本文選題：股東查閱權(quán) + 股東知情權(quán)��； 參考：《中國(guó)政法大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】： 作為股東知情權(quán)的一個(gè)重要組成部分,股東查閱權(quán)成為股東獲取公司經(jīng)營(yíng)管理信息的重要途徑,在股東知情權(quán)體系中居于基礎(chǔ)性地位,為其它股東權(quán)利的行使提供信息支持。我國(guó)2005年修訂后的《公司法》豐富了93年《公司法》對(duì)于股東查閱權(quán)的規(guī)定,但仍流于簡(jiǎn)單,導(dǎo)致實(shí)踐中出現(xiàn)了權(quán)利保障不力和權(quán)利沖突缺乏規(guī)制的問(wèn)題。本文以比較和實(shí)證的研究方法分析股東查閱權(quán)制度,目的在于對(duì)上述問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究,為我國(guó)司法實(shí)踐提供理論參考與支持。 全文由引言、正文和結(jié)論三部分組成,正文主要分為四章進(jìn)行論述: 第一章就股東查閱權(quán)立法現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行考察,對(duì)我國(guó)股東查閱權(quán)制度和美國(guó)、英國(guó)、日本和德國(guó)股東查閱權(quán)制度分別予以介紹的基礎(chǔ)上,比較分析出我國(guó)現(xiàn)有查閱權(quán)制度存在的不足之處,并點(diǎn)明我國(guó)實(shí)踐中存在權(quán)利保障不力和權(quán)利沖突缺乏規(guī)制兩個(gè)重要問(wèn)題,提出本文研究的重點(diǎn)。 第二章對(duì)股東查閱權(quán)在我國(guó)公司法股東權(quán)利體系中的地位進(jìn)行了分析,并將其與知情權(quán)制度中其它相關(guān)制度進(jìn)行了比較,分析得出股東查閱權(quán)在知情權(quán)制度體系中處于基礎(chǔ)性地位,作為一項(xiàng)工具性權(quán)利為其它股東權(quán)利的行使提供信息支持,具有輔助作用。其后,分析了股東查閱權(quán)的性質(zhì)。 第三章針對(duì)股東查閱權(quán)權(quán)利保障不力問(wèn)題,對(duì)股東查閱權(quán)的行使予以研究。就權(quán)利行使的范圍、程序和保障三方面進(jìn)行細(xì)致探討,指出我國(guó)立法不足之處的同時(shí)對(duì)權(quán)利保障的完善提出建議。 第四章針對(duì)權(quán)利沖突缺乏規(guī)制的問(wèn)題,對(duì)股東權(quán)利行使的限制予以研究。首先分析了股東查閱權(quán)需受到限制的原因在于股東利益與公司利益存在沖突,為了利益平衡的需要需對(duì)股東權(quán)利的行使加以限制。其后,對(duì)權(quán)利行使的主客觀兩方面的具體限制條件——正當(dāng)目的和持股比例和持股時(shí)間的限制予以闡述分析。最后,從事前防御和事后救濟(jì)兩個(gè)角度,對(duì)股東濫用權(quán)利的規(guī)制予以研究。 最后一部分是本文的結(jié)論部分,筆者概括了本文論述的主要內(nèi)容,并再次點(diǎn)明了本文的主要觀點(diǎn)。
[Abstract]:As an important part of the shareholders' right to know, the shareholder's right to consult has become an important way for shareholders to obtain the management information of the company. It is in the basic position in the system of shareholders' right to know and provides information support for the exercise of other shareholders' rights. In 2005, the "public judicature", after the revision of China, enriched the company law for 93 years. The provisions of the right still flow in a simple way, which leads to the lack of rights protection and the lack of regulation in the conflict of rights. In this paper, a comparative and empirical study method is used to analyze the shareholder's right of inspection. The purpose of this paper is to study the above problems and provide theoretical reference and support for the judicial practice of our country.
The full text is composed of three parts: introduction, text and conclusion. The main body is divided into four chapters:
In the first chapter, the current status of the shareholder's access right is examined. On the basis of the introduction of the system of the right to consult the shareholders of our country and the system of the right to consult the shareholders of the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and the German shareholders, the shortcomings of the existing right system in our country are compared and analyzed, and the lack of protection of rights and the lack of conflict of rights exist in the practice of our country. Two important issues of regulation are put forward.
The second chapter analyzes the status of shareholder's right of consulting in the system of shareholders' rights in the company law of China, and compares it with other relevant systems in the right to know, and analyses that the shareholder's right of inspection is in a basic position in the system of the right to know. As a tool, it provides a letter for the exercise of other shareholders' rights. Interest support has a supporting role. Subsequently, the nature of shareholder's right to inspect is analyzed.
The third chapter, in view of the inability to guarantee the right to check the right of the shareholders, studies the exercise of the right to consult the shareholders, and makes a detailed discussion on the three aspects of the scope, procedure and guarantee of the exercise of rights, and points out the shortcomings of our country's legislation and puts forward some suggestions for the improvement of the protection of the rights.
The fourth chapter, in view of the lack of regulation of the conflict of rights, studies the limitation of the exercise of shareholders' rights. First, the reason for the limitation of the right to consult the shareholders lies in the conflict between the interests of shareholders and the interests of the company. In order to balance the interests of the shareholders, the exercise of shareholders' rights should be restricted. After that, the subjective and objective views of the exercise of the rights are two parties. The specific restriction conditions - the proper purpose, the proportion of shareholding and the limit of the holding time are expounded and analyzed. At the end of this paper, the regulation of the rights of the shareholders to be abused by the shareholders is studied in two angles.
The last part is the conclusion of this article. The author summarizes the main contents of this article, and points out the main points of this article again.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 呂欣;股東知情權(quán)法律問(wèn)題研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2010年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 涂浩;論股東查閱權(quán)[D];中國(guó)政法大學(xué);2011年

2 倪凌波;我國(guó)股東查閱權(quán)的立法、解釋與完善[D];復(fù)旦大學(xué);2011年

3 任寬;論有限責(zé)任公司的股東查閱權(quán)[D];浙江大學(xué);2011年

4 吳程程;論股東查閱權(quán)的保護(hù)[D];中國(guó)政法大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號(hào)：1831433