本文選題：異議股東　切入點(diǎn)：股份回購　出處：《中國政法大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：公司制度的誕生就伴隨著股東之間及公司與債權(quán)人之間的利益沖突,平衡兩類沖突是公司法法律制度發(fā)展的永恒問題。當(dāng)公司決議的基本原則從“全體一致決”向“資本多數(shù)決”轉(zhuǎn)變后,公司股東之間因利益分歧而引發(fā)的糾紛變?cè)桨l(fā)劇烈,形成了對(duì)公司持有控制權(quán)的多數(shù)股東與處于被控制地位的少數(shù)股東之間這一難以調(diào)和的矛盾。多數(shù)股東根據(jù)“資本多數(shù)決原則”而在實(shí)質(zhì)上享受著對(duì)公司的最終控制權(quán),故當(dāng)其無視少數(shù)股東的利益而濫用該控制地位操縱公司僅為其自身謀取利益時(shí),少數(shù)股東就成為了該公司的“囚徒”:一來少數(shù)股東無法利用其已經(jīng)投入公司的資本增加自身的收益,因多數(shù)股東基于其控制地位可以輕易的排除少數(shù)股東取得公司經(jīng)營收益的可能;二來少數(shù)股東又無法將所持有的公司股份對(duì)外轉(zhuǎn)讓以便做出新的投資安排,因沒有任何一個(gè)投資者愿意接手一個(gè)已經(jīng)被控制的公司而替代原股東成為一個(gè)被操縱的傀儡,同時(shí)多數(shù)股東又會(huì)滿足于現(xiàn)狀而缺乏主動(dòng)收購少數(shù)股東股份的意愿。故出于平衡多數(shù)股東與少數(shù)股東之間因“資本多數(shù)決”原則的采用而引發(fā)的激烈矛盾,異議股東股份回購請(qǐng)求權(quán)制度得以發(fā)展,并迅速成為各國公司法立法中的重要制度之一。由于異議股東股份回購請(qǐng)求權(quán)制度具備增加股份流動(dòng)性的功能,故該制度對(duì)于有限責(zé)任公司而言更具有非凡的意義,蓋因有限責(zé)任公司的人合性與封閉性特點(diǎn),當(dāng)其多數(shù)股東與少數(shù)股東之間因利益糾紛問題發(fā)生劇烈矛盾時(shí),或出現(xiàn)公司股東會(huì)“僵局”時(shí),其股份難以轉(zhuǎn)讓的特性就會(huì)成為束縛少數(shù)股東資本流動(dòng)的極大障礙,而通過立法賦予少數(shù)股東在特定情形下得以要求公司回購其股份,是對(duì)其股份缺乏流動(dòng)性的一種最佳補(bǔ)償方式,同時(shí)也是保障其股東利益不被多數(shù)股東不正當(dāng)損害的有效途徑。2005年我國的新《公司法》正式引入了該制度,賦予了有限責(zé)任公司股東在特定情形下的回購請(qǐng)求權(quán)。但由于各種原因,目前該制度的法律條文較為粗淺。故對(duì)于廣大的少數(shù)股東而言,當(dāng)其與公司內(nèi)的多數(shù)股東之間發(fā)生利益沖突時(shí),期望利用現(xiàn)行的立法條文作為武器保障自身的權(quán)利還顯得遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不足,具體表現(xiàn)在現(xiàn)有立法對(duì)異議股東股份回購的法定事由規(guī)定并不適當(dāng)、有權(quán)提出股份回購請(qǐng)求權(quán)的股東范圍過窄、缺乏較為深入的便于執(zhí)行的股份回購程序等方面。同時(shí)因目前立法中所設(shè)立的異議股東股份回購請(qǐng)求權(quán)制度并沒有對(duì)公司債權(quán)人可能因異議股東行使股份回購請(qǐng)求權(quán)而產(chǎn)生的利益風(fēng)險(xiǎn)作出相應(yīng)的規(guī)范性安排,故在此方面對(duì)于債權(quán)人利益保障的工作仍然存在待改進(jìn)與完善�；谏鲜鲞@種種原因,本文立足于異議股東股份回購請(qǐng)求權(quán)制度所蘊(yùn)含的期待利益保障理念和利益衡平理念,論述了該制度在保障有限責(zé)任公司股東利益方面的重要意義,并結(jié)合該制度對(duì)股東和債權(quán)人利益所產(chǎn)生的影響,吸收其他國家對(duì)此問題的立法經(jīng)驗(yàn),就我國立法中所存在的不足提出完善性建議。
[Abstract]:The birth of company system is accompanied by the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors of the company and the balance, two kinds of conflicts is the eternal problem of the development of company law system. The basic principles of resolution when the company from the "unanimous decision" to "capital majority rule", the company shares between the East and the dispute because of divergence of interests became more acute, the formation of the company holds a majority shareholders and between shareholders which is difficult to reconcile the contradictions. The majority shareholders according to the "majority rule" in essence, enjoying the ultimate control of the company, so when they disregard the interests of minority shareholders and the abuse of control the company only for their own position to manipulate the interests of minority shareholders, has become the company's "prisoner": as a result of minority shareholders can not use its own company has invested capital increase The income, because the majority shareholders can easily control the position based on the exclusion of minority shareholders to obtain business income; and minority shareholders and to holdings of shares in the company to make arrangements for the transfer of foreign investment in the new, because no one is willing to take a hand investors had taken control of the company to replace the original shareholders of a a puppet, while the majority of shareholders will be satisfied with the status quo and the lack of active minority shareholders. It will fierce to balance the contradiction between majority shareholders and minority shareholders because of "the majority rule as a result of the dissenting shareholders'appraisal right system to develop, and quickly become one of the most important the system of company law legislation in many countries. Because of the dissenting shareholders'appraisal right system has increased the share liquidity function, so the system for A limited liability company has more special significance, and closed features because of limited liability company, when the majority shareholders and minority shareholders interests disputes due to dramatic conflicts, or the appearance of the shareholders of the company will "deadlock", will be difficult to transfer its shares characteristics has become a great obstacle to the minority shareholders flow bound capital, and through legislation to give minority shareholders to require the company to repurchase its shares in the specific circumstances of the company is lack of a best compensation way for liquidity,.2005 is also the effective way to protect the interests of shareholders are not many shareholders unfair damage in our country's new company law formally introduced the < > the system gives the repurchase rights of shareholders of a limited liability company in specific circumstances. But due to various reasons, the current legal provisions of the system. It is relatively simple for the less The number of shareholders, when the interests conflict between the majority shareholders and the company's expectations, using the existing legislative provisions as weapons to protect their rights is still insufficient, the specific performance is not appropriate in the provisions of statutory subject matter existing legislation on share repurchase for dissent shareholders, have the right to make a claim of share repurchase shareholder scope narrow, lack of in-depth to facilitate the implementation of the stock repurchase program and other aspects. At the same time due to the current legislation to set up the system of the appraisal right of dissenters and not because of the repurchase rights for dissent shareholders and creditors of the company shares may benefit risk to make normative arrangements accordingly, so here to protect the interests of creditors the work remains to be improved and perfected. This kind of reasons, this paper is based on the dissenting shareholders'appraisal right. With the expectation to protect the interests of ideas and interests balance idea, this paper discusses the important significance of the system in protecting the interests of the shareholders of the limited liability company, combined with the effect of the system due to the interests of the shareholders and the creditors, the legislative experience of other countries to absorb this problem, on the problems in our legislation put forward recommendations.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：D922.291.91

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 王敏金;我國有限責(zé)任公司異議股東回購請(qǐng)求權(quán)問題研究[D];蘇州大學(xué);2012年

2 寶音;有限責(zé)任公司異議股東股權(quán)回購請(qǐng)求權(quán)制度的評(píng)析與完善[D];中央民族大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號(hào)：1633148