本文選題：資本多數(shù)決　切入點：表決規(guī)則　出處：《寧波大學(xué)》2010年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：本文以資本多數(shù)決為主線,涉及公司表決權(quán)制度的一般考察、資本多數(shù)決的價值分析、資本多數(shù)決實現(xiàn)的具體形式以及資本多數(shù)決制度的修正與完善。其中文章重點探討了公司制和合作社、公司股東大會和公司董事會、有限責任公司中有條件的人數(shù)多數(shù)決進行比較考察、資本多數(shù)決的濫用和對資本多數(shù)決的修正。資本多數(shù)決是公司法中的重要原則,也是研究公司制度的重大突破口。 首先,為什么是股東享有公司事務(wù)的表決權(quán)而不是其他人,即涉及公司表決權(quán)的歸屬問題。股東享有公司表決權(quán),其他參與者不享有該項權(quán)力,是由這些主體和股東具有不同的地位和法律屬性所決定的。表決規(guī)制經(jīng)歷了一個從一致決到多數(shù)決的過程,這是由團體行為的邏輯所決定的,公司作為一個社團法人,也遵循了團體意思決定的規(guī)則和方法——多數(shù)決�！耙还梢粰�(quán)”原則是資本多數(shù)決產(chǎn)生的基礎(chǔ),股份是股份公司資本的基本單位,以此計算每股東所持有的表決權(quán)數(shù)。 其次,通過表決制度的比較考察,論證資本多數(shù)決的價值所在。本文試圖通過討論三種情況下人數(shù)決的規(guī)定,得出資本多數(shù)決才是股份公司資本制度中的民主。一是闡述合作社采取的表決機制以及合作社采取人數(shù)決的原因分析。二是論述公司董事會的表決規(guī)則。三是討論公司法第43條的規(guī)定,我國公司法允許有限責任公司就普通決議事項,通過公司章程的例外規(guī)定采取人數(shù)決,包括有限公司中股權(quán)對外轉(zhuǎn)讓也規(guī)定采取人數(shù)決。 再次,資本多數(shù)決通常有三種實現(xiàn)形式:普通決議也即簡單多數(shù)決、特別決議和需要全體股東同意的決議。對于需要全體一致同意的事項,在國外公司法中有所規(guī)定,在我國公司法中沒有涉及。 最后,資本多數(shù)決原則只是一種制度性的安排,并非最理想化的規(guī)則。在實踐中往往會出現(xiàn)控股股東濫用資本多數(shù)決的現(xiàn)象。因此,從我國現(xiàn)行公司法的規(guī)定入手,分析現(xiàn)有的各項配套制度,對資本多數(shù)決的修正和完善提出相應(yīng)的建議具有重要的實踐意義。
[Abstract]:This article takes the capital majority decision as the main line, involves the general investigation of the voting right system of the company, the value analysis of the capital majority decision, The specific forms of the realization of capital majority decision and the revision and perfection of capital majority decision system. The article focuses on the corporate system and cooperatives, corporate shareholders' general meeting and company board of directors. The conditional majority decision of limited liability company is compared, the abuse of capital majority decision and the amendment of capital majority decision. Capital majority decision is an important principle in company law, and it is also a great breakthrough in the study of company system. First of all, why do shareholders enjoy voting rights in the affairs of the company and not others, that is, the ownership of the voting rights of the company. The shareholders have the right to vote in the company, and the other participants do not enjoy that right. The voting regulation has gone through a process from unanimous decision to majority decision, which is determined by the logic of group behavior. The principle of "one share, one right" is the basis of capital majority decision, and shares are the basic unit of the capital of a joint-stock company, so as to calculate the number of voting rights held by each shareholder. Secondly, through the comparative investigation of voting system, the paper demonstrates the value of capital majority decision. It is concluded that the majority of capital is the democracy in the capital system of joint-stock companies. One is to expound the voting mechanism adopted by cooperatives and the reasons for the number of people adopted by cooperatives. The other is to discuss the voting rules of the board of directors of the company. Third, to discuss the voting rules of the board of directors. On the provisions of Article 43 of the Company Law, The company law of our country allows limited liability company to adopt the decision of the number of people through the exception of the articles of association, including the transfer of stock right to the outside of the limited company. Thirdly, capital majority decisions usually come in three forms: ordinary resolutions, that is, simple majority decisions, special resolutions, and resolutions requiring the consent of all shareholders. In our country company law does not deal with. Finally, the principle of capital majority decision is only a kind of institutional arrangement, not the most idealized rule. In practice, there is often a phenomenon of controlling shareholders abusing capital majority decision. It is of great practical significance to analyze the existing supporting systems and put forward corresponding suggestions for the revision and perfection of capital majority decision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：寧波大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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