本文選題：反收購措施 + 董事提名權(quán)限制　； 參考：《北方工業(yè)大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：上市公司在中國的出現(xiàn),是中國經(jīng)濟(jì)體制不可逆轉(zhuǎn)的具有里程碑意義的變革。從1990年底上海證券交易所和深圳證券交易所誕生至今,上市公司在中國已有了二十多年的歷史。由于股權(quán)分置改革為公司的大股東提供了大量的財(cái)富增值的機(jī)會,公司控制權(quán)市場也將逐步形成,隨著我國經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷發(fā)展,金融危機(jī)過后必然引發(fā)新一輪的收購與反收購浪潮,在成熟的市場經(jīng)濟(jì)國家,以及多數(shù)證券市場發(fā)達(dá)的國家大多是通過立法或者判例對目標(biāo)公司的反收購行為進(jìn)行規(guī)制。目前,我國在“董事提名權(quán)限制”反收購措施的立法上還存在很多不足,甚至可以說與發(fā)達(dá)國家還有很大的差距,因此,我們應(yīng)當(dāng)在不斷的實(shí)踐中尋找有利于自身的發(fā)展模式。 公司的收購是通過購買一個(gè)公司的股權(quán)來獲得該公司的控制權(quán)的行為,無論是有限責(zé)任公司還是股份有限公司,《公司法》都賦予了公司股東比較充分的權(quán)利,股東行使權(quán)力是通過出席股東大會會議,所持每一股份有一表決權(quán)。這樣就使得大股東可以利用自己的投票權(quán)來選擇對自己有利的管理者,從而達(dá)到控制公司經(jīng)營的目的。股份公司的這種組織結(jié)構(gòu)本身就含有公司實(shí)施反收購的可能性。由于這種收購常常有違目標(biāo)公司經(jīng)營者的意愿,因此,實(shí)踐中,一些公司通過在修訂的公司章程中置入反收購條款,達(dá)到狙擊潛在并購方的目的。在修訂章程時(shí),這些上市公司都有一個(gè)偏好：在董事提名權(quán)上作文章,以限制潛在并購方獲得控制公司的話語權(quán)。目前,上市公司在章程中就“股東提名董事人數(shù)等方面”加入限制條款是否合法,在理論界和法律實(shí)務(wù)界尚存很多爭論。 本文在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,主要通過對我國具體的反收購實(shí)踐和立法現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析和研究,并且借鑒歐美發(fā)達(dá)國家成熟的立法經(jīng)驗(yàn),對董事提名權(quán)的法律問題利用實(shí)例進(jìn)行論證。全文共分為五章,第一章,引言；第二章,公司章程自治與設(shè)置“董事提名權(quán)限制”條款的規(guī)制；第三章,“董事提名權(quán)限制”反收購措施的相關(guān)理論；第四章,國內(nèi)外對反收購條款決定模式的選擇和應(yīng)用；第五章,董事提名權(quán)限制條款的價(jià)值及國內(nèi)實(shí)踐。
[Abstract]:The emergence of listed companies in China is an irreversible milestone change in China's economic system. Since the birth of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange at the end of 1990, the listed companies have been in China for more than 20 years. As the reform of split share structure provides a large number of opportunities for the major shareholders of the company to increase their wealth, the market for corporate control will gradually form, and with the continuous development of our country's economy, After the financial crisis, a new wave of acquisition and anti-takeover is inevitable. In the mature market economy countries and most developed countries of the securities market, the anti-takeover behavior of the target companies is regulated by legislation or legal precedent. At present, there are still many deficiencies in the legislation of the anti-takeover measures of "restriction of director nominating right" in our country, and it can be said that there is still a big gap with the developed countries. Therefore, we should look for the development mode that is beneficial to our own in the continuous practice. The acquisition of a company is an act of acquiring control of a company by purchasing its equity. Whether it is a limited liability company or a joint stock limited company, the Company Law gives the shareholders more adequate rights. Shareholders exercise their rights by attending a general meeting of shareholders, each holding a right to vote. This enables major shareholders to use their voting rights to choose managers who are in their own interests, thus controlling the company's operations. The organizational structure of a joint-stock company itself contains the possibility of an anti-takeover. Since such acquisitions are often contrary to the wishes of the target company operators, in practice, some companies achieve the purpose of attacking potential acquirers by inserting anti-takeover clauses in the revised articles of association. In revising their statutes, these listed companies have a preference for writing on directors' nominating rights to limit the voice of potential acquirers to control the company. At present, whether it is legal for listed companies to add restrictions on the number of directors nominated by shareholders in the articles of association remains a lot of controversy in the theoretical and legal circles. On the basis of previous studies, this paper analyzes and studies the specific anti-takeover practice and legislation in China, and draws lessons from the mature legislative experience of developed countries in Europe and the United States. This paper demonstrates the legal problem of director's nominating right. The full text is divided into five chapters, chapter one, introduction; chapter two, the regulation of the autonomy of the articles of association and the establishment of "director nomination right restriction"; chapter three, the theory of anti-takeover measures of "director nomination right restriction"; chapter four, Chapter 5, the value and domestic practice of the limitation clause of director nomination right.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北方工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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