立法范式。與之相呼應,1890年美國新澤西州率先承認了關聯(lián)公司的合法性,以美國為代表的英美法系國家,也在現(xiàn)代市場的推動和指引下開始接受關聯(lián)公司這一法律概念。 本文以比較法學與實證法學為視角,兼采法經(jīng)濟學分析方法,首先闡釋了關聯(lián)公司的概念范疇、立法動因,總結了各主要公司法國家關聯(lián)公司立法的利弊得失;然后分析了關聯(lián)公司的核心法律問題,即從屬公司及其少數(shù)股東的利益保護問題、從屬公司債權人保護問題以及交叉持股的限制規(guī)則;最后在總結與分析的基礎之上,對我國現(xiàn)行關聯(lián)公司立法進行反思和評述,指出我國關聯(lián)公司立法的完善方向。本文一直試圖表達這樣一種觀點:關聯(lián)公司法律規(guī)制的基礎是控制公司與從屬公司之間的“委托—代理”關系;關聯(lián)公司法律規(guī)制的核心是解決控制公司與從屬公司之間三大代理問題,即控制公司與從屬公司、控制公司與從屬公司少數(shù)股東、控制公司與從屬公司外部債權人間的利益分歧;解決關聯(lián)公司法律問題的有效途徑是建立一套涵蓋各方利益主體在內的利益平衡機制。
[Abstract]:In the late industrial revolution, the emergence of chain enterprises marked the arrival of the era of scale economy. The function and value of an enterprise is far from being realized by a single company. In order to pursue the specific economic interests, it has become the mainstream economic phenomenon of contemporary society to connect some independent legal persons by equity or contract ties. Affiliated companies have been controversial since their inception. On the one hand, the affiliated company conforms to the development trend of the modern market under the economy of scale, and has unparalleled group advantages; on the other hand, it challenges the basic theory of company law, namely, the independence of corporate personality and the limited liability of shareholders. Unfair related party transactions and unequal income distribution policies increase the possibility of adverse selection for controlling companies and managers, and make the interests of affiliated companies, minority shareholders and creditors of subordinate companies more risky. With the development of commercial practice, the legislative status of affiliated companies has become an important yardstick to reflect the perfection of corporate legal system in various countries. Since the second half of the 19th century, the major capitalist countries have begun to explore the legislation of affiliated companies. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the law of Koncein in Germany pioneered the special legislation of affiliated companies in the countries of the continental law system. For the first time, the concepts of contract consonant and parallel Connexion are introduced, and the liability system of control company and subordinate company and the rules of rights distribution in different types of Kangzaien are systematically stipulated. It has become the legislative paradigm of modern major company law countries. In contrast, in 1890, New Jersey first recognized the legitimacy of affiliated companies. Anglo-American legal system countries, represented by the United States, also began to accept the legal concept of affiliated companies under the impetus and guidance of the modern market. From the perspective of comparative law and empirical law, and adopting the analytical method of law and economics, this paper first explains the concept category and legislative motivation of affiliated company, and summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the related company legislation in the major company law countries. Then it analyzes the core legal issues of affiliated companies, that is, the protection of the interests of affiliated companies and their minority shareholders, the protection of creditors of dependent companies and the restriction rules of cross-shareholding. Finally, on the basis of summary and analysis, This paper reviews and comments on the current related company legislation in China, and points out the perfect direction of the related company legislation in our country. This paper has been trying to express such a view: the legal regulation of affiliated companies is based on the control of the "principal-agent" relationship between companies and subordinate companies; The core of the legal regulation of affiliated companies is to solve the three major agency problems between the control company and the subordinate company, namely, the control company and the subordinate company, the minority shareholders of the control company and the subordinate company. The effective way to solve the legal problems of affiliated companies is to establish an interest balance mechanism which includes the main interests of all parties.
【學位授予單位】：吉林大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D922.291.91

【引證文獻】

相關期刊論文 前1條

1 姬燁;王春麗;諸薈嘉;;關聯(lián)公司勞務人員侵占公司財物行為的定性分析——從具體案例看職務侵占罪與盜竊罪的區(qū)別[J];法制與社會;2012年35期

相關碩士學位論文 前5條

1 懷自杰;母子公司關系的法律規(guī)制[D];北方工業(yè)大學;2012年

2 馮凱;關聯(lián)企業(yè)中從屬公司破產(chǎn)情形下法人格否認制度適用研究[D];華東政法大學;2012年

3 熊玲玲;論實際控制人的認定及法律規(guī)制[D];湖南大學;2012年

4 梁聰聰;論關聯(lián)企業(yè)的債權人債權的保護[D];華東政法大學;2013年

5 賀星紅;關聯(lián)交易結構下中石油鉆井工程服務定價方式研究[D];天津理工大學;2013年

，

本文編號：1903201