國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司監(jiān)督體系的法律研究
本文選題:國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司 + 國(guó)有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)。 參考:《湖南師范大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文
【摘要】:國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司作為國(guó)家投資企業(yè)的一種形式,是我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)改革的重要方向。經(jīng)歷了近二十年的發(fā)展,國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司不斷壯大,為國(guó)有經(jīng)濟(jì)的提升添磚加瓦。但國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司在運(yùn)行的過(guò)程中,不斷的出現(xiàn)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)流失、政企不分、內(nèi)部人控制等不良現(xiàn)象。為此國(guó)家先后頒布多部法律用以加強(qiáng)對(duì)國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司的監(jiān)督。但由于國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司對(duì)原國(guó)企舊體制路徑的依賴以及公司內(nèi)部法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)的不健全,從而使得國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司監(jiān)督體系建設(shè)落后,致使這些不良現(xiàn)象總是游離于法律約束和機(jī)構(gòu)體制之外,而得不到適度的監(jiān)督。因此構(gòu)建系統(tǒng)、完備的國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司監(jiān)督體系具有重要的理論和實(shí)踐意義。 國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司監(jiān)督體系經(jīng)歷了由行政指令、廠長(zhǎng)負(fù)責(zé)制下的低效監(jiān)督,到1988年國(guó)家從統(tǒng)一監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)、提高監(jiān)督效率的角度出發(fā),成立了國(guó)有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理局,但成效一般。1993年我國(guó)第一部《公司法》正式確立了國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司作為國(guó)企改制的重要形式,按照法人治理結(jié)構(gòu),從而初步形成了公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)督體系。但由于內(nèi)外監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)分散,多頭監(jiān)管的局面始終得不到解決,最終導(dǎo)致監(jiān)督體系混亂。為改變這一混亂的監(jiān)管環(huán)境,2003年國(guó)家成立了直屬于國(guó)務(wù)院的國(guó)有資產(chǎn)監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì),徹底統(tǒng)一了外部監(jiān)督體系。然而公司內(nèi)部監(jiān)督體系建設(shè)依然緩慢。國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司雖然具備現(xiàn)代公司法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)的形式,但是并沒(méi)有形成現(xiàn)代公司中的內(nèi)部制衡機(jī)制和監(jiān)督體系。其癥結(jié)主要表現(xiàn)在:國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司股東權(quán)沒(méi)有到位,缺少監(jiān)督責(zé)任主體;董事會(huì)監(jiān)督職權(quán)失位及專門監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)缺乏獨(dú)立性;監(jiān)事會(huì)監(jiān)督權(quán)邊界不明晰:監(jiān)督權(quán)行使有障礙;缺乏對(duì)監(jiān)事會(huì)成員的激勵(lì)機(jī)制。 因此,從問(wèn)題入手,借鑒境外國(guó)企監(jiān)督體系建設(shè)的經(jīng)驗(yàn),找出完善國(guó)有獨(dú)資公司監(jiān)督體系的良方。具體而言就是要:第一,強(qiáng)化國(guó)有股東權(quán)、完善國(guó)資委的監(jiān)督職能。包括:強(qiáng)化國(guó)家股東知情權(quán)、平衡股東與董事會(huì)之問(wèn)的信息;建立股東派生訴訟制度,用司法的手段保護(hù)股東的利益。第二,強(qiáng)化董事會(huì)監(jiān)督權(quán)、完善董事會(huì)監(jiān)督機(jī)構(gòu)。包括:協(xié)調(diào)董事會(huì)與經(jīng)理層的關(guān)系、加強(qiáng)董事會(huì)對(duì)經(jīng)理層的監(jiān)督;強(qiáng)化審計(jì)委員會(huì)的獨(dú)立性、理清與其他監(jiān)督主體的關(guān)系。第三,明晰監(jiān)事會(huì)權(quán)利邊界、掃清監(jiān)事會(huì)行權(quán)障礙。包括:明晰權(quán)利邊界、完善權(quán)利結(jié)構(gòu);完善監(jiān)事會(huì)制度,為監(jiān)事行權(quán)掃清障礙;設(shè)立監(jiān)事激勵(lì)制度、提高監(jiān)事行權(quán)動(dòng)力。
[Abstract]:As a form of state-invested enterprises, state-owned companies are the important direction of the reform of state-owned enterprises. After nearly 20 years of development, the state-owned companies continue to grow, contributing to the promotion of the state-owned economy. However, in the process of operation, the state-owned companies continue to appear the loss of state-owned assets, the separation of government and enterprises, internal control and other bad phenomena. To this end, the state has promulgated a number of laws to strengthen the supervision of wholly-owned state-owned companies. However, due to the dependence of the wholly state-owned company on the old system path of the former state-owned enterprise and the unsound corporate governance structure within the company, the construction of the supervision system of the wholly state-owned company falls behind. As a result, these phenomena are always free from the legal constraints and institutional system, and can not be properly supervised. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to construct the system and complete the supervision system of the wholly-owned state-owned company. The supervision system of a wholly state-owned company experienced inefficient supervision under the system of administrative instructions and factory director responsibility. In 1988, the state set up the State-owned assets Supervision and Management Bureau from the angle of unified supervision agencies and improving supervision efficiency. In 1993, the first "Company Law" of our country formally established the state-owned sole proprietorship company as the important form of the state-owned enterprise reform, according to the corporate governance structure, thus initially formed the internal supervision system of the company. However, due to the dispersion of internal and external supervision agencies, the situation of long-head supervision has always been unresolved, leading to the confusion of the supervision system. In order to change this chaotic regulatory environment, the State set up the State-owned assets Supervision and Administration Commission directly under the State Council in 2003, which completely unified the external supervision system. However, the construction of internal supervision system is still slow. Although the wholly state-owned company has the form of modern corporate governance structure, it has not formed the internal checks and balances mechanism and the supervision system in the modern company. The main reasons are as follows: the shareholder's right of wholly state-owned company is not in place and the subject of supervision responsibility is lacking; the supervision authority of board of directors is out of place and the special supervision institution lacks of independence; the boundary of supervision power of supervisory board is not clear: there are obstacles to the exercise of supervision power; Lack of incentive mechanism for supervisory board members. Therefore, starting with the problems and drawing lessons from the experience of the construction of the supervision system of foreign state-owned enterprises, the author finds out the good way to perfect the supervision system of the wholly state-owned companies. Specific is to: first, strengthen the right of state-owned shareholders, improve the supervision function of SASAC. It includes: strengthening the state shareholders' right to know, balancing the information between shareholders and the board of directors, establishing shareholder derivative litigation system, and protecting the interests of shareholders by judicial means. Second, strengthen the supervisory authority of the board of directors and perfect the supervisory organ of the board of directors. It includes: to coordinate the relationship between the board of directors and the managers, to strengthen the supervision of the board of directors over the managers, to strengthen the independence of the audit committee, and to clarify the relationship with other supervisory bodies. Third, clear the power of the board of supervisors boundary, clear the board of supervisors to exercise power obstacles. It includes: clarifying the boundary of rights and perfecting the structure of rights; perfecting the system of board of supervisors to clear the obstacles for supervisors to exercise their rights; setting up the incentive system of supervisors to improve the power of supervisors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:湖南師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2011
【分類號(hào)】:D922.291.91
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