本文選題：機(jī)構(gòu)投資者　切入點(diǎn)：公司治理　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：早在20世紀(jì)70年代，以美國為首的管理學(xué)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們就開始了關(guān)于“機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理”的相關(guān)研究，在理論和實(shí)證方面都積累了大量的文獻(xiàn)資料。但是這些研究是在管理學(xué)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的語境中進(jìn)行展開的，側(cè)重于研究機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的參與公司治理的動機(jī)和行為特性，用管理學(xué)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的理論對其進(jìn)行闡述。近年來，法律規(guī)制的因素作為組織行為的關(guān)鍵決定要素之一，逐漸引起理論界和學(xué)術(shù)界的興趣。美國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的發(fā)展過程中，就體現(xiàn)了對具體法律規(guī)制渠道的制度安排。國內(nèi)最近的研究成果主要散見于少數(shù)的一些論著和文章中，也大多是前瞻性或選取某一個方面進(jìn)行分析，而沒有放在體系化的框架之下。鑒于此，筆者嘗試對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與公司治理內(nèi)在的機(jī)理和交互作用進(jìn)行一個較為系統(tǒng)的梳理和闡述。 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的興起，為公司治理機(jī)制的發(fā)展提供了新契機(jī)，無論是在價值理念還是在制度設(shè)計(jì)上，公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)勢必發(fā)生一場革命性的變革。在本文結(jié)構(gòu)上共分為四個部分。首先，對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的定義和主要類別，以及公司治理的概念進(jìn)行了界定，以框定論文探討的基本范疇。 公司法基本理論學(xué)說和公司治理理論的幾大難題是本文展開的基礎(chǔ)，同時還介紹了西方學(xué)者對于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的動機(jī)理論和行為理論。學(xué)者認(rèn)為，不同類型的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的動機(jī)有所不同，影響因素包括是否存在利益沖突、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股時間和持股比例等。而當(dāng)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對管理者的治理或公司績效不滿時，一般有兩類行為選擇趨勢，一是“股東消極主義”，即沉默和放棄（即“用腳投票”）；二是“股東積極主義”（即“用手投票”）。隨后，以公司治理和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者兩部分基本理論為邏輯起點(diǎn)，對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理對“代理成本”問題、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)理論悖論、和股東至上理論與利益相關(guān)者理論論戰(zhàn)三大公司法難題的理論價值進(jìn)行了探討。實(shí)力雄厚的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的引入，對降低外部股東和管理者之間的“代理成本”，在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)中制衡大股東、保護(hù)小股東的利益，以及保護(hù)其他利益相關(guān)者的利益上，發(fā)揮了強(qiáng)大的制度優(yōu)勢。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的加入不僅對公司治理格局的變革發(fā)揮了巨大的作用力，甚至提供了諸多公司結(jié)構(gòu)理論上可供探討的課題。 通過分析機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的理論貢獻(xiàn)，，發(fā)現(xiàn)了諸多的問題。如何完善我國的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的角色，使之潛在的理論價值得以凸顯，就需要我們對我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行進(jìn)一步深入的分析，以此進(jìn)一步提出使我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)揮股東積極主義的相應(yīng)的解決對策。 對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的國際現(xiàn)狀和趨勢的分析，以美、德、日三國為例，介紹了美國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的渠道和德日兩國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者股東積極主義的興起過程。伴隨著全球金融市場一體化的進(jìn)程，形成了德日公司的治理模式和傳統(tǒng)英美公司的治理模式逐步向“機(jī)構(gòu)投資者治理”為主導(dǎo)的、用手投票的機(jī)構(gòu)治理模式轉(zhuǎn)變的發(fā)展趨勢。緊接著對我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)展歷程、現(xiàn)狀和參與公司治理過程中的不足之處進(jìn)行了介紹和分析，由于中國的資本市場環(huán)境以及相關(guān)政策法規(guī)的缺失，我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理過程中還處于比較弱勢的地位，他們關(guān)注更多的是對自身利益的保護(hù)，故而“消極股東主義”現(xiàn)象普遍存在，“搭便車”的心理、甚至市場投機(jī)行為、非法炒作行為屢見不鮮。 最后，基于以上對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理的理論、國際比較法分析的結(jié)論和對我國現(xiàn)狀的介紹，提出了我國機(jī)構(gòu)投資者發(fā)揮股東積極主義解決對策。本部分通過對契約式基金與商事信托、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資與有限合伙兩類組織形式優(yōu)勢的分析，以及機(jī)構(gòu)投資者作為受托人的信義義務(wù)的建立，對機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的理論完善提出了本文的見解；并以場外交易市場和QFII制度的發(fā)展為視角，探討機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在我國資本市場的成長潛力，最后對完善委托代理投票制度和多種非正式參與渠道等相關(guān)配套法律制度提出了本文的建議。
[Abstract]:In early 1970s, the US led management and economists began to research on the institutional investors to participate in corporate governance, in the theoretical and empirical aspects have accumulated a large amount of literature. But these studies are carried out in management and economics context, and the motivation of participating in corporate governance the research focuses on the behavior of institutional investors, the paper uses the theory of management and economics. In recent years, the legal regulation of the key factors of organizational behavior decision as one of the elements, gradually aroused the theoretical and academic interest. The process of the development of institutional investors in the United States, it reflects the specific arrangements for the legal regulation of channel the system. Recent research scattered in a few books and articles, are forward-looking or select one aspect of, Instead of putting it under the framework of systematization, in view of this, the author tries to systematize and elaborate the internal mechanism and interaction between institutional investors and corporate governance.
The rise of institutional investors, provides a new opportunity for the development of the corporate governance mechanism, both in values or the system design, the structure of corporate governance is bound to a revolutionary change. In this paper the structure is divided into four parts. Firstly, the definition of institutional investors and the main categories, as well as the concept of corporate governance defines the basic category, to frame the discussion of this thesis.
Several major problems in company law basic theory and the theory of corporate governance is the foundation of this thesis, it also introduces the theory of western scholars for motivation theory and behavior of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance. Scholars believe that different types of institutional investors have different motives in corporate governance, the factors including whether there is a conflict of interest, institutional investors the holding time and stake. When institutional investors are dissatisfied with the management of governance or corporate performance, there are two kinds of choices, one is "shareholder pessimism", namely the silence and give up (i.e. "vote by foot"); the two is "Shareholder Activism" (i.e. "vote by hand"). Subsequently, the corporate governance and institutional investors in the two part of the basic theory as the logical starting point of institutional investors participate in the corporate governance of the "agency cost" problem, ownership structure theory The paradox of value and shareholder supremacy theory and stakeholder theory, the three law controversy problem. Introduce the strength of institutional investors, to reduce the external shareholders and managers between the "agency cost", in the ownership structure balance of shareholders, protect the interests of small shareholders, and protect the interests of other the interests of stakeholders, played a strong institutional advantage. Adding not only institutional investors on corporate governance patterns play a huge force, and provides for the study of many corporate structure theory.
Through theoretical analysis the contribution of institutional investors, found many problems. How to improve the role of institutional investors in our country, the theoretical value of the potential to be highlighted, we need further in-depth analysis of China's institutional investors participating in the current situation of corporate governance, in order to further put forward that China's institutional investors play shareholder activism the corresponding countermeasures.
Analysis of international situation and the trend of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance in the United States, Germany, Japan as an example, introduces the development process of American institutional investors channel to participate in corporate governance in Germany and Japan and institutional shareholders activism. Along with the global financial market integration process, the formation of the governance mode in German and Japanese companies and the traditional Anglo American corporate governance mode to "institutional investors governance" as the leading, with the changing trends of voting mechanism hand governance model. Then the development process of China's institutional investors, introduces and analyzes the current situation and deficiencies in corporate governance in the process, due to the lack of capital market environment and Chinese the relevant policies and regulations, institutional investors participate in the corporate governance process is still in a relatively weak position, they are more concerned about their own interests The phenomenon of "negative shareholder doctrine" is common, and "hitchhiking" psychology, even market speculation, illegal speculation is common.
Finally, the institutional investors to participate in corporate governance based on the theory of international comparison analysis method and conclusion of the current situation of our country, put forward China's institutional investors play shareholder activism countermeasures. Through this part of the contractual fund and commercial trust, analysis of risk investment and limited partnership organization form two kinds of advantage. The establishment of institutional investors and as a trustee of the fiduciary duty, the theory of institutional investors perfect put forward this view; and with the development of the OTC market and the QFII system from the perspective of the discussion of institutional investors in China's capital market growth potential, finally this paper puts forward suggestions on perfecting the proxy voting system and a variety of informal channels of participation and other related legal system.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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本文編號：1566221