本文選題：股東代表訴訟　切入點(diǎn)：原告資格　出處：《中國政法大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文

【摘要】：股東代表訴訟是公司法的一項(xiàng)重要制度,是正當(dāng)原告原則和多數(shù)決規(guī)則的例外適用。如何尋求維護(hù)公司效率與保護(hù)公司、中小股東利益之間的平衡,始終是立法對股東代表訴訟進(jìn)行制度設(shè)計(jì)時(shí)考慮的重要問題,而其中對股東代表訴訟原告資格的界定,是平衡股東代表訴訟本身濫訴和怠訴問題的重要手段。從理論角度分析,界定股東代表訴訟原告資格需要堅(jiān)持維護(hù)公司人格獨(dú)立、正視資本多數(shù)決、公司利益優(yōu)先和尊重公司自治等原則,尤其是要正視大股東侵害小股東是源于大股東對其監(jiān)督成本的補(bǔ)償需求和公司資本多數(shù)決規(guī)則的運(yùn)用執(zhí)行。參考國外立法例,從持股比例、持股時(shí)間和前置程序三個(gè)方面可見我國立法規(guī)定尚有待完善之處:1、持股比例規(guī)定缺乏彈性,可將原告持股比例的設(shè)計(jì)與大股東持股比例相結(jié)合;2、持股時(shí)間規(guī)定只有推定原告善意的情形,沒有將可以排除原告惡意的情形規(guī)定為例外,應(yīng)將自公司成立之日起持有股份和因法定取得持有股份的情形規(guī)定為例外;3、前置程序規(guī)定與美國“全部請求必需”的精神相同,但卻未對董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)的訴訟決定進(jìn)行審查,導(dǎo)致對公司內(nèi)部機(jī)構(gòu)合理的訴訟決定也被忽視,情況緊急下訴前豁免請求的同時(shí)也豁免了向董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)的訴后請求,在董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)不適宜的情況下公司沒有其他機(jī)構(gòu)做出訴訟決定,對清算情況下前置程序的規(guī)定也不明確。從實(shí)踐角度分析,有限責(zé)任公司股東和股份有限公司股東受到原告資格的限制程度不同,而法院在實(shí)踐中違背立法的意愿忽視了原告資格的程序要件要求,我國股東代表訴訟已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)怠訴傾向和偏離立法原意的操作。筆者建議可以先對原告資格問題中前置程序進(jìn)行立法完善,再對持股比例、持股時(shí)間進(jìn)行完善,然后再從舉證成本、訴訟費(fèi)用入手進(jìn)行相關(guān)制度完善,循序漸進(jìn),以求更好發(fā)揮股東代表訴訟的作用。
[Abstract]:Shareholder representative action is an important system of company law. It is the exception of the principle of just plaintiff and the rule of majority decision.How to seek to maintain the balance between the efficiency of the company and the protection of the interests of the minority shareholders has always been an important issue to be considered in the legislative design of the shareholder's representative litigation system, and the definition of the qualification of the plaintiff in the shareholder's representative action.It is an important means to balance the problem of shareholder's representative litigation.From the theoretical point of view, defining the plaintiff's qualification of shareholder representative litigation needs to uphold the principles of safeguarding the personality of the company, facing the majority of capital decisions, giving priority to the interests of the company and respecting the autonomy of the company.In particular, it is necessary to face up to the fact that the compensation demand of large shareholders for their supervision costs and the application of the majority rules of corporate capital are derived from the large shareholders' encroachment on minority shareholders.Referring to foreign legislative examples, we can see that the legislative provisions of our country still need to be improved from three aspects: shareholding ratio, shareholding time and pre-procedure, and the shareholding ratio is inflexible.It is possible to combine the design of the plaintiff's shareholding ratio with the shareholding ratio of the majority shareholder. The time for holding shares is only supposed to be a case of good faith of the plaintiff, and no exception is made to the situation where the plaintiff's malice can be ruled out.Exceptions should be made to the case of holding shares and acquiring shares by law from the date of incorporation of the company. The provisions of the pre-procedure shall be the same as the spirit of "all requests necessary" in the United States, but the decisions of the board of directors and the board of supervisors shall not be examined.As a result, reasonable litigation decisions on the internal organs of the company were also ignored. In case of emergency, requests for exemption before litigation were also waived to the Board of Directors and the Board of Supervisors for post-appeal requests, in the Board of Directors,When the board of supervisors is inappropriate, the company has no other body to make the lawsuit decision, and the rules of the pre-procedure in the liquidation case are not clear.From the point of view of practice, shareholders of limited liability company and shareholders of joint stock limited company are restricted by the qualification of plaintiff, but the court ignores the procedural requirements of qualification of plaintiff against the will of legislation in practice.Shareholder representative litigation in China has appeared the tendency of litigation and deviating from the legislative intent.The author suggests that we can legislate the leading procedure in the question of plaintiff's qualification first, then perfect the proportion of stock holding and the time of holding stock, then proceed from the cost of proof and the cost of litigation to perfect the relevant system, step by step, and step by step.In order to better play the role of shareholder representative litigation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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本文編號：1692268