發(fā)布時間：2018-05-13 11:59

  本文選題：股利 + 強制分配��； 參考：《西南財經(jīng)大學》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：作為公司成員的股東,其最本質(zhì)的特征就是希望投資于公司的資本能夠以利益最大化的形式收回,而公司作為一個營利的實體,其也以賺取公司的最大利潤為目標,因此,這種公司和股東的雙重營利性決定了公司利潤分配對股東的重要性。然而在我國的公司實踐中,當控股股東濫用“資本多數(shù)決”原則,長期不分配股利時,股東的股利分配請求權(quán)必然遭受侵害,對于這種侵害,我國現(xiàn)行公司法提供的救濟手段完全不能滿足股東的需要。對有限責任公司而言,主要有《公司法》第二十條的濫權(quán)賠償、第二十二條規(guī)定的股東大會決議無效或撤銷決議、第四十條和第四十一條規(guī)定的股東會會議的召集與組織、第七十二條的股份轉(zhuǎn)讓、第七十五條的股份回購和第一百八十三條的解散公司等幾種救濟方式。第二十二條幾乎沒有用來救濟股利分配的可能。召集股東會討論股利分配時,大股東利用資本多數(shù)決否決該種提議,最終結(jié)果是竹籃打水一場空。股份轉(zhuǎn)讓很難謂之為對股東進行了充分救濟,回購股份可以被公司及控股股東輕易規(guī)避,而解散公司的情形比較罕見,那么唯一的救命稻草就是尋求《公司法》第二十條的股東濫權(quán)賠償。從法的體系來說,該條處于公司法總則篇的位置,似乎對整個公司法都有適用的余地。其實,從法律適用的角度來說,作為一項法律原則,如果還沒有達到可以涵攝案件事實的那種真正意義上的法條程度,仍不能直接適用。一般說來,公司要分配股利,首先,公司要具有可用分配的利潤,其次,由公司的股東會做出分配股利的決議,這兩者缺一不可。當股東起訴到法院要求公司分配股利時,法院通常要求股東提供證據(jù)證明公司具有盈利和股東會已經(jīng)做出了股利分配的決議,否者,法院就會以公司是否進行利潤分配,是一種基于公司自治的商業(yè)判斷,法院無權(quán)對公司的股利分配做出干涉為由,駁回股東的訴求�，F(xiàn)實中公司股東會在大股東的控制下通常都會決議不分配股利,小股東不可能提供公司分配股利的決議,這樣,尋求外部司法救濟道的路被堵死,而公司小股東又不能尋求有效的內(nèi)部救濟,小股東的救濟出路在哪里,是現(xiàn)行公司制度需要重新考慮的問題。強制分配股利之訴制度,作為由公司股東提起訴訟的一種救濟措施,正好彌補了現(xiàn)行公司法上對公司小股東股利分配保護的不足,該制度與股份轉(zhuǎn)讓、回購、退股、解散公司等其他救濟途徑相比,其制度優(yōu)勢在于為股東提供了無須離開公司也能獲得恰當救濟的可能,其成本較之上列退出公司、解散公司等顯然較低,尤其重要的是,為那些不愿離開公司的股東提供了一個尋求公平救濟的機會。因此,有必要在法律上規(guī)定公司股東提起強制分配股利之訴的權(quán)利。 本文以強制分配股利之訴制度的基本理論基礎(chǔ)和具體制度構(gòu)建構(gòu)為兩大主線,在分析基本法學原理的基礎(chǔ)上,充分借鑒英美法系和大陸法系的立法與司法實踐經(jīng)驗,結(jié)合我國公司股利分配的現(xiàn)狀,論述了在我國公司法層面構(gòu)建強制分配股利之訴制度的必要性以及具體制度的構(gòu)建。全文分為導論、正文和結(jié)束語,其中正文由四部分組成。 第一部分,強制分配股利之訴的法理基礎(chǔ)。該部分從權(quán)利救濟、實質(zhì)正義、誠實信用以及利益平衡中需要司法介入四個方面分析了建立該制度的理論可行性。本章在全文具有基礎(chǔ)性的地位,共分為四個層次：第一,利益平衡中的司法介入。第二,權(quán)利需要救濟。第三,股利分配要體現(xiàn)實質(zhì)正義。第四,誠實信用原則的需要。 第二部分,強制分配股利之訴的請求權(quán)基礎(chǔ)。該部分通過與股東代表訴訟和股東直接訴訟的比較分析,得出應將將強制分配股利之訴作為一個單獨的請求權(quán)存在,在形成“資本多數(shù)決”暴政時,能夠為公司股東提供有效的救濟,從而更好的保護股東的投資權(quán)益。因而,該部分也是本文的創(chuàng)新點所在。本部分主要從三個層面展開：第一個層面,強制分配股利之訴和股東代表訴訟的比較。第二個層面,強制分配股利之訴和股東直接訴訟的比較。第三個層面,強制分配股利之訴作為獨立請求權(quán)的必要性和可行性。通過比較分析,強制分配股利之訴制度既不能用股東代表訴訟代替,也不能用股東直接訴訟代替,它有自身存在的獨立價值,需要通過公司法進行單獨規(guī)定,否者對公司股東的投資權(quán)益保護就存在法律上的救濟空白。 第三部分,強制分配股利之訴的實體要件。該部分主要敘述了強制分配股利之訴制度的實體要件。通過對股東身份的認定、公司可分配利潤的條件、公司拒絕分配股利構(gòu)成權(quán)利濫用以及股東可以尋求的自力救濟等四個方面分析明確了提起該種訴訟的實體要求。 第四部分,強制分配股利之訴的程序要件。該部分通過對原被告的身份確立、訴訟管轄、舉證責任及其承擔以及判決的效力及其執(zhí)行四個方面的分析,明確了該制度的建立應如何從程序上同民事訴訟法的銜接。至此,全文達到從理論到具體制度的一個完整過程。 本文的創(chuàng)新點主要體現(xiàn)在：第一,本文的選題角度的創(chuàng)新。強制分配股利之訴作為公司股東維護自己投資回報權(quán)益的訴訟制度,尤其是在有限責任公司中顯得尤為迫切�？v觀我國法學界關(guān)于強制分配股利之訴制度的研究,幾乎所有的研究文獻都集中在是否應該在我國公司法上建立該制度,其建立的可行性何必要性何在,建立該制度會對公司的自治形成那些不利的影響等方面進行論述,到目前為止,筆者還未發(fā)現(xiàn)一篇就如何具體構(gòu)建該制度本身的文章。本文則主要從應該如何在我國《公司法》建立具體的制度為立足點,通過分析建立該制度所需要的實體要件和具體操作運轉(zhuǎn)的程序要件,使得該制度成為一個既有實體上的內(nèi)容又有形式上的程序的有機統(tǒng)一體。第二,本文的研究內(nèi)容創(chuàng)新。以往學者研究范圍主要是通過將強制分配股利之訴放在股東直接訴訟制度中加以討論,本文則主要是從請求權(quán)的角度來分析強制分配股利之訴制度,而不僅僅僅局限于公司法中的訴訟制度,通過將請求權(quán)融入公司訴訟中,使得該制度成為一種具有獨立請求權(quán)的訴訟制度,并得出需要在我國公司法上建立該制度的結(jié)論。第三,本文的研究方法創(chuàng)新。以往學者在對強制分配股利之訴制度進行研究時,都只是個別案例為基礎(chǔ)展開討論,而本文在比較法的視角下對一系列的案例進行了系統(tǒng)性的研究,通過表格比較的形式,對現(xiàn)實中存在的案例進行抽樣調(diào)查,從眾多個案件中分析出小股東在股利分配問題上普遍存在被壓制的現(xiàn)象,而現(xiàn)行法律卻未能提供有效的救濟手段,需要公司法在法律制度層面上為股東提供新的有效的救濟途徑。 本文的不足之處在于：強制分配股利之訴制度固然在維護公司股東權(quán)益和體現(xiàn)股利分配的實質(zhì)正義上具有重要作用。但是也必須承認,強制分配股利之訴同時也存在著法院濫用司法裁量權(quán)干涉公司自治的風險、股東濫訴的風險以及一定的訴訟成本。因此,如何尋找司法裁量和公司自治之間的平衡點是筆者需要在以后的學習和研究中進一步深入思考的問題。
[Abstract]:As a member of the company, the most essential feature is that the capital of the company is expected to be recovered in the form of maximization of interest. As a profit - making entity, the company also aims to earn the maximum profit of the company. Therefore, the double profit of this company and the shareholders determines the importance of the company's profit distribution to the shareholders. However, in our country's company practice, when the controlling shareholder abuses the principle of "capital majority" and does not allocate dividends for a long time, the shareholders' claim for dividend distribution will inevitably be infringed. For this kind of infringement, the remedy means provided by the current company law in our country can not meet the needs of the East. Judicial > twentieth articles of indiscriminate compensation, twenty-second provisions of the shareholders meeting resolution invalid or revoked resolutions, fortieth and forty-first provisions of the convening and organization of the meeting of the shareholders, the transfer of seventy-second shares, the seventy-fifth shares repurchase and the disbanded company of 183rd, and other relief methods. The twenty-two is almost impossible to relieve the dividend distribution. When the shareholders will discuss the dividend distribution, the large shareholders use the capital majority to veto the proposal, and the final result is that the share transfer is difficult to call the full relief for the shareholders, and the share repurchase shares can be easily circumvated by the company and the controlling shareholders. The case of dismandling a company is rare, then the only life-saving straw is the right to compensate for the abuse of the shareholders of the company law twentieth. From the legal system, the article is in the position of the general rule of the company law and seems to be applicable to the whole company law. In fact, as a legal principle, if the law is suitable, if it is also a legal principle, In general, the company has to assign a dividend, first of all, the company has to have the available profit, and secondly, the shareholders of the company will make a decision to allocate dividends. These two are indispensable. When the shareholders sue to the court to ask the company to distribute the dividend. In the case of dividends, the court usually requires shareholders to provide evidence that the company has a profit and the shareholders will have made a decision on the dividend distribution. Whether the court will make a profit distribution by the company, it is a business judgment based on the autonomy of the company. The court has no right to interfere in the dividend distribution of the company, and rejects the demands of the shareholders. Under the control of the large shareholders, the shareholders of the company usually decide not to distribute dividends, and the small shareholders can not provide the resolution of the dividend distribution. In this way, the road to seek external judicial relief is blocked, and the small shareholders of the company can not seek effective internal remedies. Where is the remedy for the small shareholders, the current corporate system needs to be weighed. The system of forced distribution of dividends, as a remedy for litigation by the shareholders of the company, makes up for the deficiency of the current corporate law on the protection of the dividend distribution of the small shareholders, and the institutional advantage of the system is to provide the shareholders with the transfer of shares, repurchase, withdrawal, and disbandment of the company. It is possible to get appropriate relief without leaving the company. Its cost is obviously lower than the listed company, the disbanded company, and so on. It is especially important to provide a fair relief for the shareholders who do not want to leave the company. Therefore, it is necessary to legally stipulate the right of the shareholders to bring a forced distribution of dividends. Li.
This paper, based on the basic theoretical basis of the compulsory distribution of dividends and the construction of specific system, is two main lines. On the basis of the analysis of the basic principles of law, we fully draw on the experience of the legislative and judicial practice of the common law and civil law system, and combine the current situation of our company's dividend distribution, and discuss the construction of compulsory branch in the company law level in our country. The necessity and the construction of the system of dividend suit are divided into four parts: introduction, main body and concluding remarks.
The first part is the legal basis for the compulsory distribution of dividends. This part analyzes the theoretical feasibility of the establishment of the system from four aspects of rights relief, substantive justice, honesty and credit and the need for judicial intervention in the balance of interests. This chapter has a basic position in the full text, which is divided into four levels: first, judicial intervention in the balance of interests. Second, rights need relief. Third, dividend distribution should embody substantive justice. Fourth, the need for honesty and credit.
The second part is the basis of the claim for the forced distribution of dividends. By comparing with the shareholder's representative litigation and the shareholders' direct litigation, it is concluded that the claim to be forced to distribute dividends should be a separate claim. In the form of "capital majority" tyranny, it can provide effective relief for the shareholders of the company. The part of this part is also the innovation of this article. This part is mainly from three aspects: the first level, the comparison between the forced distribution of dividends and the shareholder representative litigation. The second level, the comparison of the compulsory distribution of dividends and the direct litigation of shareholders. The third level, the compulsory distribution of dividends. It is necessary and feasible to act as an independent claim. Through comparative analysis, the system of forced distribution of dividends can neither be replaced by the shareholder's representative litigation, nor can it be replaced by direct shareholder litigation. It has its own independent value, and it needs to be provided by the company law alone, and the protection of the investment rights and interests of the shareholders of the company exists. The legal remedies are blank.
The third part, the substantive elements of the forced distribution of dividends. This part mainly describes the substantive elements of the compulsory distribution of dividends. Through the identification of the identity of the shareholders, the conditions for the distribution of profits by the company, the abuses of the rights of the company to distribute dividends and the self relief of the shareholders to seek, the author makes a clear analysis of the four aspects. The substantive requirements of this kind of litigation.
The fourth part is the procedural elements of the compulsory distribution of dividends. Through the analysis of the identity of the original defendant, the jurisdiction of the defendant, the burden of proof and its bearing and the validity of the judgment and its implementation, it is clear how the establishment of the system should be connected with the civil procedure law in procedure. At this point, the full text has reached the theory to the instrument. A complete process of the system of body.
The innovation point of this article is mainly embodied in the following aspects: first, the innovation of the topic of this article. It is particularly urgent in the limited liability company, especially in the limited liability company, which is especially urgent in the limited liability company. The literature concentrates on whether the system should be established in the company law of our country. Why should the feasibility of the establishment of the system be set up, the establishment of the system will have a negative impact on the formation of the autonomy of the company, and so far, I have not found an article on how to build the system itself. How should we establish a specific system as a foothold in China's "company law" and establish the essential elements needed by the system and the procedural requirements for the specific operation of the system, making the system an organic unity of both the contents and the formal procedures of the system. Second, the research content of this article is innovative. The scope of the study is mainly to discuss the forced distribution of dividends in the shareholders' direct litigation system. This article mainly analyzes the system of forced distribution of dividends from the angle of the right of request, and not only is limited to the litigation system in the company law, and makes the system become a kind of system through the incorporation of the claim into the company's litigation. There is an independent claim system, and draws the conclusion that the system needs to be established in our country's company law. Third, the research method of this article is innovative. The systematic study, through the form of table comparison, makes a sampling survey of the cases in reality, and analyses the phenomenon that the small shareholders are generally suppressed on the issue of dividend distribution from many cases, but the current law does not provide effective remedy. It needs the company law to provide the new shareholders with the legal system. The effective way of relief.
The inadequacy of this paper is that the system of forced distribution of dividends has an important role in maintaining the equity of the shareholders and the substantive justice of the distribution of dividends. However, it is also necessary to admit that there are also the risks of misuse of the judicial discretion in the court to interfere with the autonomy of the public company, the risk of the abuse of shareholders and the risk of indiscriminate action. Therefore, how to find the balance between the judicial discretion and the autonomy of the company is the problem that I need to consider further in the future study and research.

【學位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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