本文選題：公司董事　切入點：董事義務(wù)　出處：《河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：一般認為,在董事與公司的關(guān)系上,無論將其視為何種法律關(guān)系,勤勉和忠誠是對董事在經(jīng)營過程中的基本要求,由此產(chǎn)生在公司法上的董事兩大義務(wù)。如果說忠誠義務(wù)是對董事在誠信品質(zhì)上的要求,那么勤勉義務(wù)則更加側(cè)重于對董事在技能方面的要求。由于勤勉義務(wù)的性質(zhì),對董事是否盡到該義務(wù)的考察必須建立在合理的理論界限和判斷標準之上。違反勤勉義務(wù)的行為更多地是以比較隱蔽的不作為行為表現(xiàn)出來的。在“董事會中心主義”的現(xiàn)代公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中,公司法必須關(guān)注董事勤勉義務(wù)的履行。原因在于,只有董事的勤勉盡職才是公司及股東利益實現(xiàn)的保證。當(dāng)董事因“不勤勉”的過錯造成公司損害時,自應(yīng)負擔(dān)相應(yīng)的損害賠償責(zé)任。本文通過規(guī)范分析、比較研究等方法,借鑒民法學(xué)上關(guān)于損害賠償?shù)囊话憷碚?以務(wù)實原則兼顧體系化之思考方法,梳理并試圖澄清有關(guān)董事違反勤勉義務(wù)而導(dǎo)致?lián)p害賠償責(zé)任的公司法理論。 法律義務(wù)的不履行將導(dǎo)致法律責(zé)任的承擔(dān),這是法律運行的基本邏輯。同樣,董事勤勉義務(wù)與董事賠償責(zé)任也具有理論和實踐上的邏輯聯(lián)系。董事?lián)p害賠償責(zé)任的學(xué)理根據(jù)在于公司與董事之間具有的特別委任關(guān)系。相比于一般民事受托人,董事所負擔(dān)的義務(wù)更具有身份上的特殊性,這是董事勤勉義務(wù)得以形成的基礎(chǔ)之一。在勤勉義務(wù)的要求上,為期衡平董事經(jīng)營自由與公司商業(yè)風(fēng)險的關(guān)系,董事?lián)p害賠償責(zé)任宜采過錯責(zé)任之歸責(zé)原則.董事勤勉義務(wù)的內(nèi)在本質(zhì)要求歸責(zé)原則的具體化,同時也是探討董事?lián)p害賠償責(zé)任構(gòu)成要件的核心問題,二者共同構(gòu)成了董事對公司損害賠償責(zé)任的兩條主線。這-分析框架的依據(jù)在于,作為公司行為的實際控制者,“不勤勉”的董事如果將公司置于其行為的傀儡地位并致害時,則不應(yīng)拘泥于“公司人格獨立”的概念法學(xué)栓桔,而應(yīng)根據(jù)誠實信用原則的衡平法思想,迫使董事直接承擔(dān)損害賠償責(zé)任。 無論是理論上的辨析還是制度上的比較,所有的目的最終都指向我國法律制度。我國公司法第148條規(guī)定了董事及高級管理人員的“勤勉義務(wù)”,這無疑進一步健全了董事義務(wù)制度,有利于我國公司法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)的逐步完善。但是,由于該條規(guī)定過于原則化,缺乏具體的衡量標準及相應(yīng)的配套機制,可能導(dǎo)致該條規(guī)定在實踐中難以具體操作和應(yīng)用而被架空論為“擺設(shè)”。因此,有必要對我國制度進行全面的反思,并從一般條款設(shè)計、判斷標準選擇、經(jīng)驗判斷原則、董事責(zé)任限制以及董事責(zé)任保險等角度入手,構(gòu)建適合我國的制度。其中一般條款的設(shè)計和判斷標準的選擇是合理確定董事勤勉義務(wù)進而決定是否對其追究責(zé)任的重要依據(jù)；而經(jīng)營判斷原則構(gòu)成了對董事責(zé)任的抗辯。 當(dāng)然,就整體而言,董事?lián)p害賠償制度的運行效果,或許存在弱化董事責(zé)任的現(xiàn)象。其中,董事責(zé)任保險使將董事實際負擔(dān)賠償責(zé)任與對責(zé)任董事的可非難性評價相分離,體現(xiàn)了現(xiàn)代公司制度的人性化進步,而公司對董事責(zé)任之減免以及對董事費用之補償,則是私法自治(公司自治)原則在董事?lián)p害賠償制度上的具體演繹。
[Abstract]:Generally, the relationship between directors and companies, no matter be considered what kind of legal relationship, diligence and honesty is the basic requirement for the board of directors in the business process, resulting in the company law board two obligations. If the duty of loyalty is to the board of directors in good faith on the quality requirements, it is the duty of diligence more focus on the board of directors in terms of skills required. Due to the nature of the duty of diligence of directors, whether to make the investigation of the obligation must be based on a reasonable theoretical limits and judgment standard. In violation of the obligation of diligence behavior is more subtle in not as behavior out. Modern corporate governance structure in the "board of directors centrism", company law must fulfill the duty of diligence attention. The reason is that due diligence is the only director of the company and the interests of shareholders. When the board of directors for the guarantee for the realization of "Qin Mian fault caused damage to the company's self burden, the corresponding liability for damages. In this paper, through normative analysis, comparative research methods, from the civil law on compensation for damage to the general theory of pragmatic principles, methods of systematic thinking, combing and trying to clarify the relevant directors in violation of the obligation of diligence and the corporation law theory of liability the damage.
The legal obligation does not perform will lead to legal liability, which is the basic logic of legal operation. Also, the duty of diligence and the board of directors liability also has the logical connection between theory and practice. The board of directors for damages according to the theory that has the special appointment relationship between the company and the board of trustees. Compared to the general civil the board of directors obligations, more special identity, this is one of the basic form of the duty of diligence. The duty of diligence requirements, the relationship between a business risk equity free operation and company directors, directors liability should adopt fault liability imputation principle. The intrinsic requirement of the duty of diligence the imputation principle of the concrete, but also on board for damages constitute the core elements of the problem, the two together constitute the board of directors of company liability for damage compensation The two main line. This framework is based on the actual control of the company, as a behavior, "diligent" Directors if the company in their behavior and the damage caused by the puppet position, should not rigidly adhere to the concept of law forcible "independent personality of the company", and should be based on equitable idea of honesty and credit in principle, forcing directors directly liable for damages.
From the comparison of theory analysis and system, all the ultimate purpose of all point to the legal system of our country. Our company law provisions of article 148th of the board of directors and senior management personnel of "duty of diligence", which will further improve the system of duty, is conducive to China's corporate governance structure gradually improved. However, since this provision is too principle, the lack of specific criteria and the corresponding mechanism, may lead to the provision in practice to specific operation and application is on the overhead "decoration". Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive reflection of our system, and from the general clause design criteria choose, experience judgment principle, limitation of liability of directors and liability insurance perspective, to construct our system. The design of general terms and the judgment standard is a reasonable choice to determine the director Qin The duty of encouragement determines the important basis for its accountability, and the principle of business judgment constitutes a defense against the responsibility of the director.
Of course, on the whole, the running effect of system of compensation for damage of directors, may weaken the responsibility of directors. Among them, the board of directors liability insurance will be the actual burden of liability and the liability of directors accusable in evaluation of phase separation, embodies the humane progress of modern company system, and the relief of director liability company and on the cost of compensation, is the autonomy of private law (corporate autonomy principle) in the system of compensation for damage to specific interpretation of the board of directors.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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