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  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 交叉持股 公司法 法律規(guī)制 立法建議　出處：《中國政法大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在我國,公司之間交叉持股是國家在國有企業(yè)改革的過程中提出并實施的一項政策性措施,目的是國家要進(jìn)行國有企業(yè)改革,使國企適應(yīng)社會主義市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的要求,增強市場競爭力,建立現(xiàn)代化的公司制度。在當(dāng)時,我國的經(jīng)濟(jì)成分單一,公有制經(jīng)濟(jì)在國民經(jīng)濟(jì)中占絕對統(tǒng)治地位,因此國有企業(yè)之間相互持股成為很好的策略,既實現(xiàn)了股東的多元化,便于加強對公司生產(chǎn)運營的監(jiān)督,又節(jié)省了資金,解決了當(dāng)時資金短缺的問題。因而,交叉持股自產(chǎn)生以來即受到國家的保護(hù)、支持和推廣,對其進(jìn)行的法律規(guī)制卻是極其薄弱的。 近年來,我國資本市場上頻頻出現(xiàn)由交叉持股引起的重大案例,引起人們廣泛關(guān)注,使得交叉持股這一公司法律制度成為學(xué)界乃至廣大投資者熱議的話題。從最早的“遼寧大成股份有限公司與廣發(fā)證券有限責(zé)任公司互相成為對方的第二大股東,形成上市公司與證券公司交叉持股的我國第一起交叉持股案例”1到后來不斷出現(xiàn)的造系運動——從德隆系、中廣系到涌金系及現(xiàn)在正被中國證監(jiān)會立案調(diào)查的天寶系等,讓人眼花繚亂。 交叉持股存在有利的一面,如:實現(xiàn)企業(yè)間的戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟,防止惡意收購,交叉持股可以在節(jié)省企業(yè)資金支出同時也為企業(yè)的融資提供了極為便利的條件,而且交叉持股還是實現(xiàn)產(chǎn)業(yè)布局的很好的手段。當(dāng)然交叉持股也有極大地消極作用:“虛增公司資本,危害資本三原則”2;“干擾資本市場交易秩序,誘發(fā)內(nèi)幕交易和關(guān)聯(lián)交易”3;“相互持股的公司間易形成內(nèi)部控制,造成監(jiān)督機制缺位”4,甚至股東被架空,致使公司的治理結(jié)構(gòu)不能發(fā)揮投資者期待的作用;在極端的情況下,還會推動經(jīng)濟(jì)泡沫的產(chǎn)生和破滅。 筆者試圖通過對公司之間交叉持股的基本法律理論的研究,分析其效用:何種情形下產(chǎn)生積極效用,哪種情況下產(chǎn)生消極的效用。在此基礎(chǔ)上,考察日本、英美法系及法德等大陸法系國家對公司間交叉持股所采取的對策其原因分析,吸收借鑒外國立法的有益之處,以完善我國的法律制度。 全文共分正文和結(jié)論兩個部分,其中正文分為五章:第一章主要介紹了交叉持股的基本理論及其起源和發(fā)展;第二章著重分析了交叉持股的效用:正面效用和負(fù)面效用;第三章考察了域外法——主要是英美法系和大陸法系的主要國家關(guān)于交叉持股的立法情況;第四章探討了我國立法以及司法實務(wù)中關(guān)于交叉持股的現(xiàn)實狀況,闡釋了我國交叉持股的制度環(huán)境,并分析了相關(guān)案例;第五章闡述構(gòu)建和完善我國交叉持股制度的法律對策,參照外國的立法經(jīng)驗并結(jié)合我國國情的基礎(chǔ)上,提出了如何構(gòu)建和完善我國公司交叉持股的法律建議,為我國社會主義法制建設(shè)做出自己的努力。
[Abstract]:In China, cross-shareholding among companies is a policy measure put forward and implemented by the state in the course of the reform of state-owned enterprises. The purpose of the policy is that the state should carry out the reform of state-owned enterprises and adapt the state-owned enterprises to the requirements of the socialist market economy. Strengthening market competitiveness and establishing a modern corporate system. At that time, the economic component of our country was single, and the public ownership economy occupied an absolute dominant position in the national economy. Therefore, cross-shareholding among state-owned enterprises became a good strategy. It not only realizes the diversification of shareholders, facilitates the supervision of the production and operation of the company, but also saves funds and solves the problem of the shortage of funds at that time. Therefore, cross-shareholding has been protected, supported and popularized by the state since it came into being. But its legal regulation is extremely weak. In recent years, major cases caused by cross-shareholding have frequently appeared in China's capital market, which has aroused widespread concern. The cross-shareholding system has become a hot topic in academic circles and even among investors. From the earliest "Liaoning Dacheng Co., Ltd. and Guangfa Securities Limited liability Company" to each other's second largest shareholder, The first case of cross-shareholding between a listed company and a securities company in China was "1 to the subsequent system building movement-from the Delong system, the Zhongguang Department to the Yongjin Department, and the Tianbao Department, which is now being filed and investigated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission," and so on. It was dazzling. Cross-shareholding has its advantages, such as realizing strategic alliance among enterprises, preventing hostile takeover, cross-shareholding can save the enterprise's capital expenditure, and it can also provide a very convenient condition for enterprise's financing. And cross-shareholding is also a good means to achieve the industrial layout. Of course, cross-shareholding also has a great negative effect: "fictitious increase in corporate capital, endangering the three principles of capital" 2, "interfere with the order of capital market transactions," Inducing insider trading and related party trading "3;" "internal control of cross-shareholding companies is easy to form, resulting in the absence of supervisory mechanism" (4) and even shareholders being set up, resulting in the corporate governance structure being unable to play the role expected of investors; in extreme cases, Will also promote the emergence and burst of economic bubbles. By studying the basic legal theory of cross-shareholding among companies, the author tries to analyze its utility: under what circumstances it produces positive utility, and under which circumstances it produces negative utility. This paper analyzes the causes of the countermeasures taken by the countries of the common law system and France and Germany to cross shareholding among companies, and draws on the beneficial points of foreign legislation to perfect the legal system of our country. The text is divided into two parts: the first chapter mainly introduces the basic theory of cross-shareholding and its origin and development, the second chapter mainly analyzes the utility of cross-shareholding: positive utility and negative utility. The third chapter examines the legislation on cross-shareholding in the main countries of the Anglo-American law system and the continental law system, and the 4th chapter discusses the reality of cross-shareholding in the legislation and judicial practice of our country. This paper explains the institutional environment of cross-shareholding in China, and analyzes the relevant cases. Chapter 5th expounds the legal countermeasures to construct and perfect the cross-shareholding system in China, referring to the legislative experience of foreign countries and combining with the national conditions of our country. This paper puts forward some legal suggestions on how to construct and perfect the cross-shareholding of Chinese companies, and makes its own efforts for the construction of socialist legal system in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D922.291.91

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 李曉春;;交叉持股下公司治理的困境及出路[J];暨南學(xué)報(哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)版);2013年04期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 余芳;上市公司交叉持股的反壟斷規(guī)制[D];浙江財經(jīng)學(xué)院;2012年

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本文編號：1523205