本文選題：職業(yè)董秘　切入點(diǎn)：信息披露質(zhì)量　出處：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著董事會(huì)秘書(以下簡稱“董秘”)在我國上市公司地位的日益提升,有關(guān)董秘在公司治理領(lǐng)域作用的研究開始逐漸為學(xué)者所重視。最近幾年,我國資本市場上的中小企業(yè)板塊和創(chuàng)業(yè)板塊出現(xiàn)了公司IPO的高潮,在這一背景下,不少已上市公司的董秘、證券事務(wù)代表,來自于券商投行、會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所、律師事務(wù)所的從業(yè)人員紛紛“轉(zhuǎn)戰(zhàn)”擬上市公司擔(dān)任董事會(huì)秘書,這一現(xiàn)象催生了一群新的公司高管——職業(yè)董秘。 然而,對于職業(yè)董秘來說,其作用的發(fā)揮并不僅僅體現(xiàn)在推動(dòng)公司IPO方面,因?yàn)橐坏┕就瓿缮鲜?只要職業(yè)董秘尚未離職,他們就必須要承擔(dān)公司法及證監(jiān)會(huì)、證交所所規(guī)定的相應(yīng)職責(zé)——完善公司內(nèi)部治理、信息合規(guī)披露和投資者關(guān)系管理。即職業(yè)董秘的作用不僅僅在于幫助公司完成上市,更為重要的意義在于要充分發(fā)揮自身在公司治理層面的職責(zé),努力改善信息披露質(zhì)量,提高投資者保護(hù)的水準(zhǔn)。 本文從理論和實(shí)證兩個(gè)角度來分析與論證以下問題：職業(yè)董秘是否會(huì)對投資者保護(hù)產(chǎn)生影響,產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響,以及是否通過信息披露質(zhì)量這一變量來傳遞這種影響。在理論研究當(dāng)中,文章在梳理國內(nèi)外相關(guān)領(lǐng)域已有文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,對職業(yè)董秘、信息披露質(zhì)量、投資者保護(hù)的界定和度量方法進(jìn)行了闡釋,對國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的相關(guān)研究進(jìn)行了歸納介紹,同時(shí)指出了現(xiàn)有研究的不足；然后從理論出發(fā),系統(tǒng)分析了職業(yè)董秘、信息披露質(zhì)量以及投資者保護(hù)之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系,提出相應(yīng)的研究假設(shè),闡述了三者之間的內(nèi)在邏輯。實(shí)證研究當(dāng)中,將2008-2012年我國中小企業(yè)板的上市公司作為研究對象,對共計(jì)1969個(gè)的數(shù)據(jù)樣本進(jìn)行觀測,對職業(yè)董秘、信息披露質(zhì)量、投資者保護(hù)及其他控制變量進(jìn)行了設(shè)計(jì),構(gòu)建出相應(yīng)的回歸模型,并對相關(guān)變量分別做了描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、Person相關(guān)性分析、多元回歸分析,同時(shí)還從兩個(gè)方面出發(fā)進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)健性測試,最終探究了職業(yè)董秘、信息披露質(zhì)量以及投資者保護(hù)之間的關(guān)系及作用路徑。主要研究結(jié)果表明： (1)與非職業(yè)董秘相比,職業(yè)董秘確實(shí)能夠提高上市公司的投資者保護(hù)水平。 (2)信息披露質(zhì)量是職業(yè)董秘影響投資者保護(hù)的中介變量,在其中起到了部分的中介作用。 (3)具有財(cái)會(huì)、法律知識(shí)背景的職業(yè)董秘對投資者保護(hù)水平的正向影響更為顯著。 基于理論分析與實(shí)證研究,筆者認(rèn)為我國的上市公司應(yīng)當(dāng)更加重視職業(yè)董秘的作用,不應(yīng)將其作用僅僅局限在公司IPO方面,而要重視公司完成上市后職業(yè)董秘在公司內(nèi)部治理、信息合規(guī)披露和投資者保護(hù)方面的重要作用,保障其獨(dú)立和有效行權(quán),注重董秘素質(zhì)及能力的培養(yǎng)。同時(shí),要加快推進(jìn)中國董秘職業(yè)化的進(jìn)程,進(jìn)行更加規(guī)范化的管理,使職業(yè)董秘這一新生群體在我國的資本市場條件下更好地“成長”起來,依托其知識(shí)、經(jīng)驗(yàn)和能力的優(yōu)勢,來努力提升公司的信息披露質(zhì)量,進(jìn)而提高投資者的保護(hù)水平。最后,還希望管理當(dāng)局能夠注意信息披露制度的完善,切實(shí)加強(qiáng)對信息披露事務(wù)的監(jiān)管,注重有關(guān)投資者保護(hù)的教育工作,從多個(gè)方面采取措施來改善信息、披露質(zhì)量,更好地保護(hù)投資者的利益。
[Abstract]:As the Secretary of the board of directors (hereinafter referred to as "secretaries") increasing in the status of the listed companies in our country, the related research in the field of corporate governance Peru Dong began gradually scholars. In recent years, the SME and GEM board on the capital market of our country appeared in the IPO run in the a background, many listed company secretaries, securities affairs representative, from investment banking firms, accounting firms, law firms have fought employees of listed companies served as secretary of the board, this phenomenon has spawned a new group of executives - occupation secretaries.
However, for the occupation secretaries, its role is not only reflected in the promotion of company IPO, because once the company completed the listing, as long as the occupation secretaries has yet to leave, they have to bear the company law and the Securities Regulatory Commission, stock exchange under the corresponding responsibilities: internal governance and good company, information disclosure and compliance investor relations management. The role of the secretaries of the occupation is not only help the company to complete the listing, more important is to give full play to their corporate governance responsibilities, efforts to improve the quality of information disclosure, improve investor protection level.
This paper from two aspects of theory and empirical analysis and argumentation of the following questions: whether occupation secretaries will have an impact on investor protection, what kind of impact, and whether the quality of information disclosure of this variable to pass this effect. In the theoretical research, based on carding domestic and foreign related literatures. The occupation secretaries, the quality of information disclosure, the definition and measurement of investor protection are expounded, the related research at home and abroad were summarized, and pointed out the deficiencies of existing research; then from theory, system analysis of occupation secretaries, the relationship between the quality of information disclosure and investor protection. The corresponding research hypothesis, expounds the inherent logic between the three. The empirical study, the small and medium-sized enterprises in China in 2008-2012 years of listed companies as the research object, the A total of 1969 data samples were observed, the occupation secretaries, the quality of information disclosure, investor protection and other control variables for the design, construct the corresponding regression model, and the related variables respectively do descriptive statistical analysis, Person correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis, also from the two aspects of robustness the test, finally explores the occupation secretaries, the relationship and interaction path between the quality of information disclosure and investor protection. The main research results are as follows:
(1) compared with non professional secretaries, professional secretaries can indeed improve the level of investor protection of listed companies.
(2) the quality of information disclosure is the intermediary variable that the Professional Secretaries affect the protection of investors, which has played a part of the intermediary role.
(3) the professional secretaries with the background of legal knowledge have a more significant positive impact on the level of investor protection.
Based on theoretical analysis and empirical study, the author thinks that China's listed companies should pay more attention to the role of the occupation secretaries, whose functions should not be confined to the IPO company, and should pay attention to the company after the completion of the listing of occupation secretaries in the internal governance, information disclosure compliance and investor protection of the important role to guarantee the independent and effective exercise, cultivate secretaries quality and ability. At the same time, to accelerate the process of China dongmi occupation, more standardized management, so that the occupation secretaries of the new group in the capital market of our country better under the condition of "growth", relying on its knowledge and experience and capacity advantages, efforts to enhance the quality of information disclosure of the company, and to improve the level of investor protection. Finally, perfecting the management authorities to pay attention to the information disclosure system, strengthen the disclosure of information services Supervision, pay attention to the educational work on investor protection, take measures to improve information, disclose quality, and protect the interests of investors.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F271;F224;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 張振新;杜光文;王振山;;監(jiān)事會(huì)、董事會(huì)特征與信息披露質(zhì)量[J];財(cái)經(jīng)問題研究;2011年10期

2 黃志良;劉志娟;;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理、財(cái)務(wù)狀況與上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊(學(xué)術(shù)版);2007年06期

3 高平;朱志標(biāo);;信息不對稱與投資者保護(hù)研究——基于投資者關(guān)系管理視角[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2010年14期

4 陸秀芬;藍(lán)文永;;公司信息披露機(jī)制與投資者保護(hù)關(guān)系分析[J];財(cái)會(huì)通訊;2010年21期

5 曾月明;莊璐彬;;機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股對中小投資者保護(hù)的影響——基于公司層面的實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2011年30期

6 張人驥,劉春江;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、股東保護(hù)與上市公司現(xiàn)金持有量[J];財(cái)貿(mào)經(jīng)濟(jì);2005年02期

7 馬施;李毓萍;;監(jiān)事會(huì)特征與信息披露質(zhì)量——來自深交所的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];東北師大學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2009年06期

8 王克敏,陳井勇;股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、投資者保護(hù)與公司績效[J];管理世界;2004年07期

9 姜付秀;支曉強(qiáng);張敏;;投資者利益保護(hù)與股權(quán)融資成本——以中國上市公司為例的研究[J];管理世界;2008年02期

10 曾昭灶;李善民;陳玉罡;;我國控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移與投資者保護(hù)關(guān)系的實(shí)證研究[J];管理學(xué)報(bào);2012年07期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 余明桂;中國上市公司控股股東的代理問題研究[D];華中科技大學(xué);2004年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前5條

1 陳玉;董秘特征對信息披露質(zhì)量的影響研究[D];新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2011年

2 陳同瑜;中國公司董事會(huì)秘書制度法律問題研究[D];中國政法大學(xué);2005年

3 王香玉;中國上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量與董事會(huì)秘書特征的關(guān)系研究[D];山東大學(xué);2012年

4 晁慧芳;內(nèi)部控制、信息披露與投資者保護(hù)的實(shí)證研究[D];東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2012年

5 沙萌;董事會(huì)秘書特征與上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量的關(guān)系研究[D];河南大學(xué);2013年

，

本文編號(hào)：1693298