本文選題：有限責(zé)任公司　切入點(diǎn)：承包經(jīng)營　出處：《華東政法大學(xué)》2007年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】： 在法院實(shí)習(xí)的過程中,筆者偶然在案例中發(fā)現(xiàn)了以有限責(zé)任公司為對象的承包經(jīng)營合同,以及根據(jù)承包經(jīng)營合同對有限責(zé)任公司進(jìn)行的承包經(jīng)營這一現(xiàn)象。承包經(jīng)營責(zé)任制是我國國有企業(yè)改革中曾經(jīng)廣泛采用過的方式,但不久便被公司制所代替。面對以有限責(zé)任公司為對象的承包經(jīng)營,筆者不禁感到疑問:第一、現(xiàn)在的有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營與曾經(jīng)的國有企業(yè)承包責(zé)任制有何不同?第二,為何實(shí)踐中會(huì)出現(xiàn)這一現(xiàn)象?為了解答這兩個(gè)問題,筆者遵循從現(xiàn)象到實(shí)質(zhì)的研究方式,通過對具體的有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營合同的分析,歸納出有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營合同的全貌,進(jìn)而闡述承包經(jīng)營狀態(tài)下有限責(zé)任公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)異化現(xiàn)象。在對現(xiàn)象予以全面清晰的描述后,據(jù)此從承包經(jīng)營合同與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)這兩個(gè)角度分析有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營的本質(zhì)。在將上述結(jié)論引為論據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)上,筆者著手解答文首的兩個(gè)問題,分析了有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營與國有企業(yè)承包責(zé)任制本質(zhì)上的區(qū)別,并指出實(shí)踐中的有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營現(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生,是為了利用權(quán)責(zé)利合一的方式改變公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),以應(yīng)對現(xiàn)代公司兩權(quán)分離而導(dǎo)致的經(jīng)營者“欺詐”、“偷懶”等代理問題。最后筆者認(rèn)為,權(quán)責(zé)利合一的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)形式,將是解決公司代理問題的有效途徑。 導(dǎo)言部分,筆者簡述了發(fā)現(xiàn)問題的過程,在回溯了國有企業(yè)承包經(jīng)營責(zé)任制的興衰之后,提出文章所欲解答的兩個(gè)問題。 第一章,系對有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營合同的概述,主要通過合同內(nèi)容,即權(quán)利義務(wù)方面,通過對四個(gè)實(shí)務(wù)上真實(shí)的有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營合同進(jìn)行分析來予以論述。完成對合同權(quán)利義務(wù)的概括后,在本章最后對學(xué)術(shù)上存在一定爭議的有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營合同的效力問題進(jìn)行論述,肯定其效力,并且指出法院在司法實(shí)踐中已經(jīng)實(shí)際認(rèn)可了這種合同的效力。 第二章,在上文基礎(chǔ)上討論承包經(jīng)營對有限責(zé)任公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。第一節(jié)首先論述正常情況下的有限責(zé)任公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),指出這一法定的治理結(jié)構(gòu)其特征在于分權(quán)制衡。第二節(jié)則通過與上文的比較,論述承包經(jīng)營狀態(tài)下有限責(zé)任公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的異化,指出各公司機(jī)關(guān)的經(jīng)營權(quán)向承包人集中,經(jīng)營者受托義務(wù)的約定化,以及監(jiān)督權(quán)的合同化等現(xiàn)象。 第三章在上文對現(xiàn)象予以描述的基礎(chǔ)上,分析有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營的本質(zhì)。第一節(jié)以合同為角度,通過分析合同雙方的對價(jià)關(guān)系來探討公司承包合同的本質(zhì),得出結(jié)論為:承包人向發(fā)包人支付承包金、承擔(dān)公司經(jīng)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)作為對價(jià),從發(fā)包人處獲得在一定期限內(nèi)的公司利潤獲取權(quán)和公司經(jīng)營權(quán);發(fā)包人向承包人轉(zhuǎn)讓一定期限內(nèi)公司利潤獲取權(quán)、授予該期限內(nèi)的公司經(jīng)營權(quán)作為對價(jià),從承包人處獲得承包金、并轉(zhuǎn)移公司經(jīng)營風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。第二節(jié)以公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)為角度,通過對比古典企業(yè)形態(tài),得出有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營的本質(zhì),在于將公司的經(jīng)營權(quán)、利潤獲得權(quán)、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)責(zé)任集中在承包人一人身上,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)公司權(quán)責(zé)利的統(tǒng)一。 在上文結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,第四章用以回答文首的第一個(gè)問題,即將有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營與企業(yè)承包經(jīng)營責(zé)任制進(jìn)行比較。第一節(jié)指出了兩者的相似之處,即以合同為基礎(chǔ)、以經(jīng)營權(quán)的獨(dú)立為條件、權(quán)責(zé)利向承包人的統(tǒng)一,從而顯示兩者之間一脈相承的關(guān)系。第二節(jié)則指出了兩者區(qū)別,即合同的締結(jié)上的意思自治與行政命令、經(jīng)營權(quán)的獨(dú)立性上的徹底與不完全、權(quán)責(zé)利統(tǒng)一上的主體與非主體,表明兩者本質(zhì)上存在著極大的差別,進(jìn)而證明承包經(jīng)營體制在改革中被認(rèn)定失敗,是由于不能解決國企的主體獨(dú)立問題,不符合當(dāng)時(shí)的改革需求,但并不意味著其作為一種治理結(jié)構(gòu)模式的失敗。 在第五章中,筆者回答了第二個(gè)問題,即實(shí)踐中出現(xiàn)有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營現(xiàn)象的原因。有限責(zé)任公司具有兩權(quán)分離的必要性,但兩權(quán)分離造成的經(jīng)營者和公司所有者利益不一致,又會(huì)引起代理問題,即經(jīng)營者的“欺詐”和“偷懶”,損害所有者利益。代理問題導(dǎo)致有限責(zé)任公司中股東傾向于干預(yù)公司經(jīng)營,從而與經(jīng)營者的獨(dú)立經(jīng)營要求產(chǎn)生沖突�，F(xiàn)有的法定治理結(jié)構(gòu)不足以解決這一矛盾。而通過承包經(jīng)營,經(jīng)營者取得其所需求的獨(dú)立經(jīng)營權(quán),同時(shí)公司權(quán)責(zé)利向經(jīng)營者統(tǒng)一又會(huì)大大降低經(jīng)營者“欺詐”和“偷懶”的可能性,緩解代理問題,最終使公司所有者的安全需求與公司經(jīng)營者的自主需求之間的矛盾得到了較大程度的調(diào)和。這正是實(shí)踐中自發(fā)出現(xiàn)這一現(xiàn)象的根本原因。 最后,在結(jié)束語中,筆者分析了現(xiàn)有用以克服代理問題種種方法的弊端,指出對經(jīng)營者激勵(lì)與威懾并施,即權(quán)責(zé)利的統(tǒng)一,是有限公司承包經(jīng)營帶給公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的啟示之所在,也應(yīng)當(dāng)是公司治理的發(fā)展方向。
[Abstract]:In the process of court practice, the author discovered the object in the case of accidental contracts for limited liability company and limited liability company according to the contract of the contract management of this phenomenon. The contract responsibility system is the reform of state-owned enterprises in China have been widely used in the way, but he was soon instead of company system. In the face of limited liability company as the contract object, I can not help but feel doubt: first, the limited liability company contracted with the former state-owned enterprise contract responsibility system? Second, why in the practice of this phenomenon? In order to answer these two questions, the author follows from phenomenon to study the essence of the way, based on the detailed analysis of the limited liability company contract, summed up the limited liability company contract and explanation of the picture of the contract The camp under the condition of limited liability company governance structure alienation. To be comprehensive and clear description of the phenomenon, according to analyze the nature of limited liability company contracted from the two angles of the governance structure of the contract with the company. In the above conclusion is cited as the argument on the basis of the author to the first two questions this paper and analyzes the differences between limited liability company contracted with the state-owned enterprise contract responsibility system in essence, and points out that the limited liability company contracted phenomenon in the practice, is to use the right one way to change the corporate governance structure, the operators of "separation of two rights to deal with the modern company as a result of fraud", "lazy" the agency problem. Finally the author believes that the responsibilities together in the form of corporate governance structure, will be an effective way to solve the agency problem.
In the introductory part, the author briefly describes the process of finding problems, and after tracing back to the rise and fall of the contractual management responsibility system of state-owned enterprises, puts forward two questions that the article wants to answer.
The first chapter is an overview of the contract limited liability company contract management, mainly through the contents of the contract, the rights and obligations, through the analysis of four real practice of the limited liability company contracts to be discussed. To fulfill the obligations of the contract rights summary, discussed in the final chapter of controversial academic the limited liability company, the validity of the contract, affirm its effectiveness, and pointed out that the court in the judicial practice has been recognized by the actual effectiveness of this contract.
The second chapter, effect of contract of limited liability company governance based on the above discussion. The first section discusses the governance structure under the normal condition of the limited liability company, points out the legal governance structure is characterized in that the separation of powers. The second section through the comparison with the above discussion, the alienation of the contracted management of State Governance Structure Co. Ltd, pointed out that the right to operate each organ of the company concentrated to the contractor, the operators of fiduciary duty agreement, contract and the phenomenon of supervision.
In the third chapter, based on the above described phenomenon, analyze the nature of limited liability company contracted. In the first section on the contract angle, through the analysis on the relationship between the two parties of the contract price of the company contract nature, the conclusion is: pay the contractor contracting fee to the employer, assume business risk as to the price the right of access to, and the company right from the employer to get within a certain period of profit of the company; the employer to the contractor transfer within a certain period of time the profit of the company to obtain the right to the term of the right to operate the company granted as a consideration, got the contract payments from the contractor, and the transfer of the business risk. The second section to the company governance structure perspective, by comparing the classical form of enterprise, the nature of limited liability company contract management, is the management right, the right of profit, risk responsibility in a contractor In order to achieve the unity of the power and responsibility of the company.
Based on the above conclusions, to answer the first question of the first fourth chapters, compared to the limited liability company and enterprise contract management responsibility system. The first section pointed out the similarities between the two, which is based on the contract, with the condition of operational independence, to facilitate unified responsibilities of the contractor thus, display the same relationship between the two. The second section points out the difference between the two, namely, autonomy and administrative order contract on the independence of the management right of the complete and incomplete responsibilities, the unity of subject and non subject, indicates that the fact there is a great difference, and that contract the operating system is that failure in the reform of state-owned enterprises, because can not solve the problem of independence, not in conformity with the requirements of the reform, but it does not mean that as a kind of governance failure.
In the fifth chapter, the author tries to answer the second questions, namely, the phenomenon of the contracted management of limited liability company in practice. The cause of the limited liability company has the necessity of two power separation, but the separation of two rights caused by the operator and owner of the company interests will cause agency problems, namely "fraud" and "operator lazy, damage the interests of the owner. The agency problem leads to shareholders of a limited liability company in the business to tend to intervene the company independent management, thus requirements and operator of the conflict. The legal structure of the existing governance is not enough to solve this contradiction. And through contract management, has the right to operate independently of the demand, at the same time, the possibility of responsibilities to the operators unified and will greatly reduce the operator" fraud "and" lazy ", to alleviate agency problems, and ultimately enable operators to security requirements and the owner of the company The contradiction between independent demands has been greatly reconciled. This is the fundamental reason for the spontaneous emergence of this phenomenon in practice.
Finally, in the conclusion, the author analyzes the drawbacks of the existing methods to overcome all sorts of agency problems, and points out that the incentive and deterrence is applied, which facilitate unified responsibilities, is limited to the contracted management of the corporate governance structure of the enlightenment, but also should be the direction of development of corporate governance theory.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2007
【分類號(hào)】：D912.29

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 王海蘭;有限責(zé)任公司股東承包經(jīng)營問題研究[D];西南政法大學(xué);2011年

2 韓喬毅;論有限責(zé)任公司的承包經(jīng)營[D];西南政法大學(xué);2011年

3 王璐;有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營的法律問題研究[D];湖南大學(xué);2011年

4 賀利芳;我國有限責(zé)任公司承包經(jīng)營的法律問題研究[D];遼寧大學(xué);2012年

，

本文編號(hào)：1585753