本文選題：公司治理 + 職業(yè)經(jīng)理人　； 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)發(fā)展中,職業(yè)經(jīng)理人是資本所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)相分離的必然產(chǎn)物,職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的存在及其功能的發(fā)揮是現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的微觀基礎(chǔ)。由于內(nèi)部和外部的眾多原因,職業(yè)經(jīng)理人在我國層一度處于尷尬的境地。 倡導(dǎo)董事會(huì)中心主義的公司治理模式,又在分權(quán)制衡等角度,非常重視職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的作用。職業(yè)經(jīng)理人在董事會(huì)中發(fā)揮作用,可以防止出現(xiàn)資本的一股獨(dú)大,也可以防止出現(xiàn)內(nèi)部人控制的局面。準(zhǔn)確定位職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的角色可以預(yù)防股東會(huì)、董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)的監(jiān)督不足,也可以維護(hù)公司和股東的利益,維護(hù)交易安全。公司治理合法化、可持續(xù)化已經(jīng)是所有股東和經(jīng)營層的共同呼聲,發(fā)揮職業(yè)經(jīng)理人作用,完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)是現(xiàn)代公司立法前沿的必然趨勢。職業(yè)經(jīng)理人在公司治理中究竟處于何種法律地位?明確分析公司法上職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的法律地位,既有理論意義,也是現(xiàn)實(shí)中迫切解決的問題。 民商合一的大陸法系國家提倡交易安全,一般從行為法角度解讀經(jīng)理人與商人的關(guān)系,以契約關(guān)系取代經(jīng)理人的身份關(guān)系,從委托代理角度定位經(jīng)理人的行為。職業(yè)經(jīng)理人接受董事會(huì)的授權(quán),行使法律和公司章程賦予他們的職責(zé),這便是大多數(shù)民商合一大陸法系國家的觀點(diǎn)。 英美法系國家和民商分立的大陸法系國家追求商事效率,鼓勵(lì)經(jīng)理人創(chuàng)造性和自主性,從人法角度將公司經(jīng)理人與一般商人區(qū)分開,以雇傭理論闡述職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的權(quán)利源泉。職業(yè)經(jīng)理人一般為公司的高級(jí)雇員,與公司之間是特定的服務(wù)契約關(guān)系,基于職務(wù)身份通常被視為公司的代理人而擁有一定的自主權(quán),并對(duì)公司負(fù)信義義務(wù)。當(dāng)職業(yè)經(jīng)理人違背信義義務(wù)時(shí),公司既可以基于雇傭服務(wù)關(guān)系追究經(jīng)理人的職務(wù)責(zé)任,也可以按擬制信托的理論,將職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的額外所得轉(zhuǎn)歸公司所有。 我國公司法借鑒英美國家的實(shí)用主義,在公司法中列舉了董事、經(jīng)理等崗位的主要職能,認(rèn)為職業(yè)經(jīng)理人主要擔(dān)任的是公司高級(jí)管理人員的職位,受雇于公司而擁有經(jīng)理權(quán)。公司法中也提及了董事、監(jiān)事、高級(jí)管理人員應(yīng)當(dāng)遵守勤勉和忠實(shí)義務(wù),并且提及了賠償責(zé)任和公司歸入權(quán)。但公司法所列舉的職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的忠實(shí)勤勉義務(wù)大多為遵守法律法規(guī)和公司章程的義務(wù),這樣就沒有具體的適用標(biāo)準(zhǔn),可操作性不強(qiáng),有很大局限性。 筆者在其他國家的比較中得出對(duì)我國公司法明確職業(yè)經(jīng)理人法律地位,發(fā)揮職業(yè)經(jīng)理人在公司治理作用的一些建議：在成文法中明確職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的權(quán)利、權(quán)力源泉,同時(shí)要規(guī)范經(jīng)理人的利益激勵(lì)制度；豐富忠實(shí)勤勉義務(wù)的內(nèi)涵,對(duì)職業(yè)經(jīng)理人行為具有指引作用；同時(shí)更大程度地明確職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的責(zé)任承擔(dān)機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:In the development of modern enterprises, professional managers are the inevitable outcome of the separation of capital ownership and management rights. The existence and function of professional managers are the micro basis of modern economic development. Because of many internal and external reasons, professional managers were once in an awkward position in our country. At the angle of separation of powers and checks and balances, the role of professional managers is attached great importance to the corporate governance mode of board of directors centralism. Professional managers play a role in the board of directors, can prevent the emergence of a dominant capital, but also prevent insider control of the situation. Accurately positioning the role of professional managers can prevent the shareholders' meeting, the board of directors, the board of supervisors from inadequate supervision, but also can protect the interests of the company and shareholders, and maintain the security of transactions. The legalization and sustainability of corporate governance is the common voice of all shareholders and management levels. It is an inevitable trend of modern company legislation to play the role of professional managers and perfect the corporate governance structure. What is the legal status of professional managers in corporate governance? Clearly analyzing the legal status of professional managers in company law is not only theoretical significance, but also an urgent problem to be solved in reality. The countries of civil law system in which the civil and business are United advocate transaction security, generally interpret the relationship between manager and businessman from the angle of behavior law, replace the identity relationship of manager with contract relationship, and locate the behavior of manager from the angle of principal-agent. Professional managers are authorized by the board of directors to perform their duties under the law and the articles of association, which is the view of most civil law countries. The common law countries and the civil law countries which are separated from the civil law system pursue the commercial efficiency, encourage the managers' creativity and autonomy, distinguish the company managers from the general businessmen from the angle of personal law, and expound the source of the professional managers' rights in the employment theory. The professional manager is usually the senior employee of the company, and the relationship between the professional manager and the company is a specific service contract relationship. Based on his position, the professional manager is usually regarded as the agent of the company and has certain autonomy and fiduciary obligation to the company. When the professional manager disobeys the fiduciary duty, the company can not only investigate the manager's duty responsibility based on the employment service relation, but also transfer the extra income of the professional manager to the company according to the theory of fictitious trust. Our company law draws lessons from the pragmatism of Anglo-American countries and lists the main functions of directors and managers in the company law. It is believed that the professional managers are mainly in the positions of senior managers of the company and are employed by the company and have the managerial power. The company law also refers to the duty of diligence and loyalty of directors, supervisors and senior managers, and the liability and the right of corporate subordination. But the professional managers' duty of loyalty and diligence listed in the Company Law is mostly the obligation to abide by laws and regulations and articles of association, so there is no specific applicable standard, the operability is not strong, and there are great limitations. In the comparison of other countries, the author draws some suggestions to clarify the legal status of professional managers in China's company law and to give full play to the role of professional managers in corporate governance: to clarify the rights and sources of power of professional managers in statutory law. At the same time, we should standardize the interest incentive system of managers; enrich the connotation of loyalty and diligence obligations, and guide professional managers' behavior; at the same time, we should make clear the responsibility of professional managers to a greater extent.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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